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arXiv:1502.05081 · Springer proceedings in mathematics & statistics

Modality, Potentiality, and Contradiction in Quantum Mechanics

Christian DE RONDE

Published Jan 1, 2015• 9 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/978-81-322-2719-9_11

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Orthodox quantum mechanics includes the principle that an observable of a system possesses a well-defined value if and only if the presence of that value in the system is certain to be confirmed on measurement. Modal interpretations reject the controversial ‘only if’ half of this principle to secure definite outcomes for quantum measurements that leave the apparatus entangled with the object it has measured. However, using a result that turns on the construction of a Kochen–Specker contradiction, I argue that modal interpretations cannot deliver a metaphysically tenable conception of properties in quantum mechanics unless they also abandon the less controversial ‘if’ half of the orthodox principle.
Many world interpretations (MWIs) of quantum mechanics avoid the measurement problem by considering every term in the quantum superposition as actual. A seemingly opposed solution is proposed by modal interpretations (MIs) which state that quantum mechanics does not provide an account of what “actually is the case,” but rather deals with what “might be the case,” i.e., with possibilities. In this paper we provide an algebraic framework which allows us to analyze in depth the modal aspects of MWI. Within our general formal scheme we also provide a formal comparison between MWI and MI, in particular, we provide a formal understanding of why—even though both interpretations share the same formal structure—MI fall pray of Kochen–Specker-type contradictions while MWI escape them.