Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:2603.29028 · International Journal of Theoretical Physics

The Contextual Modal Logic of a Wigner's Friend Generalization

Felipe Dilho Alves, João Carlos Alves Barata

math-phquant-phSubmitted Mar 30, 2026• Announced Apr 1, 2026• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Quantum mechanics has been subject to logical scrutiny since its inception. The behavior of quantum systems, which are fundamentally dissimilar from classical systems, often appears to point to a logical inconsistency in quantum mechanics, allegedly leading to contradictions in the prediction of experimental measurements--though such contradictions have never materialized. A recent example of this type of inquiry into the logical well-posedness of quantum mechanics is the Frauchiger-Renner Gedankenexperiment, which purports to demonstrate that quantum mechanics is logically inconsistent. In this article, we show that by considering the property of contextuality in quantum systems--as predicted by the Kochen-Specker theorem--the supposed contradiction proposed by Frauchiger and Renner becomes logically inaccessible.

Comments
18 pages, 2 figures

Related papers

A contextually objective approach to the extended Wigner's friend thought experiment

Maxime Federico, Philippe Grangier

We present a discussion of the extended Wigner's friend thought experiment proposed by Frauchiger and Renner in [1]. We show by using various arguments, including textbook quantum mechanics and the ontological approach of Contexts, Systems, Modalities (CSM), that no contradiction arises if one admits that agents must agree on what is considered as a system and what is not. In such a contextually objective approach of quantum mechanics, the apparent contradiction is automatically removed. We also discuss why this mutual agreement between agents is already implicit in the standard formulations of quantum mechanics, and why removing it leads to inconsistencies.

arXiv:2301.03016•Jan 8, 2023•0 citations

Quantum erasing the memory of Wigner's friend

Cyril Elouard, Philippe Lewalle, Sreenath K. Manikandan +3 more

The Wigner's friend paradox concerns one of the most puzzling problems of quantum mechanics: the consistent description of multiple nested observers. Recently, a variation of Wigner's gedankenexperiment, introduced by Frauchiger and Renner, has lead to new debates about the self-consistency of quantum mechanics. At the core of the paradox lies the description of an observer and the object it measures as a closed system obeying the Schrödinger equation. We revisit this assumption to derive a necessary condition on a quantum system to behave as an observer. We then propose a simple single-photon interferometric setup implementing Frauchiger and Renner's scenario, and use the derived condition to shed a new light on the assumptions leading to their paradox. From our description, we argue that the three apparently incompatible properties used to question the consistency of quantum mechanics correspond to two logically distinct contexts: either one assumes that Wigner has full control over his friends' lab, or conversely that some parts of the labs remain unaffected by Wigner's subsequent measurements. The first context may be seen as the quantum erasure of the memory of Wigner's friend. We further show these properties are associated with observables which do not commute, and therefore cannot take well-defined values simultaneously. Consequently, the three contradictory properties never hold simultaneously.

arXiv:2009.09905•Quantum•Jul 8, 2021•13 citations

Inadequacy of Modal Logic in Quantum Settings

Nuriya Nurgalieva, Lídia del Rio

We test the principles of classical modal logic in fully quantum settings. Modal logic models our reasoning in multi-agent problems, and allows us to solve puzzles like the muddy children paradox. The Frauchiger-Renner thought experiment highlighted fundamental problems in applying classical reasoning when quantum agents are involved; we take it as a guiding example to test the axioms of classical modal logic. In doing so, we find a problem in the original formulation of the Frauchiger-Renner theorem: a missing assumption about unitarity of evolution is necessary to derive a contradiction and prove the theorem. Adding this assumption clarifies how different interpretations of quantum theory fit in, i.e., which properties they violate. Finally, we show how most of the axioms of classical modal logic break down in quantum settings, and attempt to generalize them. Namely, we introduce constructions of trust and context, which highlight the importance of an exact structure of trust relations between agents. We propose a challenge to the community: to find conditions for the validity of trust relations, strong enough to exorcise the paradox and weak enough to still recover classical logic.

Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science•Jan 31, 2019•9 citations

How Quantum Mechanics can consistently describe the use of itself

Dustin Lazarovici, Mario Hubert

We discuss the no-go theorem of Frauchiger and Renner based on an "extended Wigner's friend" thought experiment which is supposed to show that any single-world interpretation of quantum mechanics leads to inconsistent predictions if it is applicable on all scales. We show that no such inconsistency occurs if one considers a complete description of the physical situation. We then discuss implications of the thought experiment that have not been clearly addressed in the original paper, including a tension between relativity and nonlocal effects predicted by quantum mechanics. Our discussion applies in particular to Bohmian mechanics.

Scientific Reports•Jan 24, 2019•113 citations

Inadequacy of Modal Logic in Quantum Settings

Nuriya Nurgalieva, Lídia del Rio

We test the principles of classical modal logic in fully quantum settings. Modal logic models our reasoning in multi-agent problems, and allows us to solve puzzles like the muddy children paradox. The Frauchiger-Renner thought experiment highlighted fundamental problems in applying classical reasoning when quantum agents are involved; we take it as a guiding example to test the axioms of classical modal logic. In doing so, we find a problem in the original formulation of the Frauchiger-Renner theorem: a missing assumption about unitarity of evolution is necessary to derive a contradiction and prove the theorem. Adding this assumption clarifies how different interpretations of quantum theory fit in, i.e., which properties they violate. Finally, we show how most of the axioms of classical modal logic break down in quantum settings, and attempt to generalize them. Namely, we introduce constructions of trust and context, which highlight the importance of an exact structure of trust relations between agents. We propose a challenge to the community: to find conditions for the validity of trust relations, strong enough to exorcise the paradox and weak enough to still recover classical logic.

arXiv:1804.01106•Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science•Jan 31, 2019•27 citations

Resolving Schrodinger's Cat, Wigner's Friend and Frauchiger-Renner's Paradoxes at a Single-Quantum Level

Nakka Gurappa

Schrodinger's cat and Wigner's friend paradoxes are analyzed using the `wave-particle non-dualistic interpretation of quantum mechanics at a single-quantum level' and are shown to be non-paradoxes within the quantum formalism. Then, the extended version of Wigner's friend thought experiment, proposed in a recent article titled, ``Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself '', Nature Communications {\bf 9}, 3711 (2018), by Frauchiger and Renner (FR) is considered. In quantum mechanics, it's well-known that, statistically observing a large number of identical quantum systems at some particular quantum state, which results in Born's probability, and merely inferring its presence in the same quantum state with the same probability yield distinct physical phenomena. If this fact is not taken care while interpreting any experimental outcomes, then FR type paradoxes pop up. ``What an astonishingly self-consistent the Quantum Theory is!' - is explicitly worked out in the case of FR gedankenexperiment. The present work shows the importance of single-quantum phenomenon for the non-paradoxical interpretation of statistically observed experimental outcomes.

•Sep 1, 2019•0 citations
Quantum mechanics has been subject to logical scrutiny since its inception. The behavior of quantum systems, which are fundamentally dissimilar from classical systems, often appears to point to a logical inconsistency in quantum mechanics, allegedly leading to contradictions in the prediction of experimental measurements--though such contradictions have never materialized. A recent example of this type of inquiry into the logical well-posedness of quantum mechanics is the Frauchiger-Renner Gedankenexperiment, which purports to demonstrate that quantum mechanics is logically inconsistent. In this article, we show that by considering the property of contextuality in quantum systems--as predicted by the Kochen-Specker theorem--the supposed contradiction proposed by Frauchiger and Renner becomes logically inaccessible.
We present a discussion of the extended Wigner's friend thought experiment proposed by Frauchiger and Renner in [1]. We show by using various arguments, including textbook quantum mechanics and the ontological approach of Contexts, Systems, Modalities (CSM), that no contradiction arises if one admits that agents must agree on what is considered as a system and what is not. In such a contextually objective approach of quantum mechanics, the apparent contradiction is automatically removed. We also discuss why this mutual agreement between agents is already implicit in the standard formulations of quantum mechanics, and why removing it leads to inconsistencies.
The Wigner's friend paradox concerns one of the most puzzling problems of quantum mechanics: the consistent description of multiple nested observers. Recently, a variation of Wigner's gedankenexperiment, introduced by Frauchiger and Renner, has lead to new debates about the self-consistency of quantum mechanics. At the core of the paradox lies the description of an observer and the object it measures as a closed system obeying the Schrödinger equation. We revisit this assumption to derive a necessary condition on a quantum system to behave as an observer. We then propose a simple single-photon interferometric setup implementing Frauchiger and Renner's scenario, and use the derived condition to shed a new light on the assumptions leading to their paradox. From our description, we argue that the three apparently incompatible properties used to question the consistency of quantum mechanics correspond to two logically distinct contexts: either one assumes that Wigner has full control over his friends' lab, or conversely that some parts of the labs remain unaffected by Wigner's subsequent measurements. The first context may be seen as the quantum erasure of the memory of Wigner's friend. We further show these properties are associated with observables which do not commute, and therefore cannot take well-defined values simultaneously. Consequently, the three contradictory properties never hold simultaneously.
We test the principles of classical modal logic in fully quantum settings. Modal logic models our reasoning in multi-agent problems, and allows us to solve puzzles like the muddy children paradox. The Frauchiger-Renner thought experiment highlighted fundamental problems in applying classical reasoning when quantum agents are involved; we take it as a guiding example to test the axioms of classical modal logic. In doing so, we find a problem in the original formulation of the Frauchiger-Renner theorem: a missing assumption about unitarity of evolution is necessary to derive a contradiction and prove the theorem. Adding this assumption clarifies how different interpretations of quantum theory fit in, i.e., which properties they violate. Finally, we show how most of the axioms of classical modal logic break down in quantum settings, and attempt to generalize them. Namely, we introduce constructions of trust and context, which highlight the importance of an exact structure of trust relations between agents. We propose a challenge to the community: to find conditions for the validity of trust relations, strong enough to exorcise the paradox and weak enough to still recover classical logic.
We discuss the no-go theorem of Frauchiger and Renner based on an "extended Wigner's friend" thought experiment which is supposed to show that any single-world interpretation of quantum mechanics leads to inconsistent predictions if it is applicable on all scales. We show that no such inconsistency occurs if one considers a complete description of the physical situation. We then discuss implications of the thought experiment that have not been clearly addressed in the original paper, including a tension between relativity and nonlocal effects predicted by quantum mechanics. Our discussion applies in particular to Bohmian mechanics.
We test the principles of classical modal logic in fully quantum settings. Modal logic models our reasoning in multi-agent problems, and allows us to solve puzzles like the muddy children paradox. The Frauchiger-Renner thought experiment highlighted fundamental problems in applying classical reasoning when quantum agents are involved; we take it as a guiding example to test the axioms of classical modal logic. In doing so, we find a problem in the original formulation of the Frauchiger-Renner theorem: a missing assumption about unitarity of evolution is necessary to derive a contradiction and prove the theorem. Adding this assumption clarifies how different interpretations of quantum theory fit in, i.e., which properties they violate. Finally, we show how most of the axioms of classical modal logic break down in quantum settings, and attempt to generalize them. Namely, we introduce constructions of trust and context, which highlight the importance of an exact structure of trust relations between agents. We propose a challenge to the community: to find conditions for the validity of trust relations, strong enough to exorcise the paradox and weak enough to still recover classical logic.
Schrodinger's cat and Wigner's friend paradoxes are analyzed using the `wave-particle non-dualistic interpretation of quantum mechanics at a single-quantum level' and are shown to be non-paradoxes within the quantum formalism. Then, the extended version of Wigner's friend thought experiment, proposed in a recent article titled, ``Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself '', Nature Communications {\bf 9}, 3711 (2018), by Frauchiger and Renner (FR) is considered. In quantum mechanics, it's well-known that, statistically observing a large number of identical quantum systems at some particular quantum state, which results in Born's probability, and merely inferring its presence in the same quantum state with the same probability yield distinct physical phenomena. If this fact is not taken care while interpreting any experimental outcomes, then FR type paradoxes pop up. ``What an astonishingly self-consistent the Quantum Theory is!' - is explicitly worked out in the case of FR gedankenexperiment. The present work shows the importance of single-quantum phenomenon for the non-paradoxical interpretation of statistically observed experimental outcomes.