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Scientific Reports

How Quantum Mechanics can consistently describe the use of itself

Dustin Lazarovici, Mario Hubert

Published Jan 24, 2019• 113 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We discuss the no-go theorem of Frauchiger and Renner based on an "extended Wigner's friend" thought experiment which is supposed to show that any single-world interpretation of quantum mechanics leads to inconsistent predictions if it is applicable on all scales. We show that no such inconsistency occurs if one considers a complete description of the physical situation. We then discuss implications of the thought experiment that have not been clearly addressed in the original paper, including a tension between relativity and nonlocal effects predicted by quantum mechanics. Our discussion applies in particular to Bohmian mechanics.

DOI
10.1038/s41598-018-37535-1

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We discuss the no-go theorem of Frauchiger and Renner based on an "extended Wigner's friend" thought experiment which is supposed to show that any single-world interpretation of quantum mechanics leads to inconsistent predictions if it is applicable on all scales. We show that no such inconsistency occurs if one considers a complete description of the physical situation. We then discuss implications of the thought experiment that have not been clearly addressed in the original paper, including a tension between relativity and nonlocal effects predicted by quantum mechanics. Our discussion applies in particular to Bohmian mechanics.
We discuss the no-go theorem of Frauchiger and Renner based on an extended Wigner's friend thought experiment which is supposed to show that any single-world interpretation of quantum mechanics leads to inconsistent predictions if it is applicable on all scales. We show that no such inconsistency occurs if one considers a complete description of the physical situation. We then discuss implications of the thought experiment that have not been clearly addressed in the original paper, including a tension between relativity and nonlocal effects predicted by quantum mechanics. Our discussion applies in particular to Bohmian mechanics.
The concept of an isolated system, and Frauchiger and Renner's extended `Wigner's friend' scenario are discussed. It is argued that: (i) it is questionable whether the approximation of the isolated system is valid when measurement-like processes are involved; (ii) one may infer, from Frauchiger and Renner's thought-experiment, and similar thought-experiments, that any interpretation of quantum theory involving *subjective collapse* fails; (iii) this does not distinguish single-world from many-world (relative-state) interpretations of quantum theory; (iv) reasoning from observations has to take into account the possible quantum-erasure of those observations if it is to be valid reasoning; (v) a single-world interpretation is valid if certain kinds of outcome are not quantum-erased in the future.
Frauchiger and Renner have recently claimed to prove that “Single-world interpretations of quantum theory cannot be self-consistent”. This is contradicted by a construction due to Bell, inspired by Bohmian mechanics, which shows that any quantum system can be modelled in such a way that there is only one “world” at any time, but the predictions of quantum theory are reproduced. This Bell–Bohmian theory is applied to the experiment proposed by Frauchiger and Renner, and their argument is critically examined. It is concluded that it is their version of “standard quantum theory”, incorporating state vector collapse upon measurement, that is not self-consistent.
Recent extended formulations of the Wigner's friend thought experiment throw the measurement problem of quantum mechanics into sharper relief. Here I respond to an invitation by Renner to provide a consistent and concrete set of rules for quantum mechanics which can avoid the apparent paradox formulated by Frauchiger and Renner [Nat. Comm. 9, 3711 (2018)]. I propose a slight addition to standard textbook quantum mechanics, in the form of two rules, which avoids the paradox. The first specifies when a given quantum dynamics can be interpreted as a measurement. Potentially any dynamics can, but doing so depends on the context of other performed operations. The second requires that a joint context be used to determine whether several different dynamical evolutions can all be interpreted as measurement. The paradox is then avoided because not every participant in the Frauchiger-Renner thought experiment regards the stated dynamical descriptions of the experiment as measurements.
Abstract The Wigner’s friend type of thought experiments manifest the conceptual challenge on how different observers can have consistent descriptions of a quantum measurement event. In this paper, we analyze the extended version of Wigner’s friend thought experiment (Frauchiger and Renner in Nat Commun 3711:9, 2018) in detail and show that the reasoning process from each agent that leads to the no-go theorem is inconsistent. The inconsistency is with respect to the requirement that an agent should make use of updated information instead of outdated information. We then apply the relational formulation of quantum measurement to resolve the inconsistent descriptions from different agents. In relational formulation of quantum mechanics, a measurement is described relative to an observer. Synchronization of measurement result is a necessary requirement to achieve consistent descriptions of a quantum system from different observers. Thought experiments, including EPR, Wigner’s Friend and it extended version, confirm the necessity of relational formulation of quantum measurement when applying quantum mechanics to composite system with entangled but space-like separated subsystems.
We present a discussion of the extended Wigner's friend thought experiment proposed by Frauchiger and Renner in [1]. We show by using various arguments, including textbook quantum mechanics and the ontological approach of Contexts, Systems, Modalities (CSM), that no contradiction arises if one admits that agents must agree on what is considered as a system and what is not. In such a contextually objective approach of quantum mechanics, the apparent contradiction is automatically removed. We also discuss why this mutual agreement between agents is already implicit in the standard formulations of quantum mechanics, and why removing it leads to inconsistencies.