At a fundamental level, the classical picture of the world is dead, and has been dead now for almost a century. Pinning down exactly which quantum phenomena are responsible for this has proved to be a tricky and controversial question, but a lot of progress has been made in the past few decades. We now have a range of precise statements showing that whatever the ultimate laws of nature are, they cannot be classical. In this article, we review results on the fundamental phenomena of quantum theory that cannot be understood in classical terms. We proceed by first granting quite a broad notion of classicality, describe a range of quantum phenomena (such as randomness, discreteness, the indistinguishability of states, measurement-uncertainty, measurement-disturbance, complementarity, non-commutativity, interference, the no-cloning theorem and the collapse of the wave-packet) that do fall under its liberal scope, and then finally describe some aspects of quantum physics that can never admit a classical understanding – the intrinsically quantum mechanical aspects of nature. The most famous of these is Bell’s theorem, but we also review two more recent results in this area. Firstly, Hardy’s theorem shows that even a finite-dimensional quantum system must contain an infinite amount of information, and secondly, the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph theorem shows that the wave function must be an objective property of an individual quantum system. Besides being of foundational interest, results of this sort now find surprising practical applications in areas such as quantum information science and the simulation of quantum systems.
At a fundamental level, the classical picture of the world is dead, and has been dead now for almost a century. Pinning down exactly which quantum phenomena are responsible for this has proved to be a tricky and controversial question, but a lot of progress has been made in the past few decades. We now have a range of precise statements showing that whatever the ultimate laws of nature are, they cannot be classical. In this article, we review results on the fundamental phenomena of quantum theory that cannot be understood in classical terms. We proceed by first granting quite a broad notion of classicality, describe a range of quantum phenomena (such as randomness, discreteness, the indistinguishability of states, measurement-uncertainty, measurement-disturbance, complementarity, non-commutativity, interference, the no-cloning theorem and the collapse of the wave-packet) that do fall under its liberal scope, and then finally describe some aspects of quantum physics that can never admit a classical understanding – the intrinsically quantum mechanical aspects of nature. The most famous of these is Bell’s theorem, but we also review two more recent results in this area. Firstly, Hardy’s theorem shows that even a finite-dimensional quantum system must contain an infinite amount of information, and secondly, the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph theorem shows that the wave function must be an objective property of an individual quantum system. Besides being of foundational interest, results of this sort now find surprising practical applications in areas such as quantum information science and the simulation of quantum systems.
Quantum mechanics allows a remarkably accurate description of nature and powerful predictive capabilities. The analyses of quantum systems and their interpretation lead to many surprises, for example, the ability to detect the characteristics of an object without ever touching it in any way, via "interaction-free measurement," or the teleportation of an atomic state over large distances. The results can become downright bizarre. Quantum mechanics is a subtle subject that usually involves complicated mathematics -- calculus, partial differential equations, etc., for complete understanding. Most texts for general audiences avoid all mathematics. The result is that the reader misses almost all deep understanding of the subject, much of which can be probed with just high-school level algebra and trigonometry. Thus, readers with that level of mathematics can learn so much more about this fundamental science. The book starts with a discussion of the basic physics of waves (an appendix reviews some necessary classical physics concepts) and then introduces the fundamentals of quantum mechanics, including the wave function, superposition, entanglement, Bell's theorem, etc., and applications to Bose--Einstein condensation, quantum computing, and much more. The interpretation of the mathematics of quantum mechanics into a world view has been the subject of much controversy. The result is a variety of conflicting interpretations, from the famous Copenhagen view of Bohr to the multiple universes of Everett. We discuss these interpretations in the chapter "What is a wave function?" and include some very recent advances, for example, quantum Bayesianism, and measurements of the reality of the wave function.
This paper presents evidence from the fields of cognitive science and quantum information theory suggesting quantum theory to be the dominant fundamental logic in the natural world, in direct challenge to the long-held assumption that quantum logic only need be considered ‘in the quantum realm.' A summary of the evolution of quantum logic and quantum theory is presented, along with an overview for the necessity of incomplete quantum knowledge, and some representative aspects of quantum logic. A case can be made that classical logic and theory is a subset of quantum logic and theory, given that elements of quantum physics exist that can never admit classical understanding, including: Bell's theorem, Hardy's theorem, and the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem. Support can be found for the primacy of quantum logic in the natural world in the cognitive sciences, where recent research studies recognize quantum logic in studies of: the subconscious, decisions involving unknown interconnected variables, memory, and question sequencing.
Some recent experiments claim to show that any model in which a quantum state represents mere information about an underlying physical reality of the system must make predictions which contradict those of quantum theory. The present work undertakes to investigate the issue of reality, treading a more fundamental route from the Hamilton-Jacobi equation of classical mechanics to the Schrodinger equation of quantum mechanics. Motivation for this is a similar approach from the eikonal equation in geometrical optics to the wave equation in electromagnetic theory. We rewrite the classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation as a wave equation and seek to generalise de Broglie's wave particle duality by demanding that both particle and light waves have the freedom of being described by any square-integrable function. This generalisation, which allows superposition also for matter wave functions, helps us to obtain the Schrodinger equation, whose solution can be seen to be as much objective as the classical mechanics wave function. Several other equations which one writes in quantum mechanics, including the eigenvalue equations for observables, series expansion of energy states in terms of eigenstates of observables other than energy, etc., can be written in the classical case too. Absence of any collapse of the wave function, entanglement, etc. in the classical realm have their origin in the nonlinearity of the classical wave equation. These considerations indicate that many of the puzzles in quantum mechanics are present also in classical mechanics in a dormant form, which fact shall help to demystify quantum mechanics to a great extent.
Towards the end of 2011, Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph derived a theorem that aimed to show that the quantum state must be ontic (a state of reality) in a broad class of realist approaches to quantum theory. This result attracted a lot of attention and controversy. The aim of this review article is to review the background to the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem, to provide a clear presentation of the theorem itself, and to review related work that has appeared since the publication of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph paper. In particular, this review: Explains what it means for the quantum state to be ontic or epistemic (a state of knowledge); Reviews arguments for and against an ontic interpretation of the quantum state as they existed prior to the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem; Explains why proving the reality of the quantum state is a very strong constraint on realist theories in that it would imply many of the known no-go theorems, such as Bell's Theorem and the need for an exponentially large ontic state space; Provides a comprehensive presentation of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem itself, along with subsequent improvements and criticisms of its assumptions; Reviews two other arguments for the reality of the quantum state: the first due to Hardy and the second due to Colbeck and Renner, and explains why their assumptions are less compelling than those of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem; Reviews subsequent work aimed at ruling out stronger notions of what it means for the quantum state to be epistemic and points out open questions in this area. The overall aim is not only to provide the background needed for the novice in this area to understand the current status, but also to discuss often overlooked subtleties that should be of interest to the experts. Quanta 2014; 3: 67–155.
AbstractStandard quantum mechanics is formulated using complex Hilbert spaces, real-valued probabilities, continuous one-parameter dynamics, and—where particles and fields have continuous degrees of freedom —function spaces constructed over continua such as R3 . In that precise mathematical sense, the real and complex continua are deeply embedded in the standard theory. It does not follow, however, that experiments have demonstrated the physical existence of an uncountable set of exact real numbers, still less that individual quantum systems physically “store” infinitely many digits. Every preparation, control operation, and measurement has finite precision, and many quantum predictions can be approximated arbitrarily closely using countable or finite descriptions.This distinction matters because the continuum is sometimes blamed for quantum theory's conceptual strangeness. That diagnosis is mostly unsupported. Superposition, interference, uncertainty, noncommutativity, entanglement, contextuality, Bell-inequality violations, and no-cloning already occur in finite-dimensional quantum systems and do not depend in any straightforward way on continuous position space or arbitrary irrational numbers. Restricting a Hilbert space to rational, algebraic, computable, or finitely specified states therefore does not automatically produce classical physics. Indeed, dense restricted subsets can approximate ordinary quantum predictions to arbitrary finite accuracy, although turning such a subset into a complete physical theory requires much more: closed dynamics, a composition rule, a measurement theory, robustness, and new empirical predictions.A particularly developed contemporary alternative is Tim Palmer's Invariant Set Theory and its recent formulation as Rational Quantum Mechanics (RaQM). RaQM is not accurately described as simply “quantum mechanics with irrational numbers banned.” It restricts the bases in which states are physically defined through number-theoretic rationality conditions, represents admissible states using finite bit strings, invokes a fractal invariant state space equipped with a non-Euclidean, p-adic-like metric, and violates Bell measurement independence at the level of exact counterfactual settings. Palmer's 2026 proposal further predicts a finite qubit-information capacity and an eventual saturation of quantum computational advantage. These are genuine, potentially falsifiable proposals, but they remain speculative and have not displaced standard quantum theory.The strongest conclusion is consequently asymmetric. There is a serious foundational question about whether the continuum is an ontological feature of nature or an extraordinarily efficient mathematical completion. Finite precision prevents existing experiments from proving a literal continuum. But there is presently little evidence that continuum mathematics causes quantum phenomena. Any discrete replacement must still account quantitatively for interference, contextuality, Bell correlations, entanglement, spectroscopy, atomic structure, and quantum computation. Discreteness can change quantum physics only when it is accompanied by additional physical postulates—and those postulates, rather than discreteness alone, must ultimately face experiment.
In this review, we discuss a relation between quantum communication complexity and a long-standing debate in quantum foundation concerning the interpretation of the quantum state. Is the quantum state a physical element of reality as originally interpreted by Schrödinger? Or is it an abstract mathematical object containing statistical information about the outcome of measurements as interpreted by Born? Although these questions sound philosophical and pointless, they can be made precise in the framework of what we call classical theories of quantum processes, which are a reword of quantum phenomena in the language of classical probability theory. In 2012, Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph (PBR) proved, under an assumption of preparation independence, a theorem supporting the original interpretation of Schrödinger in the classical framework. The PBR theorem has attracted considerable interest revitalizing the debate and motivating other proofs with alternative hypotheses. Recently, we showed that these questions are related to a practical problem in quantum communication complexity, namely, quantifying the minimal amount of classical communication required in the classical simulation of a two-party quantum communication process. In particular, we argued that the statement of the PBR theorem can be proved if the classical communication cost of simulating the communication of n qubits grows more than exponentially in n. Our argument is based on an assumption that we call probability equipartition property. This property is somehow weaker than the preparation independence property used in the PBR theorem, as the former can be justified by the latter and the asymptotic equipartition property of independent stochastic sources. The probability equipartition property is a general and natural hypothesis that can be assumed even if the preparation independence hypothesis is dropped. In this review, we further develop our argument into the form of a theorem.