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arXiv:1407.1924 · Physical Review A

Mismatched-basis statistics enable quantum key distribution with uncharacterized qubit sources

Zhen−Qiang Yin, Chi‐Hang Fred Fung, Xiongfeng Ma, Chun-Mei Zhang, Hong-Wei Li, Wei Chen, Shuang Wang, Guang‐Can Guo, Zheng‐Fu Han

Published Nov 14, 2014• 60 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In the postprocessing of quantum key distribution, the raw key bits from the mismatched-basis measurements, where two parties use different bases, are normally discarded. Here, we propose a postprocessing method that exploits measurement statistics from mismatched-basis cases and prove that incorporating these statistics enables uncharacterized qubit sources to be used in the measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution protocol and the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol, which is otherwise impossible.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.90.052319

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In the postprocessing of quantum key distribution, the raw key bits from the mismatched-basis measurements, where two parties use different bases, are normally discarded. Here, we propose a postprocessing method that exploits measurement statistics from mismatched-basis cases and prove that incorporating these statistics enables uncharacterized qubit sources to be used in the measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution protocol and the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol, which is otherwise impossible.
The source flaw associated with the basis vector in the reference-frame-independent measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (RFI-MDI-QKD) has not been systematically studied. As a result, it is often assumed that bit error is equal to phase error, which is not theoretically rigorous. Here, we propose a postprocessing method to estimate the phase error rate from the discarded mismatched-basis statistics, where the qubit source does not need to be characterized in detail. The source flaw in the basis vector of the RFI-MDI-QKD protocol can thus be corrected using this method. The numerical simulation results clearly demonstrate that the RFI-MDI-QKD protocol with uncharacterized sources is also insensitive to the misalignment of the reference frame.
In conventional quantum key distribution protocols, the secure key is normally extracted from the measurement outcomes of the system. Here, a different approach is proposed, where the secure key is extracted from the measurement bases, rather than outcomes. Compared to the original Bennett-Brassard-1984 protocol, the proposed protocol involves no hardware change but modifications in data postprocessing. We show that this protocol is more robust against detector efficiency attacks and photon-number-splitting attacks when practical detectors and photon sources are used.
We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol for an arbitrary source whose averaged states are basis independent, a condition that is automatically satisfied if the source is suitably designed. The proof is based on the observation that, to an adversary, the key extraction process is equivalent to a measurement in the sigma(x) basis performed on a pure sigma(z)-basis eigenstate. The dependence of the achievable key length on the bit error rate is the same as that established by Shor and Preskill [Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000)]] for a perfect source, indicating that the defects in the source are efficiently detected by the protocol.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI QKD) is an efficient way to share secrets using untrusted measurement devices. However, the assumption on the characterizations of encoding states is still necessary in this promising protocol, which may lead to unnecessary complexity and potential loopholes in realistic implementations. Here, by using the mismatched-basis statistics, we present the first proof-of-principle experiment of MDI QKD with uncharacterized encoding sources. In this demonstration, the encoded states are only required to be constrained in a two-dimensional Hilbert space, and two distant parties (Alice and Bob) are resistant to state preparation flaws even if they have no idea about the detailed information of their encoding states. The positive final secure key rates of our system exhibit the feasibility of this novel protocol, and demonstrate its value for the application of secure communication with uncharacterized devices.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols aim at allowing two parties to generate a secret shared key. While many QKD protocols have been proven unconditionally secure in theory, practical security analyses of experimental QKD implementations typically do not take into account all possible loopholes, and practical devices are still not fully characterized for obtaining tight and realistic key rates. We present a simple method of computing secure key rates for any practical implementation of discrete-variable QKD (which can also apply to measurement-device-independent QKD), initially in the single-qubit lossless regime, and we rigorously prove its unconditional security against any possible attack. We hope our method becomes one of the standard tools used for analysing, benchmarking, and standardizing all practical realizations of QKD.