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arXiv:1410.5260

Quantum key distribution with key extracted from basis information

Xiongfeng Ma

Published Oct 20, 2014• 2 citations
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Abstract

In conventional quantum key distribution protocols, the secure key is normally extracted from the measurement outcomes of the system. Here, a different approach is proposed, where the secure key is extracted from the measurement bases, rather than outcomes. Compared to the original Bennett-Brassard-1984 protocol, the proposed protocol involves no hardware change but modifications in data postprocessing. We show that this protocol is more robust against detector efficiency attacks and photon-number-splitting attacks when practical detectors and photon sources are used.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1410.5260

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In conventional quantum key distribution protocols, the secure key is normally extracted from the measurement outcomes of the system. Here, a different approach is proposed, where the secure key is extracted from the measurement bases, rather than outcomes. Compared to the original Bennett-Brassard-1984 protocol, the proposed protocol involves no hardware change but modifications in data postprocessing. We show that this protocol is more robust against detector efficiency attacks and photon-number-splitting attacks when practical detectors and photon sources are used.
In the postprocessing of quantum key distribution, the raw key bits from the mismatched-basis measurements, where two parties use different bases, are normally discarded. Here, we propose a postprocessing method that exploits measurement statistics from mismatched-basis cases and prove that incorporating these statistics enables uncharacterized qubit sources to be used in the measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution protocol and the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol, which is otherwise impossible.
This paper prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in the case where the source and detector are under the limited control of an adversary. This proof applies when both the source and the detector have small basis-dependent flaws, as is typical in practical implementations of the protocol. The estimation of the key generation rate in some special cases: sources that emit weak coherent states, detectors with basis-dependent efficiency, and misaligned sources and detectors.
In this paper I present a protocol for quantum cryptography which is secure against attacks on individual signals. It is based on the Bennett-Brassard protocol of 1984. The security proof is complete as far as the use of single photons as signal states is concerned. Emphasis is placed on the practicability of the resulting protocol. For each run of the quantum key distribution the security statement gives the probability of a successful key generation and the probability for an eavesdropper's knowledge, measured as change in Shannon entropy, to be below a specified maximal value.
We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol for an arbitrary source whose averaged states are basis independent, a condition that is automatically satisfied if the source is suitably designed. The proof is based on the observation that, to an adversary, the key extraction process is equivalent to a measurement in the sigma(x) basis performed on a pure sigma(z)-basis eigenstate. The dependence of the achievable key length on the bit error rate is the same as that established by Shor and Preskill [Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000)]] for a perfect source, indicating that the defects in the source are efficiently detected by the protocol.
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers information‐theoretic security by leveraging the principles of quantum mechanics. This means the security is independent of all future advances in algorithm or computational power. However, due to the non‐availability of single‐photon sources, most traditional QKD protocols are vulnerable to various attacks, such as photon number‐splitting (PNS) attacks. Also, the imperfections in the measuring devices open a loophole for side channels that an eavesdropper may exploit to launch attacks such as large‐pulse attacks. As a result, this compromises the security of transmitted information. To address these challenges, the authors present a QKD protocol that is secure against both large‐pulse attacks and PNS attacks at zero‐error, in which the eavesdropper does not introduce any error, but still, the legitimate users of the system cannot distil a secure key. A notable feature of the proposed protocol is that it promotes greater robustness against both attacks than the Bennett‐Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol or the Scarani‐Acin‐Ribordy‐Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocol.