The issue of ontology in quantum mechanics, or equivalently the issue of the reality of the wave function is critically examined within standard quantum theory. It is argued that though no strict ontology is possible within quantum theory, ingenious measurement schemes may still make the notion of a FAPP ontology (ontology for all practical purposes) meaningful and useful. Quanta 2014; 3: 47–66.
The issue of ontology in quantum mechanics, or equivalently the issue of the reality of the wave function is critically examined within standard quantum theory. It is argued that though no strict ontology is possible within quantum theory, ingenious measurement schemes may still make the notion of a FAPP ontology (ontology for all practical purposes) meaningful and useful. Quanta 2014; 3: 47–66.
What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. We argue that: • Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; • Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously; • All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.
The meaning of the wave function has been a hot topic of debate since the early days of quantum mechanics. Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in this long-standing question. Is the wave function ontic, directly representing a state of reality, or epistemic, merely representing a state of (incomplete) knowledge, or something else? If the wave function is not ontic, then what, if any, is the underlying state of reality? If the wave function is indeed ontic, then exactly what physical state does it represent? In this book, I aim to make sense of the wave function in quantum mechanics and find the ontological content of the theory. The book can be divided into three parts. The first part addresses the question of the nature of the wave function (Chapters 1-5). After giving a comprehensive and critical review of the competing views of the wave function, I present a new argument for the ontic view in terms of protective measurements. In addition, I also analyze the origin of the wave function by deriving the free Schroedinger equation. The second part analyzes the ontological meaning of the wave function (Chapters 6, 7). I propose a new ontological interpretation of the wave function in terms of random discontinuous motion of particles, and give two main arguments supporting this interpretation. The third part investigates whether the suggested quantum ontology is complete in accounting for our definite experience and whether it needs to be revised in the relativistic domain (Chapters 8, 9).
This paper makes a case for ontology, the study of existence, to be explicitly and formally incorporated into foundational physics in general and the wave function collapse of quantum mechanics in particular. It introduces a purely ontological distinction between two modes of physical existence-actualizable and actual- into the conventional mathematical representation of the wave function collapse, and examines the implications of doing so, arguing that this may lead to insights that permit one to understand seemingly mysterious aspects of the wave function collapse, such as ’Schro ̈dinger’s cat paradox’, as well as how quantum theory in general and Einstein’s general theory of relativity relate to one another. A specific empirical prediction is given, which if confirmed, may move ontology outside the exclusive purview of philosophy.
This paper makes a case for ontology, the study of existence, to be explicitly and formally incorporated into foundational physics in general and the wave function collapse of quantum mechanics in particular. It introduces a purely ontological distinction between two modes of physical existence-actualizable and actual- into the conventional mathematical representation of the wave function collapse, and examines the implications of doing so, arguing that this may lead to insights that permit one to understand seemingly mysterious aspects of the wave function collapse, such as 'Schrodinger's cat paradox', as well as how quantum theory in general and Einstein's general theory of relativity relate to one another. A specific empirical prediction is given, which if con rmed, may move ontology outside the exclusive purview of philosophy.
What is the meaning of the wave-function? After almost 100 years since the inception of quantum mechanics, is it still possible to say something new on what the wave-function is supposed to be? Yes, it is. And Shan Gao managed to do so with his newest book. Here we learn what contemporary physicists and philosophers think about the wave-function; we learn about the de Broglie-Bohm theory, the GRW collapse theory, the gravity-induced collapse theory by Roger Penrose, and the famous PBR theorem; we learn about Schrödinger's original idea that the wave-function represents charge densities; we learn about the notorious measurement problem and its consequences; we learn about the challenges to find a consistent relativistic quantum theory; and we learn, of course, Gao's own suggestion for the status of the wave-function. Above all, Gao shows us the significance of protective measurements for our search of the ontology of quantum mechanics. Still not widely recognized among physicists and philosophers, protective measurements let us look deeper into quantum mechanics. For Gao this is the main tool to settle the issue on the ontological status of the wave-function: the wave-function is real because one can measure it
This note presents a concise and non-polemical comparison of several major interpretations of quantum mechanics, with a particular emphasis on the distinction between FAPP-solutions ("For All Practical Purposes'') versus ontological solutions to the measurement problem. Building on this distinction, we argue that the Contexts-Systems-Modalities (CSM) framework, supplemented by the operator-algebraic description of macroscopic contexts, provides a conceptually complete, non-FAPP ontology that naturally incorporates irreversibility and the physical structure of measurement devices. This approach differs significantly from other ontological interpretations such as Bohmian mechanics, spontaneous collapse, or many-worlds, and highlights the major role of contextual quantization in shaping quantum theory.