What is the meaning of the wave-function? After almost 100 years since the inception of quantum mechanics, is it still possible to say something new on what the wave-function is supposed to be? Yes, it is. And Shan Gao managed to do so with his newest book. Here we learn what contemporary physicists and philosophers think about the wave-function; we learn about the de Broglie-Bohm theory, the GRW collapse theory, the gravity-induced collapse theory by Roger Penrose, and the famous PBR theorem; we learn about Schrödinger's original idea that the wave-function represents charge densities; we learn about the notorious measurement problem and its consequences; we learn about the challenges to find a consistent relativistic quantum theory; and we learn, of course, Gao's own suggestion for the status of the wave-function. Above all, Gao shows us the significance of protective measurements for our search of the ontology of quantum mechanics. Still not widely recognized among physicists and philosophers, protective measurements let us look deeper into quantum mechanics. For Gao this is the main tool to settle the issue on the ontological status of the wave-function: the wave-function is real because one can measure it
What is the meaning of the wave-function? After almost 100 years since the inception of quantum mechanics, is it still possible to say something new on what the wave-function is supposed to be? Yes, it is. And Shan Gao managed to do so with his newest book. Here we learn what contemporary physicists and philosophers think about the wave-function; we learn about the de Broglie-Bohm theory, the GRW collapse theory, the gravity-induced collapse theory by Roger Penrose, and the famous PBR theorem; we learn about Schrödinger's original idea that the wave-function represents charge densities; we learn about the notorious measurement problem and its consequences; we learn about the challenges to find a consistent relativistic quantum theory; and we learn, of course, Gao's own suggestion for the status of the wave-function. Above all, Gao shows us the significance of protective measurements for our search of the ontology of quantum mechanics. Still not widely recognized among physicists and philosophers, protective measurements let us look deeper into quantum mechanics. For Gao this is the main tool to settle the issue on the ontological status of the wave-function: the wave-function is real because one can measure it
The meaning of the wave function has been a hot topic of debate since the early days of quantum mechanics. Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in this long-standing question. Is the wave function ontic, directly representing a state of reality, or epistemic, merely representing a state of (incomplete) knowledge, or something else? If the wave function is not ontic, then what, if any, is the underlying state of reality? If the wave function is indeed ontic, then exactly what physical state does it represent? In this book, I aim to make sense of the wave function in quantum mechanics and find the ontological content of the theory. The book can be divided into three parts. The first part addresses the question of the nature of the wave function (Chapters 1-5). After giving a comprehensive and critical review of the competing views of the wave function, I present a new argument for the ontic view in terms of protective measurements. In addition, I also analyze the origin of the wave function by deriving the free Schroedinger equation. The second part analyzes the ontological meaning of the wave function (Chapters 6, 7). I propose a new ontological interpretation of the wave function in terms of random discontinuous motion of particles, and give two main arguments supporting this interpretation. The third part investigates whether the suggested quantum ontology is complete in accounting for our definite experience and whether it needs to be revised in the relativistic domain (Chapters 8, 9).
The wave function gives not the density of stuff, but gives rather (on squaring its modulus) the density of probability. Probability of what, exactly? Not of the electron being there, but of the electron being found there, if its position is ‘measured’. Why this aversion to ‘being’ and insistence on ‘finding’? The founding fathers were unable to form a clear picture of things on the remote atomic scale . John S. Bell (1990) Introduction The physical meaning of the wave function is an important interpretative problem of quantum mechanics. Notwithstanding nearly ninety years of development of the theory, it is still an unsolved issue. During recent years, more and more research has been done on the ontological status and meaning of the wave function (see, e.g. Monton, 2002; Lewis, 2004; Gao, 2011a, 2011b; Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph, 2012; Ney and Albert, 2013). In particular, Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph (2012) demonstrated that under certain non-trivial assumptions such as the preparation independence assumption, the wave function of a quantum system is a representation of the physical state of the system. This poses a further question, namely whether the reality of the wave function can be argued without resorting to non-trivial assumptions. Moreover, a harder problem is to determine the ontological meaning of the wave function, which is still a hot topic of debate in the realistic alternatives to quantum mechanics such as the de Broglie–Bohm theory or Bohmian mechanics (Belot, 2012). In this chapter, we will first give a clearer argument for the reality of the wave function in terms of protective measurements, which does not depend on non-trivial assumptions and can also overcome existing objections. Next, based on an analysis of the mass and charge properties of a quantum system, we will propose a new ontological interpretation of the wave function. According to this interpretation, the wave function of an N -body system represents the state of ergodic motion of N particles.
Introduction One of the crucial issues about protective measurements is the extent to which they provide (additional) grounds for some realist understanding of the wave function. This issue is notoriously subject to debate, which is not the aim of this chapter. Rather, this chapter aims at clarifying the further issue of the ontological picture corresponding to the realist understanding of the wave function possibly suggested by protective measurements. Oddly enough, proponents of a realist reading of protective measurements remain in general rather vague about ontology (see for instance Aharonov et al. (1993, 4624), who assimilate the wave function to an “extended object” without further details, or the brief and somewhat unprecise discussion in Dickson (1995, 135–136) of the interpretation of the wave function within Bohmian mechanics (BM) and within the theoretical framework elaborated by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (GRW); in this volume, Gao does propose a more elaborated ontological model for quantum mechanics (QM) based on protective measurements). Despite this vagueness (or maybe because of it), it seems that the most obvious ontological intuition resulting from protective measurements points towards some form of straightforward realism about the wave function understood in the sense of a real, physical field: indeed, protective measurements are claimed to allow measuring expectation values of observables on a single quantum system, thereby providing the possibility of reconstructing (i.e. “measuring” in some sense) the wave function of a single quantum system. Aharonov et al. (1996, 125) clearly express this intuition: “We can observe the expectations values of operators, and we can observe the density and the current of the Schrödinger wave. We can “see” in some sense the Schrödinger wave. This leads us to believe that it has physical reality.” Therefore, this kind of intuition seems in line with a realist conception of the wave function, according to which the wave function is considered as a real substantial, material in some sense) entity on its own (this view is often called “wave function realism”).
Is the wave-function a physical reality traveling through our apparatus? Is it a real wave, or it is only a mathematical tool for calculating probabilities of results of measurements? Different interpretations of the quantum mechanics (QM) assume different answers to this question. It is shown in this article that the assumption that the wave-function is a real wave entails a contradiction with the predictions of the QM, when the special relativity is invoked. Therefore, this text concentrates on interpretations that conjecture that the reality that moves in our apparatuses is particles, and they move under the constraints of the wave-function. The de Broglie-Bohm interpretation, which matches this picture, assumes that the particle travels along a continuous trajectory. However, the idea of continuous trajectories was proved to lead to a contradiction with the quantum predictions. Therefore this interpretation is not considered here. S. Gao conjectured that the particle is in a permanent random and discontinuous motion (RDM). As it jumps all the time from place to place, the total set of occupied positions at a certain time is given by the absolute square of the wave-function. As motivation for his idea, Gao argued that if a charged particle were simultaneously in two or more locations at the same time, the copies of the particle would repel one another, destroying the wave-function. It is proved here that the quantum formalism renders this motivation wrong. Although refuting this motivation, the RDM interpretation is examined here. A couple of problems of this interpretation are examined and it is proved that they don’t lead to any observable contradictions with the QM predictions, except one problem which seems to have no solution. In all, it appears that none of the wide-spread interpretations of the QM is free of contradictions.
Introduction It is not exaggeration to claim that one of the major divides in the foundations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics derives from the way physicists and philosophers understand the status of the wave function. On the instrumentalist side of the camp, the wave function is regarded as a mere instrument to calculate probabilities that have been established by previous measurement outcomes. On the other “realistic” camp, the wave function is regarded as a new physical entity or a physical field of some sort. While both sides agree about the existence of quantum “particles” (the so-called theoretical entities), and therefore reject the radical agnosticism about them preached by van Fraassen (1980), the various “realistic” (and consequently, instrumentalist) philosophies of quantum mechanics are typically formulated in different, logically independent ways, so their implications need to be further investigated. For instance, on the one hand it seems plausible to claim that a realistic stance about the wave function is not the only way to defend “realism” about quantum theory. One can support a “flash” or a “density-of-stuff ” ontology (two variants of GRW), or an ontology of particles with well-defined positions (as in Bohmian mechanics), as primitive ontologies for observer-independent formulations of quantum mechanics (Allori, Goldstein, Tumulka and Zanghí, 2008). “Primitive ontologies”, as here are understood, are not only a fundamental ground for other ontological posits, but also entail a commitment to something concretely existing in spacetime (see also Allori, 2013). On the other hand, however, it is still debated whether such primitive ontologies can be autonomous from some form of realism about the wave function (Albert, 1996). In order to discuss this problem, we begin with a preliminary clarification of the meaning of “realism” and “instrumentalism” in physics, which are often subject to ideological and abstract discussions that often have little to do with the practice of physics (Section 9.2).
At the heart of quantum mechanics lies the wave function, a powerful but mysterious mathematical object which has been a hot topic of debate from its earliest stages. Covering much of the recent debate and providing a comprehensive and critical review of competing approaches, this ambitious text provides new, decisive proof of the reality of the wave function. Aiming to make sense of the wave function in quantum mechanics and to find the ontological content of the theory, this book explores new ontological interpretations of the wave function in terms of random discontinuous motion of particles. Finally, the book investigates whether the suggested quantum ontology is complete in solving the measurement problem and if it should be revised in the relativistic domain. A timely addition to the literature on the foundations of quantum mechanics, this book is of value to students and researchers with an interest in the philosophy of physics.