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arXiv:2601.20488

Revisiting the Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics: From FAPP Solutions to Contextual Ontologies

Philippe Grangier

quant-phphysics.hist-phSubmitted Jan 28, 2026• Announced Jan 29, 2026• 0 citations
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Abstract

This note presents a concise and non-polemical comparison of several major interpretations of quantum mechanics, with a particular emphasis on the distinction between FAPP-solutions ("For All Practical Purposes'') versus ontological solutions to the measurement problem. Building on this distinction, we argue that the Contexts-Systems-Modalities (CSM) framework, supplemented by the operator-algebraic description of macroscopic contexts, provides a conceptually complete, non-FAPP ontology that naturally incorporates irreversibility and the physical structure of measurement devices. This approach differs significantly from other ontological interpretations such as Bohmian mechanics, spontaneous collapse, or many-worlds, and highlights the major role of contextual quantization in shaping quantum theory.

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This note presents a concise and non-polemical comparison of several major interpretations of quantum mechanics, with a particular emphasis on the distinction between FAPP-solutions ("For All Practical Purposes'') versus ontological solutions to the measurement problem. Building on this distinction, we argue that the Contexts-Systems-Modalities (CSM) framework, supplemented by the operator-algebraic description of macroscopic contexts, provides a conceptually complete, non-FAPP ontology that naturally incorporates irreversibility and the physical structure of measurement devices. This approach differs significantly from other ontological interpretations such as Bohmian mechanics, spontaneous collapse, or many-worlds, and highlights the major role of contextual quantization in shaping quantum theory.
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ABSTRACT This essay aims at reviewing one of the major difficulties affecting the standard formulation of quantum mechanics, that is, the well‐known measurement problem. As it will be explained, the latter originates as a consequence of the quantum theory's postulates. Referring to this, we analyze in particular the conceptual issues implied by the projection (or collapse) rule. After having presented the measurement problem, we then illustrate three possible solutions offered by major interpretations of/alternatives to quantum theory: Bohmian mechanics, Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber theories, and the many‐worlds interpretation. As the reader will see, these theoretical frameworks solve this issue by virtue of their unambiguous ontologies and consistent dynamical laws. Finally, a synopsis of the open debates and future perspectives concerning the measurement problem in relativistic contexts concludes the paper.
In this paper we discuss the so called "quantum omelette" created by Bohr and Heisenberg through the mix of (ontic) objective accounts and (epistemic) subjective ones within the analysis of Quantum Mechanics (QM). We will begin by addressing the difficult relation between ontology and epistemology within the history of both physics and philosophy. We will then argue that the present "quantum omelette" is being presently cooked in two opposite directions: the first scrambling ontological problems with epistemological solutions and the second scrambling epistemic approaches with ontological questions. A good example of the former is a new type of argumentation strategy attempting to justify the use of decoherence, namely, the "For All Practical Purposes" (shortly known as FAPP) type of justification. We will argue that 'FAPP-type solutions' remain, at best, epistemological answers which not only escape the ontological questions at stake -regarding the quantum to classical limit- but also turn the original problem completely meaningless. The latter omelette can be witnessed in relation to some criticisms raised against the epistemic Bayesian approach to QM (shortly known as QBism). We will argue that QBists have produced a consistent scheme that might allow us to begin to unscramble -at least part of- the "quantum omelette". In this respect, we will show why the epistemic QBist approach is safe from several (ontological) criticisms it has recently received (see [42, 47, 48]). We end our paper with a discussion about the importance of ontological approaches within foundations of QM.
A new quantum ontology of quantum mechanics has been proposed recently. This ontology is based on impossible to realize measurements which need to be performed repeatedly on the same single physical system or on the same pair of physical systems. We agree that quantum mechanics is a contextual theory and that the experimental contexts have to be a part of any description of quantum phenomena but in our opinion this new ontology is neither convincing nor useful. In particular the authors claim that their ontology explains the peaceful coexistence between quantum mechanics and relativity in spin polarization correlation experiments. We show that, contrary to their claim, the authors are unable to explain why strong correlations, between the outcomes of distant local measurements, do exist and why they preserve a condition of parameter independence (non-signaling). Strangely enough the authors ignore that these strong but imperfect correlations can be explained in a local and causal way using statistical contextual interpretation of quantum mechanics what was demonstrated in several articles.
We begin by discussing ``What exists?'', i.e. ontology, in Classical Physics which provided a description of physical phenomena at the macroscopic level. The microworld however necessitates a introduction of Quantum ideas for its understanding. It is almost certain that the world is quantum mechanical at both microscopic as well as at macroscopic level. The problem of ontology of a Quantum world is a difficult one. It also depends on which interpretation is used. We first discuss some interpretations in which Quantum Mechanics does not provide a complete framework but has to be supplemented by extra ingredients e.g. (i) Copenhagen group of interpretations associated with the names of Niels Bohr, Heisenberg, von-Neumann, and (ii) de-Broglie-Bohm interpretations. We then look at some interpretations in which Quantum mechanics is supposed to provide the entire framework such as (i) Everett-deWitt many world, (ii) quantum histories interpretations. We conclude with some remarks on the rigidity of the formalism of quantum mechanics, which is sharp contrast to it's ontological fluidity.