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arXiv:1208.4123

The completeness of quantum theory for predicting measurement outcomes

Roger Colbeck, Renato Renner

Published Aug 20, 2012• 19 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The predictions that quantum theory makes about the outcomes of measurements are generally probabilistic. This has raised the question whether quantum theory can be considered complete, or whether there could exist alternative theories that provide improved predictions. Here we review recent work that considers arbitrary alternative theories, constrained only by the requirement that they are compatible with a notion of "free choice" (defined with respect to a natural causal order). It is shown that quantum theory is "maximally informative", i.e., there is no other compatible theory that gives improved predictions. Furthermore, any alternative maximally informative theory is necessarily equivalent to quantum theory. This means that the state a system has in such a theory is in one-to-one correspondence with its quantum-mechanical state (the wave function). In this sense, quantum theory is complete.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1208.4123

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The predictions that quantum theory makes about the outcomes of measurements are generally probabilistic. This has raised the question whether quantum theory can be considered complete, or whether there could exist alternative theories that provide improved predictions. Here we review recent work that considers arbitrary alternative theories, constrained only by the requirement that they are compatible with a notion of "free choice" (defined with respect to a natural causal order). It is shown that quantum theory is "maximally informative", i.e., there is no other compatible theory that gives improved predictions. Furthermore, any alternative maximally informative theory is necessarily equivalent to quantum theory. This means that the state a system has in such a theory is in one-to-one correspondence with its quantum-mechanical state (the wave function). In this sense, quantum theory is complete.
According to quantum theory, measurements generate random outcomes, in stark contrast with classical mechanics. This raises the question of whether there could exist an extension of the theory that removes this indeterminism, as suspected by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen. Although this has been shown to be impossible, existing results do not imply that the current theory is maximally informative. Here we ask the more general question of whether any improved predictions can be achieved by any extension of quantum theory. Under the assumption that measurements can be chosen freely, we answer this question in the negative: no extension of quantum theory can give more information about the outcomes of future measurements than quantum theory itself. Our result has significance for the foundations of quantum mechanics, as well as applications to tasks that exploit the inherent randomness in quantum theory, such as quantum cryptography. Quantum-mechanical predictions are generally probabilistic. Here, assuming freely chosen measurements, it is shown that enhanced predictions are not possible and, thus, randomness is inherent in quantum theory: a result that has applications in fields such as quantum cryptography.
It was argued [1] that there can be no extension of quantum mechanics with improved predictive power on a measurement freely chosen, independently of any event that is not in its future light cone. The assumption of measurement choice was criticized [2] to be too strong to be physically necessary and extensions of quantum mechanics were shown [3] to be possible under a more relaxed measurement assumption. Here I point out an error in the criticism and observe that the actual mistake of the no-go theorem lies in an unwarranted assumption implicitly made in the proof of [1]. Hence, quantum mechanics is guaranteed to have the maximal predictive power only in situations of complete certainty and complete uncertainty about measurement outcomes. I then show that the measurement assumption can be further relaxed without affecting the conclusion on the predictive power of quantum mechanics versus alternative theories. I further study the optimal predicative improvement over quantum mechanics of local spin measurements on a pair of entangled qubits by any alternative theory and conjecture a strict upper bound.
The question of whether the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanical predictions can be alleviated by supplementing the wave function with additional information has received a lot of attention during the past century. A few specific models have been suggested and subsequently falsified. Here we give a more general answer to this question: We provide experimental data that, as well as falsifying these models, cannot be explained within any alternative theory that could predict the outcomes of measurements on maximally entangled particles with significantly higher probability than quantum theory. Our conclusion is based on the assumptions that all measurement settings have been chosen freely (within a causal structure compatible with relativity theory), and that the presence of the detection loophole did not affect the measurement outcomes.
We introduce a logic modelling some aspects of the behaviour of the measurement process, in such a way that no direct mention of quantum states is made, thus avoiding the problems associated to this rather evasive notion. We then study some properties of the models of this logic, and deduce some characteristics that any model (and hence, any formulation of quantum mechanics compatible with its predictions and relying on a notion of measurement) should verify. The main results we obtain are that in the case of a Hilbert space of dimension at least 3, using a strengthening of the Kochen-Specker theorem, we show that no model can lead to the certain prediction of more than one atomic outcome. Moreover, if the Hilbert space is finite dimensional, then we are able to precisely describe the structure of the predictions of any model of our logic. In particular, we show that all the models of our logic do exactly make the same predictions regarding whether a given sequence of outcomes is possible or not, so that quantum mechanics can be considered complete as long as the possibility of outcomes is considered.
When we are presented with apparently bizarre properties of microsystems governed by quantum mechanics (as in our discussion of the double-slit experiment in the previous chapter), we naturally ask whether it might be possible to find another theory, or at least another story to go with the equations, that would make more sense to us. We might seek a theory and a view of fundamental physical processes that would accord more with our classically based, everyday common sense. This typically takes the form of the question of the possibility of the existence of a more detailed description of atomic processes than that afforded by the wave function (that is, by the Copenhagen interpretation of the previous chapter). In this chapter we discuss some of the central interpretive problems of the Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics. Then, in the next two chapters, we look at the severe, general restrictions that are placed on any such completion of quantum mechanics and at one particular extension of quantum mechanics. First, though, we begin here with the struggle that ensued over the status of causality in quantum theory. THE COMPLETENESS OF QUANTUM MECHANICS Although the Heisenberg uncertainty principle (Section 20.4) and the lack of absolute predictive power are an inherent feature of quantum mechanics, there have been attempts to preserve an in principle completely deterministic structure for physics. Even classically, in a macroscopic sample of gas there are so many molecules that it would be hopeless, as a practical matter, to predict the future locations of all these molecules from Newton's laws of motion.
Recently, it has been argued that quantum mechanics is a complete theory, and that different quantum states do necessarily correspond to different elements of reality, under the assumptions that quantum mechanics is correct and that measurement settings can be freely chosen. In this work, we prove that this result is a consequence of an unnecessarily strong mathematical expression of the free choice assumption, which embodies more conditions than explicitly stated. The issues of the completeness of quantum mechanics, and of the interpretation of the state vector, are by no means resolved. Taking this perspective, we describe how the recently introduced class of crypto-nonlocal hidden variables theories can be used to characterize the maximal possible departure from quantum mechanics, when the system consists of a pair of qubits.