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arXiv:1501.04127 · Physica Scripta

Is a description deeper than the quantum one possible?

G. C. Ghirardi, Raffaele Romano

Published Dec 1, 2014• 5 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Recently, it has been argued that quantum mechanics is a complete theory, and that different quantum states do necessarily correspond to different elements of reality, under the assumptions that quantum mechanics is correct and that measurement settings can be freely chosen. In this work, we prove that this result is a consequence of an unnecessarily strong mathematical expression of the free choice assumption, which embodies more conditions than explicitly stated. The issues of the completeness of quantum mechanics, and of the interpretation of the state vector, are by no means resolved. Taking this perspective, we describe how the recently introduced class of crypto-nonlocal hidden variables theories can be used to characterize the maximal possible departure from quantum mechanics, when the system consists of a pair of qubits.

DOI
10.1088/0031-8949/2014/t163/014028

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Recently, it has been argued that quantum mechanics is a complete theory, and that different quantum states do necessarily correspond to different elements of reality, under the assumptions that quantum mechanics is correct and that measurement settings can be freely chosen. In this work, we prove that this result is a consequence of an unnecessarily strong mathematical expression of the free choice assumption, which embodies more conditions than explicitly stated. The issues of the completeness of quantum mechanics, and of the interpretation of the state vector, are by no means resolved. Taking this perspective, we describe how the recently introduced class of crypto-nonlocal hidden variables theories can be used to characterize the maximal possible departure from quantum mechanics, when the system consists of a pair of qubits.
Recently, it has been argued that quantum mechanics is complete, and that quantum states vectors are necessarily in one-to-one correspondence with the elements of reality, under the assumptions that quantum theory is correct and that measurement settings can be freely chosen. In this work, we argue that the adopted form of the free choice assumption is stronger than needed. In our perspective, there are hidden assumptions underlying these results, which limit their range of validity. We support our argument by a model for the bipartite two-level system, reproducing quantum mechanics, in which the free will assumption is respected, and different quantum states can be connected to the same state of reality.
It was argued [1] that there can be no extension of quantum mechanics with improved predictive power on a measurement freely chosen, independently of any event that is not in its future light cone. The assumption of measurement choice was criticized [2] to be too strong to be physically necessary and extensions of quantum mechanics were shown [3] to be possible under a more relaxed measurement assumption. Here I point out an error in the criticism and observe that the actual mistake of the no-go theorem lies in an unwarranted assumption implicitly made in the proof of [1]. Hence, quantum mechanics is guaranteed to have the maximal predictive power only in situations of complete certainty and complete uncertainty about measurement outcomes. I then show that the measurement assumption can be further relaxed without affecting the conclusion on the predictive power of quantum mechanics versus alternative theories. I further study the optimal predicative improvement over quantum mechanics of local spin measurements on a pair of entangled qubits by any alternative theory and conjecture a strict upper bound.
In this thesis a recent claim by Roger Colbeck and Renato Renner is reviewed [18]. This claim concerns the completeness of quantum mechanics. Colbeck and Renner state that no theory can be constructed that is compatible with quantum mechanics, and gives more detailed predictions through supplemental variables added to the description of the state of a system. Their only assumption is that measurement settings can be choosen freely. We will argue that their result is for the most part valid and interesting, but the freedom assumption is not so innocent as it is presented, and parts of the result need to be clarified. Therefore, we will present a reformulation of the result. In our formulation the result is a no-go theorem for hidden variable theories satisfying Parameter Independence. This is a generalization of Bell’s theorem. Performed in the period 01-11-2012 14-08-2012
When investigating various interpretations of quantum mechanics one notices that each interpretation contains an element which escapes a complete and full description. This element is always associated with the stochasticity of the individual event in the quantum measurement process. It appears that the implications of this limit to any description of the world has not been sufficiently appreciated with notable exceptions of, for example, Heisenberg, Pauli and Wheeler. If we assume that a deeper foundation of quantum mechanics is possible, the question arises which features such a philosophical foundation might have. It is suggested that the objective randomness of the individual quantum event is a necessity of a description of the world in view of the significant influence the observer in quantum mechanics has. It is also suggested that the austerity of the Copenhagen interpretation should serve as a guiding principle in a search for deeper understanding. In recent years, a significant increase of interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics can be observed. This increase is certainly related to the immense progress made during the last two decades in experiments with individual quantum systems. This technological progress has made it possible to really perform more and more of the famous gedanken experiments which were so important in the early days of the theory. Not only did these experiments confirm the theory in every detail, they also opened up avenues for new experimental directions which might even lead some day to new technology. While such applications are certainly still far away, areas like quantum cryptography[1], quantum computation[2] and interaction-free measurement[3], just to name a few examples, certainly deserve the attention they receive. All this activity has also drawn more attention to the problems of understanding and interpreting quantum mechanics. It seems that there, a definitive consensus has not yet been reached. As witnesses quote authorities like Feynman as saying[4]: I think can safely say that nobody today understands quantum mechanics, whereby he apparently included himself, or like Roger Penrose[5], who describes his opinion remarking that while the theory agrees incredibly well with experiment and while it is of profound mathematical beauty, it makes absolutely no sense. Why did even physicists who have contributed so significantly to quantum theory Feynman was even rewarded the Nobel Prize for one of its mathematical formulations choose such emphatic and strong formulations? Why is it that the average physicist hears very little about such problems during his/her education? Why is the comprehension of the theory very often focused on formalism while questions that probe for deeper meaning are usually not tackled? To take a closer look at the situation, let us turn to a brief analysis of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We note that there are at least two levels of interpreting a formalism, a physical theory. The first, basic, level supplies the rules that determine which element of the formalism corresponds to which measurable quantity or to which observable fact in a concrete experimental situation. Theses rules are a large, mostly not explicated but only implicit, set of instructions. These instructions concern the manner of working with the statements of the theory in order to obtain predictions for future experiments or events, and they concern the instructions on how to proceed in experiment in order to demonstrate or test a theoretical
Introduction The historical development of scientific progress teaches us that every theory that was established and broadly accepted at a certain time was later inevitably replaced by a deeper and more fundamental theory of which the old one remains a special case. One celebrated example is Newtonian (classical) mechanics, which was superseded by quantum mechanics at the beginning of the last century. It is natural to ask whether in a similar manner there could be logically consistent theories that are more generic than quantum theory itself. It could then turn out that quantum mechanics is an effective description of such a theory, only valid within our current restricted domain of experience. At present, quantum theory has been tested against very specific alternative theories that, both mathematically and in their concepts, are distinctly different. Instances of such alternative theories are non-contextual hidden-variable theories [1], local hidden-variable theories [2], crypto-nonlocal hidden-variable theories [3, 4], or some nonlinear variants of the Schrödinger equation [5–8]. Currently, many groups are working on improving experimental conditions to be able to test alternative theories based on various collapse models [9–14]. The common trait of all these proposals is to suppress one or the other counterintuitive feature of quantum mechanics and thus keep some of the basic notions of a classical worldview intact. Specifically, hidden-variable models would allow us to preassign definite values to outcomes of all measurements; collapse models are mechanisms for restraining superpositions between macroscopically distinct states, and nonlinear extensions of the Schrödinger equation may admit more localized solutions for wave-packet dynamics, thereby resembling localized classical particles.