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arXiv:1302.1635

Comment on "Is a system's wave function in one-to-one correspondence with its elements of reality?" [arXiv:1111.6597]

G. C. Ghirardi, Romano, Raffaele

Published Feb 7, 2013• 5 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Recently, it has been argued [arXiv:1111.6597, arXiv:1005.5173] that different quantum states do necessarily correspond to different elements of reality, under the assumption that quantum mechanics is correct and that measurement settings can be freely chosen. Here, we prove that additional assumptions are necessary to derive this results, which then has not general validity.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1302.1635

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Recently, it has been argued [arXiv:1111.6597, arXiv:1005.5173] that different quantum states do necessarily correspond to different elements of reality, under the assumption that quantum mechanics is correct and that measurement settings can be freely chosen. Here, we prove that additional assumptions are necessary to derive this results, which then has not general validity.
Recently, it has been argued that quantum mechanics is complete, and that quantum states vectors are necessarily in one-to-one correspondence with the elements of reality, under the assumptions that quantum theory is correct and that measurement settings can be freely chosen. In this work, we argue that the adopted form of the free choice assumption is stronger than needed. In our perspective, there are hidden assumptions underlying these results, which limit their range of validity. We support our argument by a model for the bipartite two-level system, reproducing quantum mechanics, in which the free will assumption is respected, and different quantum states can be connected to the same state of reality.
Although quantum mechanics is one of our most successful physical theories, there has been a long-standing debate about the interpretation of the wave function--the central object of the theory. Two prominent views are that (i) it corresponds to an element of reality, i.e., an objective attribute that exists before measurement, and (ii) it is a subjective state of knowledge about some underlying reality. A recent result [M. F. Pusey, J. Barrett, and T. Rudolph, arXiv:1111.3328] has placed the subjective interpretation into doubt, showing that it would contradict certain physically plausible assumptions, in particular, that multiple systems can be prepared such that their elements of reality are uncorrelated. Here we show, based only on the assumption that measurement settings can be chosen freely, that a system's wave function is in one-to-one correspondence with its elements of reality. This also eliminates the possibility that it can be interpreted subjectively.
This thesis explores the relations between the wave functions that describe the state of a system in quantum mechanics and the hypothetical »ontic« states a system can have in reality. What quantum mechanics precisely implies about the nature of reality has always been a disputed point; among the contended features of quantum mechanics as a physical theory are completeness and locality. Recent results indicate that if some assumptions are made about reality being local, then quantum-mechanical and ontic states must be in one-to-one correspondence.
In a complete theory there is an element corresponding to each element of reality. A sufficient condition for the reality of a physical quantity is the possibility of predicting it with certainty, without disturbing the system. In quantum mechanics in the case of two physical quantities described by non-commuting operators, the knowledge of one precludes the knowledge of the other. Then either (1) the description of reality given by the wave function in quantum mechanics is not complete or (2) these two quantities cannot have simultaneous reality. Consideration of the problem of making predictions concerning a system on the basis of measurements made on another system that had previously interacted with it leads to the result that if (1) is false then (2) is also false. One is thus led to conclude that the description of reality as given by a wave function is not complete.
Perhaps the quantum state represents information about reality, and not reality directly. Wave function collapse is then possibly no more mysterious than a Bayesian update of a probability distribution given new data. We consider models for quantum systems with measurement outcomes determined by an underlying physical state of the system but where several quantum states are consistent with a single underlying state-i.e., probability distributions for distinct quantum states overlap. Significantly, we demonstrate by example that additional assumptions are always necessary to rule out such a model.
A recent proof [H. P. Stapp, Am. J. Phys. 65, 300 (1997)], formulated in the symbolic language of modal logic, claims to show that contemporary quantum theory, viewed as a set of rules that allow us to calculate statistical predictions among certain kinds of observations, cannot be imbedded in any rational framework that conforms to the principles that (1) the experimenters' choices of which experiments they will perform can be considered to be free choices, (2) outcomes of measurements are unique, and (3) the free choices just mentioned have no backward-in-time effects of any kind. This claim is similar to Bell's theorem, but much stronger, because no reality assumption alien to quantum philosophy is used. The paper being commented on [W. Unruh, Phys. Rev. A 59, 126 (1999)] argues that some such reality assumption has been ``smuggled'' in. That argument is examined here and shown, I believe, to be defective.