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arXiv:1207.6906

How statistical are quantum states?

O. J. E. Maroney

Published Jul 30, 2012• 33 citations
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Abstract

A novel no-go theorem is presented which sets a bound upon the extent to which 'Ψ-epistemic' interpretations of quantum theory are able to explain the overlap between non-orthogonal quantum states in terms of an experimenter's ignorance of an underlying state of reality. The theorem applies to any Hilbert space of dimension greater than two. In the limit of large Hilbert spaces, no more than half of the overlap between quantum states can be accounted for. Unlike other recent no-go theorems no additional assumptions, such as forms of locality, invasiveness, or non-contextuality, are required.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1207.6906

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A novel no-go theorem is presented which sets a bound upon the extent to which 'Ψ-epistemic' interpretations of quantum theory are able to explain the overlap between non-orthogonal quantum states in terms of an experimenter's ignorance of an underlying state of reality. The theorem applies to any Hilbert space of dimension greater than two. In the limit of large Hilbert spaces, no more than half of the overlap between quantum states can be accounted for. Unlike other recent no-go theorems no additional assumptions, such as forms of locality, invasiveness, or non-contextuality, are required.
We study the extent to which ψ-epistemic models for quantum measurement statistics-models where the quantum state does not have a real, ontic status-can explain the indistinguishability of nonorthogonal quantum states. This is done by comparing the overlap of any two quantum states with the overlap of the corresponding classical probability distributions over ontic states in a ψ-epistemic model. It is shown that in Hilbert spaces of dimension d≥4, the ratio between the classical and quantum overlaps in any ψ-epistemic model must be arbitrarily small for certain nonorthogonal states, suggesting that such models are arbitrarily bad at explaining the indistinguishability of quantum states. For dimensions d=3 and 4, we construct explicit states and measurements that can be used experimentally to put stringent bounds on the ratio of classical-to-quantum overlaps in ψ-epistemic models, allowing one in particular to rule out maximally ψ-epistemic models more efficiently than previously proposed.
According to a recent no-go theorem [M. Pusey, J. Barrett and T. Rudolph, Nat. Phys. 8, 475 (2012)], models in which quantum states correspond to probability distributions over the values of some underlying physical variables must have the following feature: the distributions corresponding to distinct quantum states do not overlap. In such a model, it cannot coherently be maintained that the quantum state merely encodes information about underlying physical variables. The theorem, however, considers only models in which the physical variables corresponding to independently prepared systems are independent, and this has been used to challenge the conclusions of that work. Here we consider models that are defined for a single quantum system of dimension d, such that the independence condition does not arise, and derive an upper bound on the extent to which the probability distributions can overlap. In particular, models in which the quantum overlap between pure states is equal to the classical overlap between the corresponding probability distributions cannot reproduce the quantum predictions in any dimension d ≥ 3. Thus any ontological model for quantum theory must postulate some extra principle, such as a limitation on the measurability of physical variables, to explain the indistinguishability of quantum states. Moreover, we show that as d→∞, the ratio of classical and quantum overlaps goes to zero for a class of states. The result is noise tolerant, and an experiment is motivated to distinguish the class of models ruled out from quantum theory.
The status of the quantum state is perhaps the most controversial issue in the foundations of quantum theory. Is it an epistemic state (state of knowledge) or an ontic state (state of reality)? In realist models of quantum theory, the epistemic view asserts that nonorthogonal quantum states correspond to overlapping probability measures over the true ontic states. This naturally accounts for a large number of otherwise puzzling quantum phenomena. For example, the indistinguishability of nonorthogonal states is explained by the fact that the ontic state sometimes lies in the overlap region, in which case there is nothing in reality that could distinguish the two states. For this to work, the amount of overlap of the probability measures should be comparable to the indistinguishability of the quantum states. In this Letter, I exhibit a family of states for which the ratio of these two quantities must be ≤2de-cd in Hilbert spaces of dimension d that are divisible by 4. This implies that, for large Hilbert space dimension, the epistemic explanation of indistinguishability becomes implausible at an exponential rate as the Hilbert space dimension increases.
Formalizing an old desire of Einstein, “ψ-epistemic theories” try to reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics, while viewing quantum states as ordinary probability distributions over underlying objects called “ontic states.” Regardless of one's philosophical views about such theories, the question arises of whether one can cleanly rule them out by proving no-go theorems analogous to the Bell inequality. In the 1960s, Kochen and Specker (who first studied these theories) constructed an elegant ψ-epistemic theory for Hilbert space dimension d = 2, but also showed that any deterministic ψ-epistemic theory must be “measurement contextual” in dimensions 3 and higher. Last year, the topic attracted renewed attention, when Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph (PBR) showed that any ψ-epistemic theory must “behave badly under tensor product.” In this paper, we prove that even without the Kochen-Specker or PBR assumptions, there are no ψ-epistemic theories in dimensions d ≥ 3 that satisfy two reasonable conditions: (1) symmetry under unitary transformations and (2) “maximum nontriviality” (meaning that the probability distributions corresponding to any two nonorthogonal states overlap). This no-go theorem holds if the ontic space is either the set of quantum states or the set of unitaries. The proof of this result, in the general case, uses some measure theory and differential geometry. On the other hand, we also show the surprising result that without the symmetry restriction, one can construct maximally nontrivial ψ-epistemic theories in every finite dimension d.
Formalizing an old desire of Einstein, ``$\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic theories'' try to reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics, while viewing quantum states as ordinary probability distributions over underlying objects called ``ontic states.'' Regardless of one's philosophical views about such theories, the question arises of whether one can cleanly rule them out by proving no-go theorems analogous to the Bell inequality. In the 1960s, Kochen and Specker (who first studied these theories) constructed an elegant $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic theory for Hilbert space dimension d=2d=2d=2, but also showed that any deterministic $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic theory must be ``measurement contextual'' in dimensions 3 and higher. Last year, the topic attracted renewed attention, when Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph (PBR) showed that any $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic theory must ``behave badly under tensor product.'' In this paper, we prove that even without the Kochen-Specker or PBR assumptions, there are no $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic theories in dimensions $d\ensuremath{\ge}3$ that satisfy two reasonable conditions: (1) symmetry under unitary transformations and (2) ``maximum nontriviality'' (meaning that the probability distributions corresponding to any two nonorthogonal states overlap). This no-go theorem holds if the ontic space is either the set of quantum states or the set of unitaries. The proof of this result, in the general case, uses some measure theory and differential geometry. On the other hand, we also show the surprising result that without the symmetry restriction, one can construct maximally nontrivial $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic theories in every finite dimension ddd.
Quantum states are the key mathematical objects in quantum theory; however, there is still much debate concerning what a quantum state truly represents. One such century-old debate is whether a quantum state is ontic or epistemic. Recently, a no-go theorem was proposed, stating that the continuous ψ-epistemic models cannot reproduce the measurement statistic of quantum states. Here we experimentally test this theorem with high-dimensional single photon quantum states without additional assumptions except for the fair-sampling assumption. Our experimental results reproduce the prediction of quantum theory and support the no-go theorem.