The status of the quantum state is perhaps the most controversial issue in the foundations of quantum theory. Is it an epistemic state (state of knowledge) or an ontic state (state of reality)? In realist models of quantum theory, the epistemic view asserts that nonorthogonal quantum states correspond to overlapping probability measures over the true ontic states. This naturally accounts for a large number of otherwise puzzling quantum phenomena. For example, the indistinguishability of nonorthogonal states is explained by the fact that the ontic state sometimes lies in the overlap region, in which case there is nothing in reality that could distinguish the two states. For this to work, the amount of overlap of the probability measures should be comparable to the indistinguishability of the quantum states. In this Letter, I exhibit a family of states for which the ratio of these two quantities must be ≤2de-cd in Hilbert spaces of dimension d that are divisible by 4. This implies that, for large Hilbert space dimension, the epistemic explanation of indistinguishability becomes implausible at an exponential rate as the Hilbert space dimension increases.
The status of the quantum state is perhaps the most controversial issue in the foundations of quantum theory. Is it an epistemic state (state of knowledge) or an ontic state (state of reality)? In realist models of quantum theory, the epistemic view asserts that nonorthogonal quantum states correspond to overlapping probability measures over the true ontic states. This naturally accounts for a large number of otherwise puzzling quantum phenomena. For example, the indistinguishability of nonorthogonal states is explained by the fact that the ontic state sometimes lies in the overlap region, in which case there is nothing in reality that could distinguish the two states. For this to work, the amount of overlap of the probability measures should be comparable to the indistinguishability of the quantum states. In this Letter, I exhibit a family of states for which the ratio of these two quantities must be ≤2de-cd in Hilbert spaces of dimension d that are divisible by 4. This implies that, for large Hilbert space dimension, the epistemic explanation of indistinguishability becomes implausible at an exponential rate as the Hilbert space dimension increases.
We study the extent to which ψ-epistemic models for quantum measurement statistics-models where the quantum state does not have a real, ontic status-can explain the indistinguishability of nonorthogonal quantum states. This is done by comparing the overlap of any two quantum states with the overlap of the corresponding classical probability distributions over ontic states in a ψ-epistemic model. It is shown that in Hilbert spaces of dimension d≥4, the ratio between the classical and quantum overlaps in any ψ-epistemic model must be arbitrarily small for certain nonorthogonal states, suggesting that such models are arbitrarily bad at explaining the indistinguishability of quantum states. For dimensions d=3 and 4, we construct explicit states and measurements that can be used experimentally to put stringent bounds on the ratio of classical-to-quantum overlaps in ψ-epistemic models, allowing one in particular to rule out maximally ψ-epistemic models more efficiently than previously proposed.
According to a recent no-go theorem [M. Pusey, J. Barrett and T. Rudolph, Nat. Phys. 8, 475 (2012)], models in which quantum states correspond to probability distributions over the values of some underlying physical variables must have the following feature: the distributions corresponding to distinct quantum states do not overlap. In such a model, it cannot coherently be maintained that the quantum state merely encodes information about underlying physical variables. The theorem, however, considers only models in which the physical variables corresponding to independently prepared systems are independent, and this has been used to challenge the conclusions of that work. Here we consider models that are defined for a single quantum system of dimension d, such that the independence condition does not arise, and derive an upper bound on the extent to which the probability distributions can overlap. In particular, models in which the quantum overlap between pure states is equal to the classical overlap between the corresponding probability distributions cannot reproduce the quantum predictions in any dimension d ≥ 3. Thus any ontological model for quantum theory must postulate some extra principle, such as a limitation on the measurability of physical variables, to explain the indistinguishability of quantum states. Moreover, we show that as d→∞, the ratio of classical and quantum overlaps goes to zero for a class of states. The result is noise tolerant, and an experiment is motivated to distinguish the class of models ruled out from quantum theory.
Ontological models of quantum theory seek to realize quantum theory as a statistical theory over underlying degrees of freedom, whose measurement statistics are described by classical probability theory. Harrigan and Spekkens (2010) proposed a distinction between ontological models in which pure quantum states represent states of reality (ψ-ontic) or knowledge about reality (ψ-epistemic) depending on whether their associated probability distributions overlap, subsequently formalized into measure-theoretic form by Leifer (2014). In this thesis, I examine whether this ψ-ontic/epistemic distinction truly captures the intended difference between ontic and epistemic conceptions of pure states. I consider some mathematical alternatives relating to different notions of non-overlap between probability measures and compare them. I discuss the implications of these results for quantum ontology theorems – theorems that rule out ψ-epistemic readings of pure states under certain assumptions about the ontological model – such as the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph Theorem (2012).
A novel no-go theorem is presented which sets a bound upon the extent to which 'Ψ-epistemic' interpretations of quantum theory are able to explain the overlap between non-orthogonal quantum states in terms of an experimenter's ignorance of an underlying state of reality. The theorem applies to any Hilbert space of dimension greater than two. In the limit of large Hilbert spaces, no more than half of the overlap between quantum states can be accounted for. Unlike other recent no-go theorems no additional assumptions, such as forms of locality, invasiveness, or non-contextuality, are required.
Quantum nonlocality has been a long-standing and fascinating problem in the foundations of quantum theory since its proof by the Bell inequality. It seems to contradict our intuitive picture of space-time and thus urges us to reconsider its foundation. With the advent of quantum information science, it has attracted renewed interest from a fundamental point of view as well as from a quantum information-theoretic one. Another fundamental question on the nature of quantum theory is how we understand what quantum states represent. (Quantum states hereafter refer to pure states.) This is also a long-standing problem since the early days of quantum theory. Roughly speaking, there are two conflicting views on this matter: one is ontology and the other is epistemology. Ontological models of quantum theory are models in which we assume some underlying reality for physical systems and require that all the predictions of quantum theory should be reproduced. The ontological models are divided into two categories, depending on which views the models are based on, ontology or epistemology. In the models based on ontology, quantum states represent the underlying reality in some sense, and different quantum states correspond to different realities. In the models based on epistemology, quantum states do not necessarily correspond to the underlying realities, and even different quantum states can be consistent with a common underlying reality. The former type of ontological models of quantum theory is called 1⁄4-ontic. The latter is called 1⁄4-epistemic. Thus, it might be rather confusing that ontological models are classified further into 1⁄4-ontic models and 1⁄4-epistemic ones. We use these terms here in accordance with the recent literature on quantum foundations. (For details of these notions in the ontological models of quantum theory, see the paper by Harrigan and Spekkens.) Quite recently, the question just mentioned has been answered by Pusey et al., and one of the above models has been refuted. It was shown that 1⁄4-epistemic models are inconsistent with the predictions of quantum theory. In other words, epistemological views on quantum states turned out to be false as long as we assume some underlying reality for physical systems. Therefore, only 1⁄4-ontic models of quantum theory are valid for describing quantum systems. This significantly advances our understanding on the nature of quantum states. It is expected that various conclusions will be drawn from this fact. In this paper, we will discuss a connection with nonlocality. The above two fundamental questions, nonlocality and the nature of quantum states, are intimately connected, and the connection was first implicitly recognised by Einstein in the early days of quantum theory. In a private correspondence with Schrodinger, Einstein constructed a fascinating argument that relates the above two. (That argument is distinctly different from the well-known EPR argument.) Recently, it was revisited and reconstructed in accordance with more rigorous notions in quantum foundations. Nonlocality is usually shown by violations of Bell inequalities. (Bell inequalities hereafter include all the subsequent developments such as the CHSH inequality.) Even if it is not clear whether the models of quantum theory are 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic, we can prove nonlocality just by showing the violation of Bell inequalities. However, the above argument originated by Einstein implies that if we know the models are 1⁄4-ontic in advance (as we do now), we can prove nonlocality in a simpler way without Bell inequalities. (This argument had been known in quantum foundations before the refutation of 1⁄4-epistemic models.) Nonlocality is rigorously defined as a violation of the notion of local causality defined by Bell. Showing the violation of Bell inequalities is one way of demonstrating the violation of local causality. Since the simpler proof initiated by Einstein directly demonstrates the violation of local causality, it is a more straightforward proof of nonlocality from a conceptual point of view. In the following, we will see that this simple argument of nonlocality without Bell inequalities can be used to show multipartite nonlocality as well. Before moving onto multipartite cases, first let us define the necessary notions for presenting our result. First of all, we assume that there exists a complete specification of the properties of a physical system, which we refer to as the ontic state of that system. The ontic states represent the underlying realities and are not necessarily equal to ordinary quantum states. (In other words, the ontic states correspond to hidden variables.) Ontological models of quantum theory are models that assume ontic states and reproduce all the predictions of quantum theory. An important question is how ontic states correspond to quantum states in quantum theory. In order to frame the question accurately, we need the notion of an epistemic state, which represents the relation between them. Suppose we prepare a physical system in a quantum state 1⁄4. Although the system is uniquely specified as 1⁄4 in quantum theory, there still remains a possibility that it allows a more detailed specification in the ontic state space, in which case many different ontic states turn out to be consistent with 1⁄4. The relation between ontic states and the preparation procedure, P1⁄4, is described by a conditional probability distribution over the ontic state space, pð jP1⁄4Þ, which we refer to as an epistemic state. In general, the preparation P can be a preparation of a physical system in a mixed sate. Unless there exists a one-to-one correspondence between ontic states and quantum states, the probability distribution spreads over . (See Fig. 1.) The question of whether an ontological model is 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic is concerned with the behaviour of the epistemic states for two distinct preparations of quantum states. Consider two distinct preparations of quantum states, Journal of the Physical Society of Japan 82 (2013) 055003
Formalizing an old desire of Einstein, ``$\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic theories'' try to reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics, while viewing quantum states as ordinary probability distributions over underlying objects called ``ontic states.'' Regardless of one's philosophical views about such theories, the question arises of whether one can cleanly rule them out by proving no-go theorems analogous to the Bell inequality. In the 1960s, Kochen and Specker (who first studied these theories) constructed an elegant $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic theory for Hilbert space dimension d=2, but also showed that any deterministic $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic theory must be ``measurement contextual'' in dimensions 3 and higher. Last year, the topic attracted renewed attention, when Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph (PBR) showed that any $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic theory must ``behave badly under tensor product.'' In this paper, we prove that even without the Kochen-Specker or PBR assumptions, there are no $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic theories in dimensions $d\ensuremath{\ge}3$ that satisfy two reasonable conditions: (1) symmetry under unitary transformations and (2) ``maximum nontriviality'' (meaning that the probability distributions corresponding to any two nonorthogonal states overlap). This no-go theorem holds if the ontic space is either the set of quantum states or the set of unitaries. The proof of this result, in the general case, uses some measure theory and differential geometry. On the other hand, we also show the surprising result that without the symmetry restriction, one can construct maximally nontrivial $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic theories in every finite dimension d.