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arXiv:1110.0974

The Logic of Consistent Histories: A Reply to Maudlin

Robert B. Griffiths

Published Oct 5, 2011• 3 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The relationship between quantum logic, standard propositional logic, and the (consistent) histories rules for quantum reasoning is discussed. It is shown that Maudlin's claim [Am. J. Phys. 79 (2011) 954] that the histories approach is inconsistent, is incorrect. The histories approach is both internally consistent and adequate for discussing the physical situations considered by Maudlin.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1110.0974

Related papers

Comment on “Consistent Sets Yield Contrary Inferences in Quantum Theory”

Robert B. Griffiths, James B. Hartle

In a recent paper Kent has pointed out that in consistent histories quantum theory it is possible, given initial and final states, to construct two different consistent families of histories, in each of which there is a proposition that can be inferred with probability one, and such that the projectors representing these two propositions are mutually orthogonal. In this note we stress that, according to the rules of consistent history reasoning two such propositions are not contrary in the usual logical sense namely, that one can infer that if one is true then the other is false, and both could be false. No single consistent family contains both propositions, together with the initial and final states, and hence the propositions cannot be logically compared. Consistent histories quantum theory is logically consistent, consistent with experiment as far as is known, consistent with the usual quantum predictions for measurements, and applicable to the most general physical systems. It may not be the only theory with these properties, but in our opinion, it is the most promising among present possibilities.

arXiv:gr-qc/9710025•Physical Review Letters•Aug 31, 1998•51 citations

How bell reasoned: A reply to Griffiths

Tim Maudlin

Robert Griffiths claims that the consistent histories approach to quantum theory recovers all of the predictions of standard quantum theory and retains the principle of locality, contrary to Bell’s theorem. Griffiths locates the flaw in Bell’s reasoning in his use of standard logic. According to Griffiths, quantum theory requires us to adopt new rules for reasoning, which he calls quantum reasoning. I review the structure of the standard logical connectives and the proof that reasoning by standard logic is always valid. Griffiths’s novel logical “rule,” which is claimed to expose Bell’s error, serves rather only to obscure the fact that the theory Griffiths proposes is inconsistent and hence cannot be correct.

American Journal of Physics•Aug 19, 2011•13 citations

Quantum logic and decohering histories

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An introduction is given to an algebraic formulation and generalisation of the consistent histories approach to quantum theory. The main technical tool in this theory is an orthoalgebra of history propositions that serves as a generalised temporal analogue of the lattice of propositions of standard quantum logic. Particular emphasis is placed on those cases in which the history propositions can be represented by projection operators in a Hilbert space, and on the associated concept of a `history group'.

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Reply to “Comment on ‘Consistent histories and quantum reasoning’ ”

Robert B. Griffiths

The argument presented in the preceding Comment is not consistent with the principles of reasoning employed in the consistent histories interpretation of quantum theory, and hence tells us nothing about locality or nonlocality from the perspective of that interpretation.

Physical Review A•Oct 1, 1998•0 citations

Kent Replies:

Adrian Kent

It was pointed out recently [A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78 (1997) 2874] that the consistent histories approach allows contrary inferences to be made from the same data. These inferences correspond to projections $P$ and $Q$, belonging to different consistent sets, with the properties that $PQ = QP = 0$ and $P \neq 1 -Q$. To many, this seems undesirable in a theory of physical inferences. It also raises a specific problem for the consistent histories formalism, since that formalism is set up so as to eliminate contradictory inferences, i.e. inferences $P$ and $Q$ where $P = 1 - Q$. Yet there seems to be no sensible physical distinction between contradictory and contrary inferences. It seems particularly hard to defend the asymmetry, since (i) there is a well-defined quantum histories formalisms which admits both contradictory and contrary inferences, and (ii) there is also a well-defined formalism, based on ordered consistent sets of histories, which excludes both. In a recent comment, Griffiths and Hartle, while accepting the validity of the examples given in the above paper, restate their own preference for the consistent histories formalism. As this brief reply explains, in so doing, they fail to address the arguments made against their approach to quantum theory.

arXiv:gr-qc/9808016•Physical Review Letters•Aug 31, 1998•30 citations

Consistent Histories and the Bohm Approach

Basil J. Hiley, O. J. E. Maroney

In a recent paper Griffiths claims that the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics gives rise to results that contradict those obtained from the Bohm interpretation. This is in spite of the fact that both claim to provide a realist interpretation of the formalism without the need to add any new mathematical content and both always produce exactly the same probability predictions of the outcome of experiments. In constrasting the differences Griffiths argues that the consistent histories interpretation provides a more physically reasonable account of quantum phenomena. We examine this claim and show that the consistent histories approach is not without its difficulties.

arXiv:quant-ph/0009056•Sep 13, 2000•10 citations
The relationship between quantum logic, standard propositional logic, and the (consistent) histories rules for quantum reasoning is discussed. It is shown that Maudlin's claim [Am. J. Phys. 79 (2011) 954] that the histories approach is inconsistent, is incorrect. The histories approach is both internally consistent and adequate for discussing the physical situations considered by Maudlin.
In a recent paper Kent has pointed out that in consistent histories quantum theory it is possible, given initial and final states, to construct two different consistent families of histories, in each of which there is a proposition that can be inferred with probability one, and such that the projectors representing these two propositions are mutually orthogonal. In this note we stress that, according to the rules of consistent history reasoning two such propositions are not contrary in the usual logical sense namely, that one can infer that if one is true then the other is false, and both could be false. No single consistent family contains both propositions, together with the initial and final states, and hence the propositions cannot be logically compared. Consistent histories quantum theory is logically consistent, consistent with experiment as far as is known, consistent with the usual quantum predictions for measurements, and applicable to the most general physical systems. It may not be the only theory with these properties, but in our opinion, it is the most promising among present possibilities.
Robert Griffiths claims that the consistent histories approach to quantum theory recovers all of the predictions of standard quantum theory and retains the principle of locality, contrary to Bell’s theorem. Griffiths locates the flaw in Bell’s reasoning in his use of standard logic. According to Griffiths, quantum theory requires us to adopt new rules for reasoning, which he calls quantum reasoning. I review the structure of the standard logical connectives and the proof that reasoning by standard logic is always valid. Griffiths’s novel logical “rule,” which is claimed to expose Bell’s error, serves rather only to obscure the fact that the theory Griffiths proposes is inconsistent and hence cannot be correct.
An introduction is given to an algebraic formulation and generalisation of the consistent histories approach to quantum theory. The main technical tool in this theory is an orthoalgebra of history propositions that serves as a generalised temporal analogue of the lattice of propositions of standard quantum logic. Particular emphasis is placed on those cases in which the history propositions can be represented by projection operators in a Hilbert space, and on the associated concept of a `history group'.
It was pointed out recently [A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78 (1997) 2874] that the consistent histories approach allows contrary inferences to be made from the same data. These inferences correspond to projections PPP and QQQ, belonging to different consistent sets, with the properties that PQ=QP=0PQ = QP = 0PQ=QP=0 and P≠1−QP \neq 1 -QP=1−Q. To many, this seems undesirable in a theory of physical inferences. It also raises a specific problem for the consistent histories formalism, since that formalism is set up so as to eliminate contradictory inferences, i.e. inferences PPP and QQQ where P=1−QP = 1 - QP=1−Q. Yet there seems to be no sensible physical distinction between contradictory and contrary inferences. It seems particularly hard to defend the asymmetry, since (i) there is a well-defined quantum histories formalisms which admits both contradictory and contrary inferences, and (ii) there is also a well-defined formalism, based on ordered consistent sets of histories, which excludes both. In a recent comment, Griffiths and Hartle, while accepting the validity of the examples given in the above paper, restate their own preference for the consistent histories formalism. As this brief reply explains, in so doing, they fail to address the arguments made against their approach to quantum theory.
In a recent paper Griffiths claims that the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics gives rise to results that contradict those obtained from the Bohm interpretation. This is in spite of the fact that both claim to provide a realist interpretation of the formalism without the need to add any new mathematical content and both always produce exactly the same probability predictions of the outcome of experiments. In constrasting the differences Griffiths argues that the consistent histories interpretation provides a more physically reasonable account of quantum phenomena. We examine this claim and show that the consistent histories approach is not without its difficulties.