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arXiv:0902.2680

How Einstein's quantum hypothesis requires a departure from classical mechanics

Gabriele Carcassi

Published Feb 16, 2009• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The aim of this work is to show how Einstein's quantum hypothesis leads immediately and necessarily to a departure from classical mechanics. First we note that the classical description and predictions are in terms of idealized measurements that are exact, instantaneous, non-perturbative, independent of each other and process agnostic. If we assume we cannot arbitrarily reduce the strength of a signal, measurements are ultimately perturbative to some degree. We show how a physical description in which the best measurement conceivable, i.e. the ideal measurement, perturbs the system leads to all the concepts present in quantum mechanics including conjugate variables, probabilistic predictions and measurements connected to symmetries.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.0902.2680

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The aim of this work is to show how Einstein's quantum hypothesis leads immediately and necessarily to a departure from classical mechanics. First we note that the classical description and predictions are in terms of idealized measurements that are exact, instantaneous, non-perturbative, independent of each other and process agnostic. If we assume we cannot arbitrarily reduce the strength of a signal, measurements are ultimately perturbative to some degree. We show how a physical description in which the best measurement conceivable, i.e. the ideal measurement, perturbs the system leads to all the concepts present in quantum mechanics including conjugate variables, probabilistic predictions and measurements connected to symmetries.
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The EPR controversy between Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr about the completeness of the quantum mechanics is one of the most essential contemporary debates in physics with respect to the issue of realism. Initially considered as a though-experiment, the EPR paradox was meant to evidence the inadequacy of quantum mechanics with respect to the traditional leading principle of physics such as locality, independence of the system elements of reality with respect to the observer or semantic reference of theories to elements of the reality in itself. Bell’s mathematical inquiry opened the possibility to empirically discriminate between the view of Bohr and Einstein through the so-called Bell’s inequalities. Based on these inequalities, the experimental test provided in particular by the work of Alain Aspect settled the debate in favor of Bohr and the completeness of quantum mechanics. The previously evident assumption that physical theories are describing the reality in it-self can thus be questioned. Several approaches have been proposed to face that challenge, such as the orthodox quantum physics formulation coupled with the interpretation of Bernard d’Espagnat , the non-local theory of De Broglie-Bohm or the quantum mechanics approach with extended probability of James B. Hartle . In this paper, we consider the idea according to which the field of experiments and measurements on quantum systems is a research context where several epistemic values traditionally leading the scientific activity are in conflict. Instead of conceiving the transition from classical to quantum physics along Thomas Kuhns’ theory of revolutionary paradigm change , characterized by a strong incommensurability between the old and the new approaches, we argue that this epistemological shift could be rationally understood as an incremental evolution of the epistemic values leading scientific activity. As the analysis in this paper aims to show, such a rational reconstruction shows a process of gradual change, where core epistemic values are maintained, while others are broadened to account for the new scientific approaches. The settling of the EPR controversy could be understood as the indication that the previously assumed epistemic values cannot be consistently held together in the quantum context. The values of logical consistency and empirical adequacy remained universally shared, but the controversy leads to question the other traditionally admitted principles, such as the locality, the requirement of semantic references to the reality in itself and the independence of experimental results with respect to the observer, all tightly connected with the realistic conceptions of the world. This first part of the paper characterizes the selected contemporary approaches in quantum context with respect to the modification of the epistemic principles they adopt to restore their consistency. While the de Broglie-Bohm theory explicitly follows the requirement of referring to the reality in itself at the expense of the locality principle, the approaches of d’Espagnat and of Hartle give priority to the values of theoretical framework simplicity and predictive power. In the case of d’Espagnat, the descriptive purpose of the scientific activity remains, but only in a weak objectivity perspective, restricted to the “empirical reality” in which the observer is involved. In the case of Hartle, the extended probability formulation of quantum mechanics is conceived as “an extension of familiar probability theory that incorporates negative probabilities”6, which relies on the Bayesian conception of “probabilities as instruction for betting” (negative probability is thus associated to the instruction “don’t bet”). In a second part, the paper uses this reconstruction of the various theories in order to address the epistemic status of the principles of descriptive power and of independence of the observed system with respect to the observer. In particular, our analysis aims to assess if a reference to the observer is part of the reality description or if such reference is avoidable. This is of prior interest in exploring the main characteristics of a realistic approach that would be applicable in the context of experiments and measurements on quantum systems. In that perspective, we argue that the direct holistic realism, developed by Hilary Putnam in The Threefold Cord , could be a promising intermediate option between a classical realism, which assumes that theoretical structures are describing the reality in it-self, and a more instrumentalist view, focusing mainly on the modeling of the empirical reality as a result of experimental operations while rejecting access to the reality in itself.
In this paper a didactic approach is described which immediately leads to an understanding of those postulates of quantum mechanics used most frequently in quantum computation. Moreover, an interpretation of quantum mechanics is presented which is motivated by retaining the point of view of classical mechanics as much as possible, and which is consistent with relativity theory. Everything can be written down in terms of well-known mathematical formulations that can be found in every textbook about quantum mechanics. Therefore, in this version, almost no formulas are used.
Abstract Our conception of time changed from the lofty absolute coordinate of the classical paradigm to merely a connection between local reference frames, thanks to the Special Theory of Relativity, a connection that depends on knowing the relative velocity between frames, and that entails knowing local velocities. We measure local velocities using a clock that cannot give us precise time because knowing time depends solely on knowing the process that we use to generate time. In the case of both macroscopic and microscopic clocks, an intrinsic uncertainty blocks us from knowing both the dynamic and static states of the variables involved. By focusing on the conceptual process that we use to describe physical systems, we can approach a common epistemology of both microscopic and macroscopic dynamical systems. We find that both systems of description require that we inser t time implicitly into the formalism to account for the conservation of identity through our own psychological experience of time. Although we cannot define exactly the nature of the conserved identity, we can describe its evolution with pairs of conjugate variables, one tracking the static state and one the dynamic state. Uncertainty extends from our conceiving system into our descriptive theories. An epistemology that emphasizes the balance between the conjugate variables as they serve to describe the evolution of the identity provides a common ground on which to discuss both the Heisenberg uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics and the bounded randomness of a deterministic macroscopic system. We have seen time go from a global to a local phenomenon, and perhaps now we must allow time to become an epiphenomenon even at the local level, one that we ourselves insert to account for the continuity of our own conscious experience.