The EPR controversy between Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr about the completeness of the quantum mechanics is one of the most essential contemporary debates in physics with respect to the issue of realism. Initially considered as a though-experiment, the EPR paradox was meant to evidence the inadequacy of quantum mechanics with respect to the traditional leading principle of physics such as locality, independence of the system elements of reality with respect to the observer or semantic reference of theories to elements of the reality in itself. Bell’s mathematical inquiry opened the possibility to empirically discriminate between the view of Bohr and Einstein through the so-called Bell’s inequalities. Based on these inequalities, the experimental test provided in particular by the work of Alain Aspect settled the debate in favor of Bohr and the completeness of quantum mechanics. The previously evident assumption that physical theories are describing the reality in it-self can thus be questioned. Several approaches have been proposed to face that challenge, such as the orthodox quantum physics formulation coupled with the interpretation of Bernard d’Espagnat , the non-local theory of De Broglie-Bohm or the quantum mechanics approach with extended probability of James B. Hartle . In this paper, we consider the idea according to which the field of experiments and measurements on quantum systems is a research context where several epistemic values traditionally leading the scientific activity are in conflict. Instead of conceiving the transition from classical to quantum physics along Thomas Kuhns’ theory of revolutionary paradigm change , characterized by a strong incommensurability between the old and the new approaches, we argue that this epistemological shift could be rationally understood as an incremental evolution of the epistemic values leading scientific activity. As the analysis in this paper aims to show, such a rational reconstruction shows a process of gradual change, where core epistemic values are maintained, while others are broadened to account for the new scientific approaches. The settling of the EPR controversy could be understood as the indication that the previously assumed epistemic values cannot be consistently held together in the quantum context. The values of logical consistency and empirical adequacy remained universally shared, but the controversy leads to question the other traditionally admitted principles, such as the locality, the requirement of semantic references to the reality in itself and the independence of experimental results with respect to the observer, all tightly connected with the realistic conceptions of the world. This first part of the paper characterizes the selected contemporary approaches in quantum context with respect to the modification of the epistemic principles they adopt to restore their consistency. While the de Broglie-Bohm theory explicitly follows the requirement of referring to the reality in itself at the expense of the locality principle, the approaches of d’Espagnat and of Hartle give priority to the values of theoretical framework simplicity and predictive power. In the case of d’Espagnat, the descriptive purpose of the scientific activity remains, but only in a weak objectivity perspective, restricted to the “empirical reality” in which the observer is involved. In the case of Hartle, the extended probability formulation of quantum mechanics is conceived as “an extension of familiar probability theory that incorporates negative probabilities”6, which relies on the Bayesian conception of “probabilities as instruction for betting” (negative probability is thus associated to the instruction “don’t bet”). In a second part, the paper uses this reconstruction of the various theories in order to address the epistemic status of the principles of descriptive power and of independence of the observed system with respect to the observer. In particular, our analysis aims to assess if a reference to the observer is part of the reality description or if such reference is avoidable. This is of prior interest in exploring the main characteristics of a realistic approach that would be applicable in the context of experiments and measurements on quantum systems. In that perspective, we argue that the direct holistic realism, developed by Hilary Putnam in The Threefold Cord , could be a promising intermediate option between a classical realism, which assumes that theoretical structures are describing the reality in it-self, and a more instrumentalist view, focusing mainly on the modeling of the empirical reality as a result of experimental operations while rejecting access to the reality in itself.
The EPR controversy between Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr about the completeness of the quantum mechanics is one of the most essential contemporary debates in physics with respect to the issue of realism. Initially considered as a though-experiment, the EPR paradox was meant to evidence the inadequacy of quantum mechanics with respect to the traditional leading principle of physics such as locality, independence of the system elements of reality with respect to the observer or semantic reference of theories to elements of the reality in itself. Bell’s mathematical inquiry opened the possibility to empirically discriminate between the view of Bohr and Einstein through the so-called Bell’s inequalities. Based on these inequalities, the experimental test provided in particular by the work of Alain Aspect settled the debate in favor of Bohr and the completeness of quantum mechanics. The previously evident assumption that physical theories are describing the reality in it-self can thus be questioned. Several approaches have been proposed to face that challenge, such as the orthodox quantum physics formulation coupled with the interpretation of Bernard d’Espagnat , the non-local theory of De Broglie-Bohm or the quantum mechanics approach with extended probability of James B. Hartle . In this paper, we consider the idea according to which the field of experiments and measurements on quantum systems is a research context where several epistemic values traditionally leading the scientific activity are in conflict. Instead of conceiving the transition from classical to quantum physics along Thomas Kuhns’ theory of revolutionary paradigm change , characterized by a strong incommensurability between the old and the new approaches, we argue that this epistemological shift could be rationally understood as an incremental evolution of the epistemic values leading scientific activity. As the analysis in this paper aims to show, such a rational reconstruction shows a process of gradual change, where core epistemic values are maintained, while others are broadened to account for the new scientific approaches. The settling of the EPR controversy could be understood as the indication that the previously assumed epistemic values cannot be consistently held together in the quantum context. The values of logical consistency and empirical adequacy remained universally shared, but the controversy leads to question the other traditionally admitted principles, such as the locality, the requirement of semantic references to the reality in itself and the independence of experimental results with respect to the observer, all tightly connected with the realistic conceptions of the world. This first part of the paper characterizes the selected contemporary approaches in quantum context with respect to the modification of the epistemic principles they adopt to restore their consistency. While the de Broglie-Bohm theory explicitly follows the requirement of referring to the reality in itself at the expense of the locality principle, the approaches of d’Espagnat and of Hartle give priority to the values of theoretical framework simplicity and predictive power. In the case of d’Espagnat, the descriptive purpose of the scientific activity remains, but only in a weak objectivity perspective, restricted to the “empirical reality” in which the observer is involved. In the case of Hartle, the extended probability formulation of quantum mechanics is conceived as “an extension of familiar probability theory that incorporates negative probabilities”6, which relies on the Bayesian conception of “probabilities as instruction for betting” (negative probability is thus associated to the instruction “don’t bet”). In a second part, the paper uses this reconstruction of the various theories in order to address the epistemic status of the principles of descriptive power and of independence of the observed system with respect to the observer. In particular, our analysis aims to assess if a reference to the observer is part of the reality description or if such reference is avoidable. This is of prior interest in exploring the main characteristics of a realistic approach that would be applicable in the context of experiments and measurements on quantum systems. In that perspective, we argue that the direct holistic realism, developed by Hilary Putnam in The Threefold Cord , could be a promising intermediate option between a classical realism, which assumes that theoretical structures are describing the reality in it-self, and a more instrumentalist view, focusing mainly on the modeling of the empirical reality as a result of experimental operations while rejecting access to the reality in itself.
In the Einstein-Bohr debate, Einstein considered quantum mechanics incomplete and disagreed with Born’s probabilistic interpretation of wave-functions. Observers in the axioms of quantum mechanics also bothered Einstein. Inspired by Einstein, Bell and his followers intended to complete quantum mechanics within the framework of local realism. Regrettably, the deterministic correlation between distant components of a separable system in Einstein’s local-realist description of the world is mistaken for non-locality in the world described by Bell’s theorem, leading to incorrect interpretations of experimental results obtained by testing Bell inequalities. This article introduces a new principle, the general principle of measurements, which is proved as a mathematical theorem and allows quantum mechanics to be completed within the framework of local realism while keeping the formal axiomatic definition of a general Hilbert space unchanged. The completed theory can provide the same probabilistic predictions of empirical results as those provided by the current theory. Using disjunction (“or”) as the logical relation between superposed orthonormal vectors, the completed theory precludes observers in the axioms of the current theory and inexplicable collapses of wave-functions, thus it is intuitively comprehensible and alleviates much difficulty in understanding quantum mechanics. Among various world views, Einstein’s local-realist world view is correct.
Quantum mechanics, despite its extraordinary success in describing microscopic phenomena, continues to raise foundational questions concerning measurement, nonlocality, and the nature of physical reality. These issues are exemplified by the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox and the Bell inequality, which contrast quantum correlations with classical notions of locality and realism. In this work, we critically examine the assumptions underlying Bell’s theorem in light of the incompatible and contextual nature of quantum observables. We show that Bell’s constraint on simultaneous definite values for incompatible observables, together with the assumption of hidden variables, is not applicable to quantum mechanics itself, which is inherently nonclassical and contextual. When measurement is modeled as a local system-environment interaction within the framework of quantum decoherence, the resulting dynamics remain entirely local and unitary in the EPR scenario. Decoherence naturally selects pointer states and suppresses interference, giving rise to the appearance of wavefunction collapse consistent with quantum predictions. Importantly, the Bell correlations obtained in this framework reproduce the standard quantum results and are independent of both system-bath and inter-bath interactions, which affect only the rate of decoherence. Our analysis suggests that, in the EPR scenario, quantum mechanics can be both local and realistic when the wavefunction is treated as an ontic description of reality within the decoherence framework, offering a potential route toward a locally realistic quantum theory aligned with Einstein’s vision. This work contributes to a more rigorous foundation for quantum mechanics, providing insights that can accelerate progress in quantum computing and nanoenergy harvesting.
The foundations and meaning of quantum theory became a central issue to Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr since the onset of their impassioned debate in the 1920s, enriched by the contributions of many other distinguished scientists and philosophers.The questions are not settled down at all, despite the great achievements of the theory, its impressive accordance with experiment and predictive power.The fundamental and technological applications range from cosmology to biology, with the development of invaluable instruments and the design of new materials.Is quantum mechanics a complete or an incomplete theory?Is there an objective reality independent of the observer or is the reality created by the measurements?Are hidden-variable theories justifiable?Is there a quantum theory founded in a local-causal and non-linear approach that formally contains the orthodox linear theory as a special case?Can such a formulation unify classical and quantum physics?Are Heisenberg's uncertainty relations valid in all cases?Here, the subject is addressed as an adaptation of our contribution to the Colloquium "Quantal aspects in Chemistry and Physics.
In recent decades there has been a resurge of interest in the foundations of quantum theory, partly motivated by new experimental techniques, partly by the emerging field of quantum information science. Old questions, asked since the seminal article by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR), are being revisited. The work of John Bell has changed the direction of investigation by recognising that those fundamental philosophical questions can have, after all, input from experiment. Abner Shimony has aptly termed this new field of enquiry experimental metaphysics. The objective of this Thesis is to contribute to that body of research, by formalising old concepts, proposing new ones, and finding new results in well-studied areas. Without losing from sight that the appeal of experimental metaphysics comes from the adjective, every major result is followed by clear experimental proposals with detailed analysis of feasibility for quantum-atom optical setups. After setting the appropriate terminology and the basic concepts, we will start by analysing the original argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen. We propose a general mathematical form for the assumptions behind the EPR argument, namely those of local causality and completeness. That formalisation entails what was termed a Local Hidden State model by Wiseman et al., which was proposed as a formalisation of the concept of steering first introduced by Schrodinger in a reply to the EPR paper. Violation of any consequences that can be derived from the assumption of that model therefore implies a demonstration of the EPR paradox. We will show how one can then re-derive the well-known EPR-Reid criterion for continuous-variables correlations, and derive new ones applicable to the spin setting considered by Bohm. The spin set-up of the EPR-Bohm was used by Bell to derive his now famous theorem demonstrating the incompatibility of the assumption of local causality and the predictions of quantum mechanics. The inequalities which bear his name can be derived for any number of discrete outcomes, but so far there has been no derivation which can be directly applied to the continuous-variables case of the original EPR paradox. We close the circle by deriving a class of inequalities which make no explicit mention about the number of outcomes of the experiments involved, and can therefore be used in continuous-variables measurements with no need for binning the continuous results into discrete ones. Apart from that intrinsic interest, these inequalities could prove important as a means to perform an unambiguous test of Bell inequalities since optical homodyne detection can be performed with high detection efficiency. The technique, which is based on a simple variance inequality, can alsobe used tore-derive alarge class of well-known Bell-type inequalities and at the same time find their quantum bound, making explicit from a formal point of view that the non-commutativity of the local operators is at the heart of the quantum violations. Finally, we address the issue of macroscopic superpositions originally sparked by the infamous cat paradox of Schrodinger. We consider macroscopic, mesoscopic and ‘S -scopic’ quantum superpositions of eigenstates of an observable, and develop some signatures for their existence. We define the extent, or size S of a (pure-state) su-perposition, with respect to an observable X, as being the maximum difference in the outcomes of X predicted by that superposition. Such superpositions are referred to as generalised S -scopic superpositions to distinguish them from the extreme superpo-sitions that superpose only the two states that have a difference S in their prediction for the observable. We also consider generalised S -scopic superpositions of coherent states. We explore the constraints that are placed on the statistics if we suppose a system to be described by mixtures of superpositions that are restricted in size. In this way we arrive at experimental criteria that are sufficient to deduce the existence of a generalised S -scopic superposition. The signatures developed are useful where one is able to demonstrate a degree of squeezing.
In this presentation, I explore the possibility of combining pluralism and scientific realism in the framework of Putnam’s pragmatic realism (Putnam, 1999; Bernstein, 2005). I illustrate my claim through the analysis of a case of Duhem-Quine underdetermination originating in the violation of Bell’s Inequalities and involving several contemporary conceptions of quantum mechanics: the instrumentalist approach called ‘no interpretation view’ (Fuchs and Peres, 2000), Bohmian Mechanics (Dürr and Teufel, 2009), the veiled reality conception (d'Espagnat, 2011) and the approach with extended probabilities (Gell-Mann and Hartle, 2012). First, I briefly expose how the violation of Bell’s Inequalities can be understood as imposing a necessary trade-off between epistemic values usually satisfied in the context of classical physics. This allows conceiving the proponents of the studied approaches as standing in “faultless” or “rational” disagreement (Gattei, 2008; Pritchard, 2009). However, while the idea of faultless disagreement becomes more and more accepted, pluralism is rarely advocated for beyond the epistemological (cognitive) human sphere. Indeed, while it is often acknowledged that several competing theories can all be reasonably endorsed (Kelly, 2005), admitting that more than one is really is usually considered as opening the door to anti-realism (about entities described by scientific theories and about truth) or to relativism. I then mobilize Putnam’s pragmatic realism to challenge this last claim, in discussing the possibility of admitting a plurality of true theories while preserving scientific realism and realism about truth. The core of Putnam’s conception is to reject sense data (or inner theater) epistemology in considering that genuine aspects of reality (and not mere mental phenomena) are met in our ordinary perception (Putnam, 1999, 2013). Putnam arrived at this conclusion after a long intellectual path initiated with the rejection of metaphysical realism and its associated understanding of truth as a unique (and transcontextual) substantive property (of correspondence to the metaphysical reality). Putnam first opposed to this type of view his internal realism in which truth becomes intimately connected to standards of rational acceptability, opening the road for conceptual pluralism (Putnam, 1981). However, this first attempt proved unsatisfying, providing no sufficient ground for realism and for discrimination between truth and verification. Putnam diagnosis is then radical: in the framework of sense data epistemology, one cannot escape the forced choice between metaphysical realism and verificationism – this is the antinomy of realism (Putnam, 1999). With pragmatic realism and the rejection of the inner theater picture, Putnam proposes an interesting alternative. It becomes possible to admit the disquotational conception of truth from Tarski while 1) escaping its deflationist interpretation without returning to metaphysical realism and 2) maintaining conceptual pluralism. According to pragmatic realism, the way a knowledge claim can be responsible to reality – can be true – is neither unique nor fixed in advance. As it will be illustrated with the discussion of the disagreement about quantum mechanics, this pragmatic realism framework permits the combined admission of conceptual pluralism and scientific realism. • Bernstein, R. J. (2005). In Y. Ben-Menahem (Ed.), Hilary Putnam (pp. 251-265): Cambridge University Press. • D'Espagnat, B. (2011). Foundations of Physics, 41(11), 1703-1716. • Dürr, D. and Teufel, S. (2009). Bohmian Mechanics: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. • Fuchs, C. A. and Peres, A. (2000). Physics Today, 53(3), 70-71. • Gattei, S. (2008). Thomas Kuhn's "Linguistic Turn" and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism: Incommensurability, Rationality and the Search for Truth: Ashgate. • Gell-Mann, M. and Hartle, J. B. (2012). Physical Review A, 85(6), 062120. • Kelly, T. (2005). In T. Szabó Gendler and J. Hawthorne
The objective of this article is to demonstrate how the historical debate between materialism and idealism, in the field of Philosophy, extends, in new clothes, to the field of Quantum Physics characterized by realism and anti-realism. For this, we opted for a debate, also historical, between the realism of Albert Einstein, for whom reality exists regardless of the existence of the knowing subject, and Niels Bohr, for whom we do not have access to the ultimate reality of the matter, unless conditioning it to the existence of an observer endowed with rationality, position adopted in the Interpretation of Complementarity (1927) – posture that was expanded in 1935 when Bohr assumed a “relationalist” conception, according to which the quantum state is defined by the relationship between the quantum object and the entire measuring device. This is an extremely important debate, as it further consolidates the results of nascent Quantum Mechanics, guaranteeing Bohr the leadership of the orthodoxy based on the interpretation of complementarity. Here, when dealing with Quantum Theory, we will not make any distinction between the terms Quantum Physics, Quantum Theory or Quantum Mechanics. The entire discussion will be held under the name “Quantum Theory”. Theory that tries to analyze and describe the behavior of physical systems of reduced dimensions, close to the sizes of molecules, atoms and subatomic particles. We hope that the reader will appreciate the genius of these two titans in this field of Physics when they magnificently formulate the arguments that support the object of their defenses.