Abstract Our conception of time changed from the lofty absolute coordinate of the classical paradigm to merely a connection between local reference frames, thanks to the Special Theory of Relativity, a connection that depends on knowing the relative velocity between frames, and that entails knowing local velocities. We measure local velocities using a clock that cannot give us precise time because knowing time depends solely on knowing the process that we use to generate time. In the case of both macroscopic and microscopic clocks, an intrinsic uncertainty blocks us from knowing both the dynamic and static states of the variables involved. By focusing on the conceptual process that we use to describe physical systems, we can approach a common epistemology of both microscopic and macroscopic dynamical systems. We find that both systems of description require that we inser t time implicitly into the formalism to account for the conservation of identity through our own psychological experience of time. Although we cannot define exactly the nature of the conserved identity, we can describe its evolution with pairs of conjugate variables, one tracking the static state and one the dynamic state. Uncertainty extends from our conceiving system into our descriptive theories. An epistemology that emphasizes the balance between the conjugate variables as they serve to describe the evolution of the identity provides a common ground on which to discuss both the Heisenberg uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics and the bounded randomness of a deterministic macroscopic system. We have seen time go from a global to a local phenomenon, and perhaps now we must allow time to become an epiphenomenon even at the local level, one that we ourselves insert to account for the continuity of our own conscious experience.
Abstract Our conception of time changed from the lofty absolute coordinate of the classical paradigm to merely a connection between local reference frames, thanks to the Special Theory of Relativity, a connection that depends on knowing the relative velocity between frames, and that entails knowing local velocities. We measure local velocities using a clock that cannot give us precise time because knowing time depends solely on knowing the process that we use to generate time. In the case of both macroscopic and microscopic clocks, an intrinsic uncertainty blocks us from knowing both the dynamic and static states of the variables involved. By focusing on the conceptual process that we use to describe physical systems, we can approach a common epistemology of both microscopic and macroscopic dynamical systems. We find that both systems of description require that we inser t time implicitly into the formalism to account for the conservation of identity through our own psychological experience of time. Although we cannot define exactly the nature of the conserved identity, we can describe its evolution with pairs of conjugate variables, one tracking the static state and one the dynamic state. Uncertainty extends from our conceiving system into our descriptive theories. An epistemology that emphasizes the balance between the conjugate variables as they serve to describe the evolution of the identity provides a common ground on which to discuss both the Heisenberg uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics and the bounded randomness of a deterministic macroscopic system. We have seen time go from a global to a local phenomenon, and perhaps now we must allow time to become an epiphenomenon even at the local level, one that we ourselves insert to account for the continuity of our own conscious experience.
The laws of classical mechanics and quantum theory do not distinguish between the past and the future. But a lot of phenomena tell us that the "arrow of time" points only in one direction. For example, in biology we discover evolutionary processes leading to diversification and increasing complexity; it is a typical feature of such evolutionary processes that "forward" in time is possible but "backward" in time is impossible. At what level can phenomena like these be described? There is another problem in connection with time: within usual quantum theory, space-coordinates and time are not symmetrical to each other, which is in contrast to the basic results of special theory of relativity. In usual quantum theory coordinates are operators and play the role of statistical quantities; time however does not behave statistically and remains a simple parameter when we go from classical to quantum mechanics. For this reason there is no uncertainty relation for the time and energy within usual quantum theory which would agree in its physical content with that for the coordinates and momenta. The purpose of this paper is to show, on the basis of new aspects, that both one-sidedness of time and its uncertainty are charateristics at the fundamental level of quantum theory. We have extended usual quantum theory on the basis of space-time arguments. In this connection a time-operator appeared and there is in general temporal asymmetry at the microscopic level. The picture might be important in the description of phenomena with an "arrow of time", i.e., processes which belong to the physics of becoming. Furthermore, we have derived an uncertainty relation for the energy and time which agrees in its physical content with the uncertainty relation for the momentum and the coordinate; this relation is different from that of usual quantum theory. Within the frame of this physical picture all the concepts (diversity, natural selection, mutation), which are presently used in connection with the evolution of biological systems, are already established at the quantum mechanical level and, therefore, our theoretical picture might also be the foundation for the explanation of the phenomena at the biological (macro-molecular) level.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
Time has been in increasing trouble in physics. Skeptics are on the rise since many among its former supporters are nowadays acknowledging the notion that time might be unreal or just a local variable. In the Quanto-Geometric Theory, we have proposed new physics and novel solutions in response to the many conundrums facing the field which radically proscribe time in the metric of the physical realms. What is difficult to construct in a program of timeless physics is an interpretation of the evolution of time-independent dynamic systems at all scales. While we already know what that looks like for the quantum world with E. Scrodinger’s Quantum Mechanics, a granular dynamic description of time-independent physics in the macrocosm has probably yet to be achieved. In this proposal, we undertake to substantially muster up a time-free description of motion in dynamic systems from momentum to entanglement, in physics at all scales.
This preprint develops a τ-based formulation of the quantum uncertainty principle by explicitly separating external time t (laboratory, wall-clock, atomic-clock time) from internal time τ (the intrinsic temporal coordinate generated by each system’s own dynamics). Quantum evolution is written in τ, the Schrödinger equation is reparametrized accordingly, and the usual Heisenberg bound appears as the special case of a pure t-frame description. In an idealized τ-frame limit, trajectories can in principle become arbitrarily sharp, with apparent indeterminacy arising only when τ-dynamics are projected into the mismatched coordinate t.The paper offers τ-based reinterpretations of key foundational issues: the measurement problem as τ-synchronization, EPR/Bell correlations as shared internal time, double-slit interference as projection of τ-trajectories, and Schrödinger’s cat as a mismatch between microscopic and macroscopic τ-structure. Conceptual experimental protocols are proposed (not yet performed) to probe possible internal-time effects in quantum clocks, entangled systems under τ-perturbations, and controlled τ–t desynchronization.Important note on evaluation: this work should not be judged purely from within the external-time paradigm. Following Thomas Kuhn’s insight that a new paradigm must be evaluated from within its own framework, the τ-Epoch interpretation requires that reviewers — human or AI — temporarily adopt internal time τ as the primary temporal variable when assessing coherence, explanatory power, and empirical testability. If one remains conceptually imprisoned in t, τ-determinism will look either impossible or trivial. If one steps into the τ-frame, the proposal can be evaluated on its real claim: that quantum “uncertainty” is a frame effect, not an ontological necessity.This preprint is part of the broader τ-Epoch / Union Dipole Theory corpus, which reconstructs a wide range of physical, computational, and biological laws in internal time τ.
A vast number of internal “time” quantities, intrinsically associated with some particular phenomena, is all that can be consistently defined in physics. This leads us to interpret the notion of “uncertainty in time” specifically, for each of the considered phenomena. However, a universal conception of “time” can be proposed from the unifying point of view of the Observer, considering only the information process underlying any phenomenon. A change in the available information relative to that phenomenon can be calculated with the use of a universal “time”-information operator. This operator computes the algorithmic information content of the predictive tool associated with any experimental situation. Its standard deviation is then used to interpret the notion of “uncertainty in time” as a limit of predictability for any evolution. Heisenberg’s principle of “time”-energy uncertainty can then be rigorously regarded as a cognitive principle governing the evolution of any physical system.
As the two pillars of modern physics, relativity and quantum mechanics have both achieved overwhelming experimental success in their respective domains, yet they have never realized self-consistent unification at the underlying logical level. Most existing studies focus on the mathematical technical difficulties of quantum gravity, while generally neglecting the structural divergence of the core concepts of "observer" and "time" between the two theories. Through conceptual analysis and logical tracing, this paper points out that the observer in relativity is essentially a massless geometric coordinate marker with no intrinsic clock, which only undertakes the functions of event marking and reference frame mutual translation. It belongs to the object level concept within the classical world, and can be summarized as the translator of the ready-made world. The observer required by quantum mechanics is a physical entity that can trigger wave function collapse and carry the time metric benchmark. It is the logical premise for the generation of the observable classical world, belonging to the meta-level concept, and can be summarized as the legislator of the real world. The divergence between the two is not an isolated terminological difference. Its deep root lies in the completely heterogeneous presuppositions of the two theories on "time": time in quantum mechanics is a transcendental, uniform global background parameter "before the birth of clocks", that is, a "logical concept before measurement"; time in relativity is a local, operable relative metric result "after the birth of clocks", that is, a "logical concept of the classical deterministic motion world". As physical theories both belonging to the principle theory paradigm, both actively skip the construction of the physical ontology of time and directly presuppose the functional role of time, which eventually leads to the double logical dislocation of observer and time concepts. Relativity lacks the "first chapter" of deriving observers from the vacuum substrate, and quantum mechanics lacks the physical carrier definition of observers, which are essentially two manifestations of the same ontological gap. Metretics Dynamics (MD; formerly Time Field Theory, TFT) takes the scalar time field as the only physical ontology, defines mass as the local condensed state of the time field, and deduces the ontological proposition that "mass is the observer". It eliminates the absolute division between meta-level and object level from the ontological level, and reduces "global background time" and "local relative time" to the apparent forms of the same physical field under different condensation degrees. The continuous unitary evolution of the wave function corresponds to the uniform rhythmic flow of the time field in its diffuse state, while wave function collapse is essentially a local state mutation of the time field when coupled with a macroscopic mass condensate. Both processes are unified under the intrinsic dynamical laws of the time field. Within a unified framework, it simultaneously accommodates the metric anchor of quantum measurement and the coordinate mutual translation mechanism of relativity, providing a constructive ontological path for the conceptual compatibility of the two major theories.