Ontological models are attempts to quantitatively describe the results of a probabilistic theory, such as Quantum Mechanics, in a framework exhibiting an explicit realism-based underpinning. Unlike either the well known quasi-probability representations, or the "r-p" vector formalism, these models are contextual and by definition only involve positive probability distributions (and indicator functions). In this article we study how the ontological model formalism can be used to describe arbitrary statistics of a system subjected to a finite set of preparations and measurements. We present three models which can describe any such empirical data and then discuss how to turn an indeterministic model into a deterministic one. This raises the issue of how such models manifest contextuality, and we provide an explicit example to demonstrate this. In the second half of the paper we consider the issue of finding ontological models with as few ontic states as possible.
Ontological models are attempts to quantitatively describe the results of a probabilistic theory, such as Quantum Mechanics, in a framework exhibiting an explicit realism-based underpinning. Unlike either the well known quasi-probability representations, or the "r-p" vector formalism, these models are contextual and by definition only involve positive probability distributions (and indicator functions). In this article we study how the ontological model formalism can be used to describe arbitrary statistics of a system subjected to a finite set of preparations and measurements. We present three models which can describe any such empirical data and then discuss how to turn an indeterministic model into a deterministic one. This raises the issue of how such models manifest contextuality, and we provide an explicit example to demonstrate this. In the second half of the paper we consider the issue of finding ontological models with as few ontic states as possible.
We consider ontological models of a quantum system, assuming that not all probability distributions over the space Λ of ontic states are preparable, only those belonging to a certain set C. We assume further that every POVM with a finite value space can be measured and that for every density matrix there exists a distribution in C whose outcome statistics is given by the density matrix. We show that this mapping from C to the set of density matrices must be many-to-one, that is, that there must be empirically indistinguishable distributions in C. This shows that there must be limitations to knowledge in the sense of facts in nature that cannot be discovered empirically.
Studying the extent to which realism is compatible with quantum mechanics teaches us something about the quantum mechanical universe, regardless of the validity of such realistic assumptions. It has also recently been appreciated that these kinds of studies are fruitful for questions relating to quantum information and computation. Motivated by this, we extend the ontological model formalism for realistic theories to describe a set of theories emphasizing the role of measurement and preparation devices by introducing `hidden variables' to describe them. We illustrate both the ontological model formalism and our generalization of it through a series of example models taken from the literature. Our extension of the formalism allows us to quantitatively analyze the meaning contextuality (a constraint on successful realistic theories), finding that - taken at face-value - it can be realized as a natural interaction between the configurations of a system and measurement device. However, we also describe a property that we call deficiency, which follows from contextuality, but does not admit such a natural interpretation. Loosely speaking, deficiency breaks a symmetry between preparations and measurements in quantum mechanics. It is the property that the set of ontic states which a system prepared in quantum state psi may actually be in, is strictly smaller than the set of ontic states which would reveal the measurement outcome psi with certainty.
Since being defined by Kochen and Specker, and separately by Bell, contextuality has been proposed as one of the key phenomena that distinguishing quantum theory from classical theories. However, with the rise of quantum information contextuality's position as the leading definition of the quantum/classical boundary has been called into question. This is due to the fact that a contextual explanation is required by subtheories that offer no exponential quantum computational advantage over classical computation. In this thesis, submitted in requirement for a PhD in physics with quantum information, we shall explore this unwanted contextuality, and show that generalized contextuality is more prevalent than was previously thought. \n \nFirst we will show that the single-qubit stabilizer subtheory, which was previously thought of as a non-contextual subtheory, requires a generalized contextual ontological model, when transformations are included in the operational description. In addition to this we show that the even smaller single-rebit stabilizer subtheory, a strict subtheory of the single-qubit stabilizer subtheory, must also admit a generalized contextual ontological model, again when transformations are included in the operational description. We then show that both these subtheories require negatively represented quasi-probability representations, re-establishing the link between contextuality and negativity for transformations. We also investigate the representation of transformations in generic quasi-probability representations, showing that under a reasonable assumption almost-all unitaries must be negatively represented by a finite quasi-probability representation. \n \nSecond we will investigate the efficiently simulable n-qubit stabilizer subtheory, which exhibits all forms of contextuality and thus represents the main obstacle to identifying contextuality as a resource for quantum computation. To this end we present an attempt at constructing a model based on a frame-switching Wigner function. This leads us to constructing a contextual ψ-epistemic ontological model of the n-qubit stabilizer formalism. We shall see that this model is outcome deterministic, which is one of the core assumptions in the definition of traditional non-contextuality. This model then will lead us to a result that proves that any ontological model of the n-qubit stabilizer formalism requires at least n-1 generators to be encoded in the ontology of the model. As n-1 generators represents almost full knowledge about the stabilizer state, we therefore posit that ψ-onicity, a more controversial notion of non-classicality, is actually the resource for quantum computation.
Certain concrete "ontological models" for quantum mechanics (models in which measurement outcomes are deterministic and quantum states are equivalent to classical probability distributions over some space of `hidden variables') are examined. The models are generalizations of Kochen and Specker's such model for a single 2-dimensional system - in particular a model for a three dimensional quantum system is considered in detail. Unfortunately, it appears the models do not quite reproduce the quantum mechanical statistics. They do, however, come close to doing so, and in as much as they simply involve probability distributions over the complex projective space they do reproduce pretty much everything else in quantum mechanics. The Kochen-Specker theorem is examined in the light of these models, and the rather mild nature of the manifested contextuality is discussed.
This paper argues that probabilistic structure should not be treated as ontologically primitive. Instead, probability is defined relative to conditions of recordability: it organizes spaces of possible records rather than properties of events as such. The analysis distinguishes between events, records, and probabilistic structures, and shows that probability acquires meaning only when stable, distinguishable, and reproducible records are available. In this view, Kolmogorovian probability theory provides a formally consistent framework, but does not specify how probabilistic domains arise from empirical observation. As a result, probabilistic formalism underdetermines ontology. Different ontological models can generate identical probabilistic structures, which implies that probability cannot serve as a direct guide to the nature of reality. The paper critically examines Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), arguing that it risks conflating representational structure with ontological structure. It concludes that any ontological interpretation of probabilistic or correlational structures requires independent justification beyond formalism.
In this paper, we explore realist models of quantum theory that does not fit into the standard definitions of ontological models. The models here go beyond standard definition of ontological models in the sense that quantum states do not correspond to distributions over the ontic state space and a system prepared in a quantum state is not in an ontic state. Instead, a system in a quantum state is always in a process, i.e. moving around in the ontic state space. Also, quantum measurement outcomes are not direct measurement of the ontic state, but depend probabilistically on the entire path the system takes during the measurement process. Consequently, we explain how, in our model, quantum states can neither be classified as ontic nor epistemic in the sense of knowledge about an underlying reality. In our model, quantum probabilities describes our (objective) knowledge about measurement outcomes. We also look at two hybrid models where either the preparation or measurement do follow the definitions in standard ontological models. Lastly, we propose a form of generalised ontological model that reduces to the standard PBR model when the underlying process reduces to a point in ontic space.