Certain concrete "ontological models" for quantum mechanics (models in which measurement outcomes are deterministic and quantum states are equivalent to classical probability distributions over some space of `hidden variables') are examined. The models are generalizations of Kochen and Specker's such model for a single 2-dimensional system - in particular a model for a three dimensional quantum system is considered in detail. Unfortunately, it appears the models do not quite reproduce the quantum mechanical statistics. They do, however, come close to doing so, and in as much as they simply involve probability distributions over the complex projective space they do reproduce pretty much everything else in quantum mechanics. The Kochen-Specker theorem is examined in the light of these models, and the rather mild nature of the manifested contextuality is discussed.
Certain concrete "ontological models" for quantum mechanics (models in which measurement outcomes are deterministic and quantum states are equivalent to classical probability distributions over some space of `hidden variables') are examined. The models are generalizations of Kochen and Specker's such model for a single 2-dimensional system - in particular a model for a three dimensional quantum system is considered in detail. Unfortunately, it appears the models do not quite reproduce the quantum mechanical statistics. They do, however, come close to doing so, and in as much as they simply involve probability distributions over the complex projective space they do reproduce pretty much everything else in quantum mechanics. The Kochen-Specker theorem is examined in the light of these models, and the rather mild nature of the manifested contextuality is discussed.
The Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem establishes the impossibility of a noncontextual hidden variable model of quantum theory, or equivalently, that quantum theory is contextual. In this paper, an operational definition of contextuality is introduced which generalizes the standard notion in three ways: (i) it applies to arbitrary operational theories rather than just quantum theory, (ii) it applies to arbitrary experimental procedures rather than just sharp measurements, and (iii) it applies to a broad class of ontological models of quantum theory rather than just deterministic hidden variable models. We derive three no-go theorems for ontological models, each based on an assumption of noncontextuality for a different sort of experimental procedure; one for preparation procedures, another for unsharp measurement procedures (that is, measurement procedures associated with positive-operator valued measures), and a third for transformation procedures. All three proofs apply to two-dimensional Hilbert spaces, and are therefore stronger than traditional proofs of contextuality.
When it isn't possible to tell two distinct experimental procedures apart purely from their input/output statistics, then it seems a plausible hypothesis that the two procedures must be physically identical. We call such a hypothesis "noncontextuality", an instance of Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Read in the contrapositive, this hypothesis entails that any physical distinctions between two experimental procedures must necessarily lead to a difference in their operational statistics. The results I present in this thesis concern the failure of this hypothesis -- a failure dubbed "contextuality" -- when one tries to embed an operational theory (such as quantum theory) in the ontological models framework. The Kochen-Specker theorem demonstrates the failure of noncontextuality for deterministic ontological models of quantum theory, i.e., those ontological models where the ontic/physical state of the system fixes the outcome of any projective measurement on the system in a deterministic manner. This thesis goes beyond the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem by asking what operational facts must be verified in experiments to conclude that Nature does not admit noncontextual ontological models, not even indeterministic ones. This leads to noncontextuality inequalities that are robust to noise in the preparations and measurements. In the particular case of quantum theory, these inequalities are meaningful even when unsharp measurements (or POVMs) are allowed, a feature not shared by the traditional approach to KS-noncontextuality where unsharp measurements are excluded by fiat: allowing them renders even trivial POVMs (proportional to identity) maximally KS-contextual. The sense in which trivial POVMs are indeed "trivial" (or "noncontextual") is clear in our approach: they are simply too noisy to lead to violation of our noncontextuality inequalities.
The presence of contextuality in quantum theory was first highlighted by Bell, Kochen and Specker, who discovered that for quantum systems of three or more dimensions, measurements could not be viewed as deterministically revealing pre-existing properties of the system. More precisely, no model can assign deterministic outcomes to the projectors of a quantum measurement in a way that depends only on the projector and not the context (the full set of projectors) in which it appeared, despite the fact that the Born rule probabilities associated with projectors are independent of the context. A more general, operational definition of contextuality introduced by Spekkens, which we will term 'probabilistic contextuality', drops the assumption of determinism and allows for operations other than measurements to be considered contextual. Even two-dimensional quantum mechanics can be shown to be contextual under this generalised notion. Probabilistic noncontextuality represents the postulate that elements of an operational theory that cannot be distinguished from each other based on the statistics of arbitrarily many repeated experiments (they give rise to the same operational probabilities) are ontologically identical. In this paper, we introduce a framework that enables us to distinguish between different noncontextuality assumptions in terms of the relationships between the ontological representations of objects in the theory given a certain relation between their operational representations. This framework can be used to motivate and define a 'possibilistic' analogue, encapsulating the idea that elements of an operational theory that cannot be unambiguously distinguished operationally can also not be unambiguously distinguished ontologically. We then prove that possibilistic noncontextuality is equivalent to an alternative notion of noncontextuality proposed by Hardy. Finally, we demonstrate that these weaker noncontextuality assumptions are sufficient to prove alternative versions of known 'no-go' theorems that constrain ψ -epistemic models for quantum mechanics.
This paper examines no-hidden-variables theorems in quantum mechanics from the point of view of statistical mechanics. It presents a general analysis of the measurement process in the Boltzmannian framework that leads to a characterization of (in)compatible measurements and reproduces several features of quantum probabilities often described as “non-classical”. The analysis is applied to versions of the Kochen–Specker and Bell theorems to shed more light on their implications. It is shown how, once the measurement device and the active role of the measurement process are taken into account, contextuality appears as a natural feature of random variables. This corroborates Bell’s criticism that no-go results of the Kochen–Specker type are based on gratuitous assumptions. In contrast, Bell-type theorems are much more profound, but should be understood as nonlocality theorems rather than no-hidden-variables theorems. Finally, the paper addresses misunderstandings and misleading terminology that have confused the debate about hidden variables in quantum mechanics.
The question of a hidden variable interpretation of quantum contextuality in the Mermin-Peres square is considered. The Kochen-Specker theorem implies that quantum mechanics may be interpreted as a contextual hidden-variable theory. It is shown that such a hidden-variable description can be viewed as either contextual in the random variables mapping hidden states to observable outcomes or in the probability measure on the hidden state space. The latter view suggests that this apparent contextuality may be interpreted as a simple consequence of measurement disturbance, wherein the initial hidden state is altered through interaction with the measuring device, thereby giving rise to a possibly different final hidden-variable state from which the measurement outcome is obtained. In light of this observation, a less restrictive and, arguably, more reasonable definition of noncontextuality is suggested. To prove that such a description is possible, an explicit and, in this sense, noncontextual hidden-variable model is constructed, which reproduces all quantum theoretic predictions for the Mermin-Peres square. A critical analysis of some recent and proposed experimental tests of contextuality is also provided. Although the discussion is restricted to a four-dimensional Hilbert space, the approach and conclusions are expected to generalize to any Hilbert space.
Quantum contextuality is a concept used to describe the property of hidden-variable theory that measurement outcomes predetermined by the hidden variables depend on the measurement context. The term measurement context can have different meanings, giving rise to different flavours of quantum contextuality. The first discovered flavour is Kochen-Specker (KS) contextuality where measurement outcomes will depend on what compatible measurements are jointly performed with the selected measurement. Another flavour, here to be compared with KS contextuality, is that referred to in Bohmian mechanics where outcomes of some specific measurements are not completely specified by the model state, but depend also on specifics of the measurement device used. It has been claimed that this type of Bohmian contextuality is necessary to enable KS contextuality in a hidden variable model. In this paper we show that this is not the case. The recently proposed Contextual Ontological Model (COM) [Hindlycke and Larsson, Phys. Rev. Lett. 2022] produces KS contextual predictions but does not have the Bohmian contextuality; the outcome of every measurement allowed by COM can be predicted from the model state itself. This distinguishes Bohmian contextuality from KS contextuality, and enables individual study of the two concepts.