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arXiv:quant-ph/9801032

On Stapp-Unruh-Mermin Discussion on Quantum Nonlocality: Quantum Jumps and Relativity

Vladimir S. Mashkevich

Published Jan 15, 1998• 1 citation
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Abstract

We argue that the participants of the discussion have overlooked an essential circumstance, in view of which Stapp's fifth proposition fails. The circumstance is that though $L$ and $R$ measurements, being causally separated, are not invariantly time ordered, quantum-jump hypersurfaces associated with the measurements are causelikewise ordered. Stapp's fifth proposition is true iff $L$ hypersurface precedes $R$ one; but within the limits of special relativity, it is impossible to determine the causelike order of those hypersurfaces. The entire Stapp's construct is revised.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/9801032

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We argue that the participants of the discussion have overlooked an essential circumstance, in view of which Stapp's fifth proposition fails. The circumstance is that though LLL and RRR measurements, being causally separated, are not invariantly time ordered, quantum-jump hypersurfaces associated with the measurements are causelikewise ordered. Stapp's fifth proposition is true iff LLL hypersurface precedes RRR one; but within the limits of special relativity, it is impossible to determine the causelike order of those hypersurfaces. The entire Stapp's construct is revised.
A 1997 paper by Henry Stapp attempts to achieve a definitive argument for his long-sustained thesis that quantum mechanics implies a nonlocality inconsistent with the locality of relativity theory. His argument assumes both the validity of counterfactual reasoning under certain circumstances and the free choice of performance of experiments, and it specifically refrains from any assumptions about “elements of physical reality” as understood by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. In Sec. I we drastically condense his argument but retain his central principle of inference, called “LOC2,” which he claims is a consequence of relativistic locality. By careful attention to counterfactual reasoning we then throw doubt upon this claim and hence upon his argument as a whole. In Sec. II we answer Stapp’s reply to our critique of the 1997 paper. Section III is a postscript, commenting briefly on Stapp’s answer to Sec. II.
A recent proof [H. P. Stapp, Am. J. Phys. 65, 300 (1997)], formulated in the symbolic language of modal logic, claims to show that contemporary quantum theory, viewed as a set of rules that allow us to calculate statistical predictions among certain kinds of observations, cannot be imbedded in any rational framework that conforms to the principles that (1) the experimenters' choices of which experiments they will perform can be considered to be free choices, (2) outcomes of measurements are unique, and (3) the free choices just mentioned have no backward-in-time effects of any kind. This claim is similar to Bell's theorem, but much stronger, because no reality assumption alien to quantum philosophy is used. The paper being commented on [W. Unruh, Phys. Rev. A 59, 126 (1999)] argues that some such reality assumption has been ``smuggled'' in. That argument is examined here and shown, I believe, to be defective.
Recent discussions by Mermin [1] and Stapp [2] in this journal on non-locality and counterfactuality are shown to contain linguistic problems that require verification. As such they can at most provide us with two subjective choices for the meaning of 'counterfactual statements' in quantum mechanics. We shall show that the word 'counterfactual' is in fact inappropriate here and should be replaced by the word 'hypothetical'. Mermin's choice imposes a strictly contextual meaning based upon an interpretation of counterfactuality which he used to refute, without proof as we shall see, Stapp's logical proof [3] of non-locality in quantum theory. In linguistic theory both authors' choices of meaning: counterfactual versus hypothetical are equally acceptable and therefore some of the issues they discussed lie outside the domain of physics. The issues they discussed are further confused by the fact that in his reply Stapp [2] seems to have adopted Mermin's counterfactual interpretation against his own original [3] hypothetical interpretation. In the rest of this paper we shall adopt the hypothetical sense of Stapp's original statements but we modify his crucial statement LOC2 appropriately, then following his argumentations, we shall show that there is no conflict between relativity and quantum mechanics. We suggest that this should be the natural (pragmatic) choice of meaning in defining the predictions of events in the Hardy experiment.
If several interventions performed on a quantum system are localized in mutually spacelike regions, they will be recorded as a sequence of ``quantum jumps'' in one Lorentz frame, and as a different sequence of jumps in another Lorentz frame. Conditions are specified that must be obeyed by the various operators involved in the calculations, so that these two different sequences lead to the same observable results. These conditions are similar to the equal-time commutation relations in quantum field theory. They are sufficient to prevent superluminal signaling. (The derivation of these results does not require most of the contents of the preceding article [Peres, Phys. Rev. A 61, 022116 (2000)]. What is needed is briefly summarized here, so that the present article is essentially self-contained.)
Gisin has provided an argument for the conclusion that no covariant nonlocal model can reproduce the operational statistics observed in Bell experiments. Gisin's argument applies only to deterministic models and we argue that proposed generalizations of the argument beyond determinism based solely on statistical notions are unconvincing, as they lack the resources to formulate a satisfactory notion of no-retrocausality. We introduce the framework of frame-indexed causal models in order to extend Gisin's argument to the genuinely probabilistic case. Frame-indexed causal models associate potentially different causal models with different reference frames while requiring corresponding operational variables to agree runwise. Within this framework, we establish two no-go results based on Gisin's argument. First, we show that no empirically adequate frame-indexed causal model can jointly satisfy Independent Settings, No-Retrocausality, and Causal Lorentz Invariance. Second, it is established that this result continues to hold when Causal Lorentz Invariance is weakened to Lorentz Invariance of Causal Connections, which requires only the skeleton of the causal structure to remain invariant, thereby allowing the direction of causal influence to depend on the choice of reference frame. These results are discussed in the context of relativistic interpretations of quantum theory and nonclassical causal inference.