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arXiv:quant-ph/9709056 · Journal of Physics A Mathematical and General

Quantum mechanics and elements of reality inferred from joint measurements

Adán Cabello, Guillermo García-Alcaine

Published Jan 21, 1997• 2 citations
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Abstract

The Einstein - Podolsky - Rosen argument on quantum mechanics incompleteness is formulated in terms of elements of reality inferred from joint (as opposed to alternative) measurements, in two examples involving entangled states of three spin- particles. The same states allow us to obtain proofs of the incompatibility between quantum mechanics and elements of reality.

DOI
10.1088/0305-4470/30/2/032

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The Einstein - Podolsky - Rosen argument on quantum mechanics incompleteness is formulated in terms of elements of reality inferred from joint (as opposed to alternative) measurements, in two examples involving entangled states of three spin- particles. The same states allow us to obtain proofs of the incompatibility between quantum mechanics and elements of reality.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics involves two assumptions: one about locality and the other about when it is legitimate to infer the existence of an element-of-reality. Using one simple thought experiment, we argue that quantum predictions and the relativity of simultaneity require that both these assumptions fail, whether or not quantum mechanics is complete. EPR’s (1935) argument for the incompleteness of QM turns upon the following sufficient condition: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.“ EPR apply this condition in a case where knowledge gained from measuring one quantum system allows one to predict with certainty a value for a physical quantity on another.
Based on (i) the physical principle of local causality and (ii) a certain notion of elements of reality, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen put forward an argument showing that physical instances may exist in which two noncommuting observables can be joint elements of the physical reality. Here, we introduce a new criterion of joint reality. We demonstrate that according to this criterion, quantum mechanics generally prevents noncommuting observables from having joint elements of reality. In addition, we introduce a measure to quantify the extent to which the criterion is violated and explore the implications of such a measure in connection with incompatibility and correlations. Our findings suggest new manners of interpreting quantum phenomena.
In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called "Reality Criterion" imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics. There must be, they concluded, a more complete description of physical reality behind quantum mechanics. There must be a state, a hidden variable, characterizing the state of affairs in the world in more details than the quantum mechanical state, something that also reflects the missing elements of reality. Under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion implies that in some spin-correlation experiments the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities). The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities. And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments in the last three decades. The problem is still open and hotly debated among both physicists and philosophers. It has motivated a wide range of research from the most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will.
Over fifty years ago Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen published a striking argument that quantum theory provides only an incomplete description of physical reality – that is, that some elements of physical reality fail to have a counterpart in quantum-theoretical description. What made this a challenge to the quantum-theoretical Weltanschauung was the very mild character of the sufficient condition for the reality of a physical quantity on which their argument hinged: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.” The argument consists in pointing out that it is possible to construct a quantum-mechanical state ψ with the following properties: The state ψ describes two noninteracting systems (I and II). In almost all discussions the two systems are taken to be two particles, and the absence of relevant interaction is built in by taking ψ to assign negligible probability to finding the particles closer together than some macroscopically large distance. By measuring an observable A of system I, one can predict with certainty the result of a subsequent measurement of a corresponding observable P of system II. If, instead, one chooses to measure a different observable B of system I, one can predict with certainty the result of a subsequent measurement of a corresponding observable Q of system II. The observables P and Q are represented in quantum theory by noncommuting operators, which means that they cannot both have definite values.
What if Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen were right that quantum mechanics is incomplete, and there do exist ‘‘elements-of-reality’’ corresponding to all observables whether or not they are compatible? The implications are surprising. Not only must the values of these elements-of-reality depend upon what measurements are actually performed on the system, but also upon measurements performed at spacelike separation from it! The former dependence has been dubbed ‘‘contextualism,’’ and the latter ‘‘nonlocality.’’ It is important for students to understand the necessity of these two features, if only to reinforce the point that a straightforward classical recasting of quantum theory in terms of pre-existing measurement independent elements-of-reality is not feasible. Unfortunately the argument for contextualism, in particular, is daunting due to its reliance on an elaborate geometrical argument. I aim here to minimize the geometry needed to argue for contextualism by using some ideas inspired by the original arguments of Bell and of Kochen and Specker. Using similar methods, I simplify the closely related geometrical argument for nonlocality due to Heywood and Redhead and to Stairs.