A source of much difficulty and confusion in the interpretation of quantum mechanics is a ``naive realism about operators.'' By this we refer to various ways of taking too seriously the notion of operator-as-observable, and in particular to the all too casual talk about ``measuring operators'' that occurs when the subject is quantum mechanics. Without a specification of what should be meant by ``measuring'' a quantum observable, such an expression can have no clear meaning. A definite specification is provided by Bohmian mechanics, a theory that emerges from Schrodinger's equation for a system of particles when we merely insist that ``particles'' means particles. Bohmian mechanics clarifies the status and the role of operators as observables in quantum mechanics by providing the operational details absent from standard quantum mechanics. It thereby allows us to readily dismiss all the radical claims traditionally enveloping the transition from the classical to the quantum realm---for example, that we must abandon classical logic or classical probability. The moral is rather simple: Beware naive realism, especially about operators!
A source of much difficulty and confusion in the interpretation of quantum mechanics is a naive realism about operators.'' By this we refer to various ways of taking too seriously the notion of operator-as-observable, and in particular to the all too casual talk about measuring operators'' that occurs when the subject is quantum mechanics. Without a specification of what should be meant by measuring'' a quantum observable, such an expression can have no clear meaning. A definite specification is provided by Bohmian mechanics, a theory that emerges from Schrodinger's equation for a system of particles when we merely insist that particles'' means particles. Bohmian mechanics clarifies the status and the role of operators as observables in quantum mechanics by providing the operational details absent from standard quantum mechanics. It thereby allows us to readily dismiss all the radical claims traditionally enveloping the transition from the classical to the quantum realm---for example, that we must abandon classical logic or classical probability. The moral is rather simple: Beware naive realism, especially about operators!
Bohmian mechanics is the most naively obvious embedding imaginable of Schrödinger’s equation into a completely coherent physical theory. It describes a world in which particles move in a highly non-Newtonian sort of way, one which may at first appear to have little to do with the spectrum of predictions of quantum mechanics. It turns out, however, that as a consequence of the defining dynamical equations of Bohmian mechanics, when a system has wave function ψ its configuration is typically random, with probability density ρ given by |ψ|², the quantum equilibrium distribution. It also turns out that the entire quantum formalism, operators as observables and all the rest, naturally emerges in Bohmian mechanics from the analysis of “measurements.” This analysis reveals the status of operators as observables in the description of quantum phenomena, and facilitates a clear view of the range of applicability of the usual quantum mechanical formulas.
A type of mechanics will be presented that possesses some distinctive properties. On the one hand, its physical description & rules of operation are readily comprehensible & intuitively clear. On the other, it fully satisfies all observable predictions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Within it, particles exist at points in space, follow continuous, piecewise differentiable paths, and their linear momentum is equal to their mass times their velocity along their path. Yet the probabilities for position and momentum, conditioned on the state of the particle's environment, follow the rules of quantum theory. Indeed, all observable consequences of quantum theory are satisfied; particles can be entangled, have intrinsic spin, this spin is not local to the particle, particle identity can effect probabilities, and so forth. All the rules of quantum mechanics are obeyed, and all arise in a straightforward fashion. After this is established, connections will be drawn out between this type of mechanics and other types of quantum worlds; those that obey Bohmian mechanics, stochastic mechanics, the many worlds interpretation, and physical collapse. In the final section, a relativistic version of the mechanics will be presented.
Introduction It is not exaggeration to claim that one of the major divides in the foundations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics derives from the way physicists and philosophers understand the status of the wave function. On the instrumentalist side of the camp, the wave function is regarded as a mere instrument to calculate probabilities that have been established by previous measurement outcomes. On the other “realistic” camp, the wave function is regarded as a new physical entity or a physical field of some sort. While both sides agree about the existence of quantum “particles” (the so-called theoretical entities), and therefore reject the radical agnosticism about them preached by van Fraassen (1980), the various “realistic” (and consequently, instrumentalist) philosophies of quantum mechanics are typically formulated in different, logically independent ways, so their implications need to be further investigated. For instance, on the one hand it seems plausible to claim that a realistic stance about the wave function is not the only way to defend “realism” about quantum theory. One can support a “flash” or a “density-of-stuff ” ontology (two variants of GRW), or an ontology of particles with well-defined positions (as in Bohmian mechanics), as primitive ontologies for observer-independent formulations of quantum mechanics (Allori, Goldstein, Tumulka and Zanghí, 2008). “Primitive ontologies”, as here are understood, are not only a fundamental ground for other ontological posits, but also entail a commitment to something concretely existing in spacetime (see also Allori, 2013). On the other hand, however, it is still debated whether such primitive ontologies can be autonomous from some form of realism about the wave function (Albert, 1996). In order to discuss this problem, we begin with a preliminary clarification of the meaning of “realism” and “instrumentalism” in physics, which are often subject to ideological and abstract discussions that often have little to do with the practice of physics (Section 9.2).
Abstract In stark contrast to classical Newtonian mechanics, the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics associates the Schrödinger wavefunction, not in a determ- inistic way with definite predictions about a specific, individual experimental result, but only in a probabilistic manner, with |ψ(x, t )|2 acting as a probability density, in this case, for position measurements. Before analyzing this approach in more detail, we will find it profitable to briefly review some of the basic concepts of discrete and