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arXiv:quant-ph/9511032

Remarks on Consistent Histories and Bohmian Mechanics

Adrian Kent

Published Nov 22, 1995• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Recent work with Dowker on the scientific status of the consistent histories approach to quantum theory is reviewed and summarised. The approach is compared with formulations of quantum theory, such as Bohmian mechanics and the Copenhagen interpretation a la Landau-Lifshitz, in which classical variables are explicitly appended. I try to explain why the consistent histories formulation is scientifically problematic, in that it is a very weak theory, but also scientifically interesting, shedding new light on quantum theory.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/9511032

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Recent work with Dowker on the scientific status of the consistent histories approach to quantum theory is reviewed and summarised. The approach is compared with formulations of quantum theory, such as Bohmian mechanics and the Copenhagen interpretation a la Landau-Lifshitz, in which classical variables are explicitly appended. I try to explain why the consistent histories formulation is scientifically problematic, in that it is a very weak theory, but also scientifically interesting, shedding new light on quantum theory.
The predictions of the Bohmian and the decoherent (or consistent) histories formulations of the quantum mechanics of a closed system are compared for histories---sequences of alternatives at a series of times. For certain kinds of histories, Bohmian mechanics and decoherent histories may both be formulated in the same mathematical framework within which they can be compared. In that framework, Bohmian mechanics and decoherent histories represent a given history by different operators. Their predictions for the probabilities of histories of a closed system therefore generally differ. However, in an idealized model of measurement, the predictions of Bohmian mechanics and decoherent histories coincide for the probabilities of records of measurement outcomes. The formulations are thus difficult to distinguish experimentally. They may differ in their accounts of the past history of the Universe in quantum cosmology.
The foundations of quantum mechanics have been plagued by controversy throughout the 85 year history of the field. It is argued that lack of clarity in the formulation of basic philosophical questions leads to unnecessary obscurity and controversy and an attempt is made to identify the main forks in the road that separate the most important interpretations of quantum theory. The consistent histories formulation, also known as "consistent quantum theory", is described as one particular way (favored by the author) to answer the essential questions of interpretation. The theory is shown to be a realistic formulation of quantum mechanics, in contrast to the orthodox or Copenhagen formulation which will be referred to as an operationalist theory.
There are good motivations for considering some type of quantum histories formalism. Several possible formalisms are known, defined by different definitions of event and by different selection criteria for sets of histories. These formalisms have a natural interpretation, according to which nature somehow chooses one set of histories from among those allowed, and then randomly chooses to realise one history from that set; other interpretations are possible, but their scientific implications are essentially the same. The selection criteria proposed to date are reasonably natural, and certainly raise new questions. For example, the validity of ordering inferences which we normally take for granted – such as that a particle in one region is necessarily in a larger region containing it – depends on whether or not our history respects the criterion of ordered consistency, or merely consistency. However, the known selection criteria, including consistency and medium decoherence, are very weak. It is not possible to derive the predictions of classical mechanics or Copenhagen quantum mechanics from the theories they define, even given observational data in an extended time interval. Attempts to refine the consistent histories approach so as to solve this problem by finding a definition of quasiclassicality have so far not succeeded. On the other hand, it is shown that dynamical collapse models, of the type originally proposed by Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber, can be re-interpreted as set selection criteria within a quantum histories framework, in which context they appear as candidate solutions to the set selection problem. This suggests a new route to relativistic generalisation of these models, since covariant definitions of a quantum event are known.
Within the last decade, significant progress has been made towards a consistent and complete reformulation of the Copenhagen interpretation (an interpretation consisting in a formulation of the experimental aspects of physics in terms of the basic formalism; it is consistent if free from internal contradiction and complete if it provides precise predictions for all experiments). The main steps involved decoherence (the transition from linear superpositions of macroscopic states to a mixing), Griffiths histories describing the evolution of quantum properties, a convenient logical structure for dealing with histories, and also some progress in semiclassical physics, which was made possible by new methods. The main outcome is a theory of phenomena, viz., the classically meaningful properties of a macroscopic system. It shows in particular how and when determinism is valid. This theory can be used to give a deductive form to measurement theory, which now covers some cases that were initially devised as counterexamples against the Copenhagen interpretation. These theories are described, together with their applications to some key experiments and some of their consequences concerning epistemology.
Some mostly recent theoretical and mathematical advances can be linked together to yield a new consistent interpretation of quantum mechanics. It relies upon a unique and universal interpretative rule of a logical character which is based upon Griffiths consistent historie. Some new results in semi-classical physics allow to derive classical physics from this rule, including its logical aspects, and to prove accordingly the existence of determinism within the quantum framework. Together with decoherence, this can be used to retrieve the existence of facts, despite the probabilistic character of the theory. Measurement theory can then be made entirely deductive. It is accordingly found that wave packet reduction is a logical property, whereas one can always choose to avoid using it. The practical consequences of this interpretation are most often in agreement with the Copenhagen formulation but they can be proved never to give rise to any logical inconsistency or paradox.
The consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics is a reformulation of the standard Copenhagen interpretation that aims at incorporating quantum probabilities as part of the axiomatic foundations of the theory. It is not only supposed to equip quantum mechanics with clear criteria of its own experimental verification but, first and foremost, to alleviate one of the stumbling blocks of the theory ‐ the measurement problem. Since the consistent histories interpretation operates with a series of quantum events integrated into one quantum history, the measurement problem is naturally absorbed as one of the events that build up a history. The interpretation rests upon the two following assumptions, proposed already by J. von Neumann: (1) both the microscopic and macroscopic regimes are subject to the same set of quantum laws and (2) a projector operator that is assigned to each event within a history permits to transcribe the history into