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arXiv:quant-ph/9510007 · Foundations of Physics

On a possibility to find experimental evidence for the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics

R. Plaga

Published Apr 1, 1997• 18 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/bf02550677

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Recognizing that syntactic and semantic structures of classical logic are not sufficient to understand the meaning of quantum phenomena, we propose in this paper a new interpretation of quantum mechanics based on evidence theory. The connection between these two theories is obtained through a new language, quantum set theory, built on a suggestion by J. Bell. Further, we give a modal logic interpretation of quantum mechanics and quantum set theory by using Kripke's semantics of modal logic based on the concept of possible worlds. This is grounded on previous work of a number of researchers (Resconi, Klir, Harmanec) who showed how to represent evidence theory and other uncertainty theories in terms of modal logic. Moreover, we also propose a reformulation of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics in terms of Kripke's semantics. We thus show how three different theories — quantum mechanics, evidence theory, and modal logic — are interrelated. This opens, on one hand, the way to new applications of quantum mechanics within domains different from the traditional ones, and, on the other hand, the possibility of building new generalizations of quantum mechanics itself.

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The three major theoretical principles of quantum mechanics relevant to its interpretation are: (T1), linearity; (T2), invariance under certain groups; and (T3) the orthogonality and isolation of the different branches of the state vector. These three imply the particle-like properties of mass, energy, momentum, spin, charge, and locality are actually properties of the state vector; and this in turn implies there is no evidence for the existence of particles. Experimentally there is no evidence for collapse (E1) and theoretically linearity prohibits collapse. One also has the experimentally verified probability law (E2), which is found to rule out the many-worlds interpretation. The failure of these three major interpretation, particles, collapse, and many-worlds, apparently implies an acceptable interpretation must be based on perception. Rather than being a separate principle, probability follows in this interpretation from a weak assumption on perception plus the combinatorics when an experiment is run many times. This suggests a relatively simple experimental test of the perception interpretation.

arXiv:0910.3850•Oct 20, 2009•0 citations
Recognizing that syntactic and semantic structures of classical logic are not sufficient to understand the meaning of quantum phenomena, we propose in this paper a new interpretation of quantum mechanics based on evidence theory. The connection between these two theories is obtained through a new language, quantum set theory, built on a suggestion by J. Bell. Further, we give a modal logic interpretation of quantum mechanics and quantum set theory by using Kripke's semantics of modal logic based on the concept of possible worlds. This is grounded on previous work of a number of researchers (Resconi, Klir, Harmanec) who showed how to represent evidence theory and other uncertainty theories in terms of modal logic. Moreover, we also propose a reformulation of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics in terms of Kripke's semantics. We thus show how three different theories — quantum mechanics, evidence theory, and modal logic — are interrelated. This opens, on one hand, the way to new applications of quantum mechanics within domains different from the traditional ones, and, on the other hand, the possibility of building new generalizations of quantum mechanics itself.
In an attempt to search for evidence that gravity is not quantised, Page and Geilker (1981) have looked for those components of the wavefunctions in an Everett-type interpretation of quantum mechanics which are usually assumed unobservable, in an experiment involving gravitational attraction between two lead balls. It is pointed out that they use one of several possible interpretations of this type, an interpretation the author claims to be untenable, as it is not consistent with a very wide range of experimental evidence.
The three major theoretical principles of quantum mechanics relevant to its interpretation are: (T1), linearity; (T2), invariance under certain groups; and (T3) the orthogonality and isolation of the different branches of the state vector. These three imply the particle-like properties of mass, energy, momentum, spin, charge, and locality are actually properties of the state vector; and this in turn implies there is no evidence for the existence of particles. Experimentally there is no evidence for collapse (E1) and theoretically linearity prohibits collapse. One also has the experimentally verified probability law (E2), which is found to rule out the many-worlds interpretation. The failure of these three major interpretation, particles, collapse, and many-worlds, apparently implies an acceptable interpretation must be based on perception. Rather than being a separate principle, probability follows in this interpretation from a weak assumption on perception plus the combinatorics when an experiment is run many times. This suggests a relatively simple experimental test of the perception interpretation.