Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:quant-ph/0701016 · Foundations of Physics

Reply to Comments of Bassi, Ghirardi, and Tumulka on the Free Will Theorem

John Conway, Simon Kochen

Published Oct 1, 2007• 14 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/s10701-007-9173-1

Related papers

Consistent Quantum Realism: A Reply to Bassi and Ghirardi

Robert B. Griffiths

arXiv:quant-ph/0001093•Journal of Statistical Physics•Jun 1, 2000•20 citations

Comment on “The Free Will Theorem”

Roderich Tumulka

arXiv:quant-ph/0611283•Foundations of Physics•Jan 13, 2007•59 citations

On the notion of free will in the Free Will Theorem

Klaas Landsman

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics•Nov 24, 2016•7 citations

Counting Marbles with 'Accessible' Mass Density: A Reply to Bassi and Ghirardi

R. Clifton, Bradley Monton

In a previous article (cf. quant-ph/9905065) we argued that, while Lewis is correct that the enumeration principle fails in dynamical wavepacket reduction theories, one need not following Lewis in rejecting these theories. Because the dynamical reduction process itself prevents the failure of enumeration from ever becoming manifest, and because one can treat the semantics for dynamical reduction theories as not adding anything of ontological import to them, it is reasonable to accept these theories notwithstanding Lewis's counting anomaly. In their response to our paper (cf. quant-ph/9907050), Bassi and Ghirardi reject our criticisms of their own response to Lewis, as well as our argument against Lewis that dynamical reduction precludes failures of enumeration from ever becoming manifest. Our intention here is to demonstrate that Bassi and Ghirardi's responses to us do not succeed.

arXiv:quant-ph/9909071•The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•Mar 1, 2000•22 citations

The Free Will Theorem and Limits on Realistic Theories

Christopher Godfrey

Bulletin of the American Physical Society•Mar 17, 2010•0 citations

Comment on "Dynamical reduction models" by A. Bassi and G.C. Ghirardi (arXiv:quant-ph/0302164)

Fred H. Thaheld

Bassi and Ghirardi have developed a new theory to address the measurement problem based upon non-linear and stochastic modifications of the Schroedinger equation, which has been given the name Quantum Mechanical Spontaneous Localization or QMSL, with one of the emphasis dealing with reduction or wavefunction collapse within the nervous system. Analysis of this portion of their theory reveals that it faces several problems.

arXiv:0901.4071•Jan 26, 2009•7 citations
In a previous article (cf. quant-ph/9905065) we argued that, while Lewis is correct that the enumeration principle fails in dynamical wavepacket reduction theories, one need not following Lewis in rejecting these theories. Because the dynamical reduction process itself prevents the failure of enumeration from ever becoming manifest, and because one can treat the semantics for dynamical reduction theories as not adding anything of ontological import to them, it is reasonable to accept these theories notwithstanding Lewis's counting anomaly. In their response to our paper (cf. quant-ph/9907050), Bassi and Ghirardi reject our criticisms of their own response to Lewis, as well as our argument against Lewis that dynamical reduction precludes failures of enumeration from ever becoming manifest. Our intention here is to demonstrate that Bassi and Ghirardi's responses to us do not succeed.