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arXiv:quant-ph/0607057 · Foundations of Physics

Against ‘Realism’

Travis Norsen

Published Feb 3, 2007• 83 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/s10701-007-9104-1

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The framework of a simple opposition realism – anti-realism is not enough to analyze the views on the reality of unobservable objects of quantum theory. First, it is necessary to distinguish between realism in relation to the theory and realism in relation to the theory’s objects. Secondly, realism in relation to classical objects can be combined, both with realism and with anti-realism in relation to quantum objects. Third, the concept of “existence” and “to exist objectively” can have different meanings. To take into account these factors, the article describes three approaches: classical realism, quantum anti-realism, and quantum realism. I show that the debate around quantum reality has intensified in recent decades due to a series of new quantum experiments. The current stage of the debate is caused by the second quantum revolution relating to the transfer and processing of quantum information. Classical realism and old versions of quantum anti-realism have become insufficiently effective to explain the results of a series of experiments. Proponents of quantum realism, in turn, refer to the possibility of using the wave function to manipulate quantum objects before their measurement. In conclusion, I assume that not only theoretical discussions but also experiments and new technologies can have a major impact on the seemingly purely philosophical debate about reality.
How are quantum mechanics and realism related? This paper will discuss whether or not the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics and the doctrine of philosophical realism are compatible. To answer this question, this paper will first introduce quantum mechanics and the Copenhagen Interpretation in terms of the particle in the box experiment. Then, philosophical realism will be introduced and defined. Finally, the relationship between the Copenhagen Interpretation and philosophical realism will be evaluated. Several points of the Copenhagen Interpretation appear to contradict philosophical realism; thus, it can be concluded that the Copenhagen Interpretation is not compatible with philosophical realism.