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arXiv:quant-ph/0606038

Remarks on an attempted axiomatisation of Quantum Mechanics, due to Lucien Hardy, and Ten Theses on Hilbert's Sixth Problem and Quantum Measurement

Joseph F. Johnson

Published Jun 6, 2006• 0 citations
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Abstract

From the standpoint of Hilbert's Sixth Problem, which is the axiomatisation of Physics, the famous paper of Lucien Hardy's, Quantum Theory from Five Reasonable Axioms, is not relevant. The present paper argues that Hardy does not give a physical definition of `limit', and if we assume the usual mathematical definition of limit of a sequence, he fails to define a sequence in physical terms to which the usual definition is applicable. We argue that one should not, in fact, try to define probability in terms of the usual notion of limit of a sequence of results of a measurement because of seemingly insurmountable difficulties in axiomatising the notion of function or sequence in this context. Von Plato's and the authour's work (see http:arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0502124 and euclid.unh.edu/~jjohnson/axiomatics.html for larger context and further references) on the definition of physical probability needs to be used in this context. We conclude with ten theses on quantum measurement, from the standpoint of the Hilbert problem.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0606038

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From the standpoint of Hilbert's Sixth Problem, which is the axiomatisation of Physics, the famous paper of Lucien Hardy's, Quantum Theory from Five Reasonable Axioms, is not relevant. The present paper argues that Hardy does not give a physical definition of `limit', and if we assume the usual mathematical definition of limit of a sequence, he fails to define a sequence in physical terms to which the usual definition is applicable. We argue that one should not, in fact, try to define probability in terms of the usual notion of limit of a sequence of results of a measurement because of seemingly insurmountable difficulties in axiomatising the notion of function or sequence in this context. Von Plato's and the authour's work (see http:arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0502124 and euclid.unh.edu/~jjohnson/axiomatics.html for larger context and further references) on the definition of physical probability needs to be used in this context. We conclude with ten theses on quantum measurement, from the standpoint of the Hilbert problem.
Analysing Quantum Measurement requires analysing the physics of amplification since amplification of phenomena from one scale to another scale is essential to measurement. There still remains the task of working this into an axiomatic logical structure, what should be the foundational status of the concepts of measurement and probability. We argue that the concept of physical probability is a multi-scale phenomenon and as such, can be explicitly defined in terms of more fundamental physical concepts. Thus Quantum Mechanics can be given a logically unexceptionable axiomatisation. We introduce a new definition of macroscopic observable which implements Bohr's insight that the observables of a measurement apparatus are classical in nature. In particular, we obtain the usual non-abelian observables as limits of abelian, classical, observables. This is the essential step in Hilbert's Sixth Problem.
We discuss the Hilbert program for the axiomatization of physics in the context of what Hilbert and von Neumann came to call the analytical apparatus and its conditions of reality.We suggest that the idea of a physical logic is the basis for a physical mathematics and we use quantum mechanics as a paradigm case for axiomatics in the sense of Hilbert.Finite probability theory requires finite derivations in the measurement theory of QM and we give a polynomial formulation of local complementation for the metric induced on the topology of the Hilbert space.The conclusion hints at a constructivist physics.
Abstract By formulating the axioms of quantum mechanics, von Neumann also laid the foundations of a “quantum probability theory”. As such, it is regarded a generalization of the “classical probability theory” due to Kolmogorov. Outside of quantum physics, however, Kolmogorov’s axioms enjoy universal applicability. This raises the question of whether quantum physics indeed requires such a generalization of our conception of probability or if von Neumann’s axiomatization of quantum mechanics was contingent on the absence of a general theory of probability in the 1920s. This work argues in favor of the latter position. In particular, it shows how to construct a mathematically rigorous theory for non-relativistic N -body quantum systems subject to a time-independent scalar potential, which is based on Kolmogorov’s axioms and physically natural random variables. Though this theory is provably distinct from its quantum-mechanical analog, it nonetheless reproduces central predictions of the latter. Further work may make an empirical comparison possible. Moreover, the approach can in principle be adapted to other classes of quantum-mechanical models. Part II of this series discusses the empirical violation of Bell inequalities in the context of this approach. Part III addresses the projection postulate and the question of measurement.
Quantum mechanics has several deficiencies as a complete theoretical description of the measurement process. Among them is the fact that the quantum mechanical description of correlations between the single measurements of a sequence is quite problematic. A single measurement is defined to be a preparation followed by an observation. In particular, one feels that an infinite sequence of such single measurements which corresponds to the measurement of a question O on a state η where η does not lie entirely in an eigenspace of O should generate a random output sequence. However, quantum mechanics seems to say nothing about this. In this paper, physical theories are defined in such a manner that correlations between single measurements are explicitly included. In particular, a physical theory is considered to be a mapping U, with domain in the set [Qsτ] of infinite instruction strings for carrying out infinite sequences of single measurements and range in the set of probability measures defined on A, the usual σ algebra of subsets of Ω. Ω is the set of all infinite sequences of natural numbers. A fundamental property which any valid physical theory must satisfy is that it agrees with experiment. It is proposed and discussed here that much of the intuitive meaning of agreement between a theory U and experiment with respect to H is given by the statement ∀Qsτ [U(Qsτ) defined⇒E(H,U(Qsτ),ψQsτ)],where U(Qsτ) is the probability measure U associates with the infinite instruction string Qsτ and ψQsτ is the outcome sequence obtained by carrying out Qsτ. E(H, U(Qsτ),ψQsτ) is the statement that all formulas in H with one free sequence variable which are true on Ω almost everywhere with respect to U(Qsτ) are true for ψQsτ. H is a subclass of the class of all formulas in a formal language L. A theorem is proved which states that, if U(Qsτ) corresponds to a nontrivial product probability measure and U H-agrees with experiment, then the outcome sequence ψQsτ is H-random. H-randomness is defined here in terms of the statement E(H, P, φ). Another property of a valid physical theory, which is defined here, is that, for some Qsτ, U(Qsτ) must be determinable on much of AH from ψQsτ. Sufficient conditions for this property to hold are given. AH is the class of all H definable subsets of Ω. Some properties of the statement E(H, P, φ) are given. Among other things, it is proved that, if E(H, P, φ) holds and P is a nontrivial probability measure on A, then φ is not definable in H.
In Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (1932) von Neumann made separability of Hilbert space an axiom. Subsequent work in mathematics (some of it by von Neumann himself) investigated non-separable Hilbert spaces, and mathematical physicists have sometimes made use of them. This note discusses some of the problems that arise in trying to treat quantum systems with non-separable spaces. Some of the problems are "merely technical" but others point to interesting foundations issues for quantum theory, both in its abstract mathematical form and its applications to physical systems. Nothing new or original is attempted here. Rather this note aims to bring into focus some issues that have for too long remained on the edge of consciousness for philosophers of physics.