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arXiv:quant-ph/0602009

A Quantum Gate as a Physical Model of an Universal Arithmetical Algorithm without Church's Undecidability and Godel's Incompleteness

Vladan Panković, Milan Predojević

Published Feb 1, 2006• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In this work we define an universal arithmetical algorithm, by means of the standard quantum mechanical formalism, called universal qm-arithmetical algorithm. By universal qm-arithmetical algorithm any decidable arithmetical formula (operation) can be decided (realized, calculated. Arithmetic defined by universal qm-arithmetical algorithm called qm-arithmetic one-to-one corresponds to decidable part of the usual arithmetic. We prove that in the qm-arithmetic the undecidable arithmetical formulas (operations) cannot exist (cannot be consistently defined). Or, we prove that qm-arithmetic has no undecidable parts. In this way we show that qm-arithmetic, that holds neither Church's undecidability nor Godel's incompleteness, is decidable and complete. Finally, we suggest that problems of the foundation of the arithmetic, can be solved by qm-arithmetic.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0602009

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In this work we define an universal arithmetical algorithm, by means of the standard quantum mechanical formalism, called universal qm-arithmetical algorithm. By universal qm-arithmetical algorithm any decidable arithmetical formula (operation) can be decided (realized, calculated. Arithmetic defined by universal qm-arithmetical algorithm called qm-arithmetic one-to-one corresponds to decidable part of the usual arithmetic. We prove that in the qm-arithmetic the undecidable arithmetical formulas (operations) cannot exist (cannot be consistently defined). Or, we prove that qm-arithmetic has no undecidable parts. In this way we show that qm-arithmetic, that holds neither Church's undecidability nor Godel's incompleteness, is decidable and complete. Finally, we suggest that problems of the foundation of the arithmetic, can be solved by qm-arithmetic.
A practical viewpoint links reality, representation, and language to calculation by the concept of Turing (1936) machine being the mathematical model of our computers. After the Gödel incompleteness theorems (1931) or the insolvability of the so-called halting problem (Turing 1936; Church 1936) as to a classical machine of Turing, one of the simplest hypotheses is completeness to be suggested for two ones. That is consistent with the provability of completeness by means of two independent Peano arithmetics discussed in Section I.Many modifications of Turing machines cum quantum ones are researched in Section II for the Halting problem and completeness, and the model of two independent Turing machines seems to generalize them.Then, that pair can be postulated as the formal definition of reality therefore being complete unlike any of them standalone, remaining incomplete without its complementary counterpart. Representation is formal defined as a one-to-one mapping between the two Turing machines, and the set of all those mappings can be considered as “language” therefore including metaphors as mappings different than representation. Section III investigates that formal relation of “reality”, “representation”, and “language” modeled by (at least two) Turing machines.The independence of (two) Turing machines is interpreted by means of game theory and especially of the Nash equilibrium in Section IV.Choice and information as the quantity of choices are involved. That approach seems to be equivalent to that based on set theory and the concept of actual infinity in mathematics and allowing of practical implementations.
Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorem refers to incompleteness in the sense that there are always statements which can be formulated within a formal system, but which re-main unproved within the system. Gödel’s theorem was first connected with the theory of computability by Alan Turing. Until recently, the inconsistency that Gödel’s theo-rem tackle has not been directly shown to correspond to any physical phenomenon. A recent article showed how to apply Gödel’s theorem in the context of many-body quan-tum mechanical calculations. Even so, it is still not known whether it can be applied to the most primitive quantum physical phenomena. In the present study, we used Gödel’s incompleteness theorem in the case of the quantum double-slit experiment by applying a proof of Turing machine’s halting problem. In addition, we made an analogy between Gödel’s theorem (and Church - Turing theses of computability), and quantum compu-ting by extrapolating the term “computation” as low as to the single-quantum level.
Logical foundation for quantum theory is considered. I claim that quantum theory correctly represents Nature when mathematical physics embraces and indeed features, logical anomalies inherent in pure mathematics. This approach links undecidability in arithmetic with the logic of quantum experiments. The undecidablity occupies an algebraic environment which is the missing foundation for the 3-valued logic predicted by Hans Reichenbach, shown by him to resolve `causal anomalies' of quantum mechanics, such as: inconsistency between prepared and measured states, complementarity between pairs of observables, and the EPR-paradox of action at a distance. Arithmetic basic to mathematical physics, is presented formally as a logical system consisting of axioms and propositions. Of special interest are all propositions asserting the existence of particular numbers. All numbers satisfying the axioms permeate the arithmetic indistinguishably, but these logically partition into two distinct sets: numbers whose existence the axioms determine by proof, and numbers whose existence axioms cannot determine, being neither provable nor negatable. Failure of mathematical physics to incorporate this logical distinction is seen as reason for quantum theory being logically at odds with quantum experiments. Nature is interpreted as having rules isomorphic to the abovementioned axioms with these governing arithmetical combinations of necessary and possible values or effects in experiments. Soundness and Completeness theorems from mathematical logic emerge as profoundly fundamental principles for quantum theory, making good intuitive sense of the subject.
In this work, we show that very natural, apparently simple problems in quantum measurement theory can be undecidable even if their classical analogues are decidable. Undecidability hence appears as a genuine quantum property here. Formally, an undecidable problem is a decision problem for which one cannot construct a single algorithm that will always provide a correct answer in finite time. The problem we consider is to determine whether sequentially used identical Stern-Gerlach-type measurement devices, giving rise to a tree of possible outcomes, have outcomes that never occur. Finally, we point out implications for measurement-based quantum computing and studies of quantum many-body models and suggest that a plethora of problems may indeed be undecidable.
It is possible in principle to construct quantum mechanical observables and unitary operators which, if implemented in physical systems as measurements and dynamical evolution, would contradict the Church-Turing thesis, which lies at the foundation of computer science. Elsewhere we have argued that the quantum measurement problem implies a finite, computational model of the measurement and evolution of quantum states. If correct, this approach helps to identify the key feature that can reconcile quantum mechanics with the Church-Turing thesis: finitude of the degree of fine-graining of Hilbert space. This suggests that the Church-Turing thesis constrains the physical universe and thereby highlights a surprising connection between purely logical and algorithmic considerations on the one hand and physical reality on the other.
We show how Gödel's first incompleteness theorem has an analog in quantum theory. Gödel's theorem implies endless opportunities for appending axioms to arithmetic, implicitly showing a role for an agent, namely an agent that asserts an axiom. There is an analog of this theorem in physics, to do with the set of explanations of given evidence. We prove that the set of explanations of given evidence is uncountably infinite, thereby showing how contact between theory and experiment depends on activity beyond computation and measurement -- physical activity characterized as agency.