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arXiv:quant-ph/0510120 · Canadian Journal of Physics

The epistemic view of quantum states and the ether

L Marchildon

Published Jan 15, 2006• 4 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The idea that the wave function represents information, or knowledge, rather than the state of a microscopic object has been held to solve foundational problems of quantum mechanics. Realist interpretation schemes, like Bohmian trajectories, have been compared to the ether in prerelativistic theories. I argue that the comparison is inadequate, and that the epistemic view of quantum states begs the question of interpretation.PACS Nos.: 03.65.Ta, 03.50.De, 03.30.+p

DOI
10.1139/p06-018

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The idea that the wave function represents information, or knowledge, rather than the state of a microscopic object has been held to solve foundational problems of quantum mechanics. Realist interpretation schemes, like Bohmian trajectories, have been compared to the ether in pre-relativistic theories. I argue that the comparison is inadequate, and that the epistemic view of quantum states begs the question of interpretation. PACS Nos.: 03.65.Ta, 03.50.De, 03.30.+p 1

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The idea that the wave function represents information, or knowledge, rather than the state of a microscopic object has been held to solve foundational problems of quantum mechanics. Realist interpretation schemes, like Bohmian trajectories, have been compared to the ether in prerelativistic theories. I argue that the comparison is inadequate, and that the epistemic view of quantum states begs the question of interpretation.PACS Nos.: 03.65.Ta, 03.50.De, 03.30.+p
A quantum state, via the Born Rule, assigns probabilities to the different possible values of observables of a quantum system. It is only in virtue of these probabilities — or, alternatively, expectation values — that quantum mechanics is empirically testable. Since assigning a state to a system means assigning probabilities to the values of observables, it may seem natural to read Peierls’ claim that the state ‘represents our knowledge of the system’ (Peierls [1991], p. 19) as a shorthand for saying that the state represents our knowledge of these probabilities. The latter view is sometimes even straightforwardly identified with the epistemic conception of states, for example by Marchildon, who claims that ‘[i]n the epistemic view [of quantum states], the state vector (or wave function or density matrix) does not represent the objective state of a microscopic system […], but rather our knowledge of the probabilities of outcomes of future measurements’ (Marchildon [2004], p. 1454). However, according to an argument due to Fuchs and endorsed by Timpson, 31 the idea that quantum states represent our knowledge about quantum probabilities should not be regarded as the core claim of the epistemic conception of quantum states, simply because, as they argue, this idea is in fact incompatible with the latter. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Abstract—Since the beginning, quantum mechanics has raised major foundational and interpretative problems. Foundational research has been an important factor in the development of quantum cryptography, quantum information theory and, per-haps one day, practical quantum computers. Many believe that, in turn, quantum information theory has bearing on foundational research. This is largely related to the so-called epistemic view of quantum states, which maintains that the state vector represents information on a system and which has led to the suggestion that quantum theory needs no interpretation. I will argue that this and related approaches fail to take into consideration two different explanatory functions of quantum mechanics, that of accounting for classically unexplainable correlations between classical phenomena and that of explaining the microscopic structure of classical objects. The epistemic view provides no answer to what constitutes the main question of interpretation: How can the world be for quantum mechanics to be true? I will then review three different approaches to understanding quan-tum mechanics, namely, Bohmian mechanics, Everett’s relative states, and Cramer’s transactional interpretation. I will show that these approaches answer the above question, as well as other foundational ones. This paper is written from the perspective that different logically consistent interpretations, far from leading to confusion, in fact contribute to increased understanding of the theory. I.
Since the beginning, quantum mechanics has raised major foundational and interpretative problems. Foundational research has been an important factor in the development of quantum cryptography, quantum information theory and, perhaps one day, practical quantum computers. Many believe that, in turn, quantum information theory has bearing on foundational research. This is largely related to the so-called epistemic view of quantum states, which maintains that the state vector represents information on a system and has led to the suggestion that quantum theory needs no interpretation. I will argue that this and related approaches fail to take into consideration two different explanatory functions of quantum mechanics, namely that of accounting for classically unexplainable correlations between classical phenomena and that of explaining the microscopic structure of classical objects. If interpreting quantum mechanics means answering the question, "How can the world be for quantum mechanics to be true?", there seems to be no way around it.
The most puzzling issue in the foundations of quantum mechanics is perhaps that of the status of the wave function of a system in a quantum universe. Is the wave function objective or subjective? Does it represent the physical state of the system or merely our information about the system? If the former, does it provide a complete or partial description of the system ? We address these questions mainly from a Bohmian perspective and argue that part of the difficulty in ascertaining the status of the wave function arises from the fact that there are two different sorts of wave functions involved. The most fundamental wave function is that of the universe, which, we argue, has a law-like character. From the wave function of the universe together with its configuration one can define the wave function of a subsystem of the universe. This, although objective, has a strong informational/subjective aspect.
The wave function gives probabilities, but is it a real physical quantity, as in the ontic interpretation of quantum mechanics, or just a measure of human belief about a physical system, as in an epistemic interpretation? These questions are introduced by treating Schrödinger’s cat and Wigner’s friend. An important question is whether quantum mechanics applies to macroscopic objects, for example, cats. SQUID experiments have been performed that see quantum interference in very large objects, whereas with most macroscopic objects quantum interference disappears because of decoherence. Various views of the meaning of quantum mechanics are discussed: the Copenhagen interpretation, continuous spontaneous localization, Everett’s many-worlds interpretation, Bohm’s hidden-variable model, and quantum Bayesianism. The latter holds that the wave function represents one’s best belief about the state of a quantum system, rather than an actual physical property. This leads to discussions of recent theories and experiments explicitly designed to test wave function reality.