The most puzzling issue in the foundations of quantum mechanics is perhaps that of the status of the wave function of a system in a quantum universe. Is the wave function objective or subjective? Does it represent the physical state of the system or merely our information about the system? If the former, does it provide a complete or partial description of the system ? We address these questions mainly from a Bohmian perspective and argue that part of the difficulty in ascertaining the status of the wave function arises from the fact that there are two different sorts of wave functions involved. The most fundamental wave function is that of the universe, which, we argue, has a law-like character. From the wave function of the universe together with its configuration one can define the wave function of a subsystem of the universe. This, although objective, has a strong informational/subjective aspect.
The most puzzling issue in the foundations of quantum mechanics is perhaps that of the status of the wave function of a system in a quantum universe. Is the wave function objective or subjective? Does it represent the physical state of the system or merely our information about the system? If the former, does it provide a complete or partial description of the system ? We address these questions mainly from a Bohmian perspective and argue that part of the difficulty in ascertaining the status of the wave function arises from the fact that there are two different sorts of wave functions involved. The most fundamental wave function is that of the universe, which, we argue, has a law-like character. From the wave function of the universe together with its configuration one can define the wave function of a subsystem of the universe. This, although objective, has a strong informational/subjective aspect.
We outline how Bohmian mechanics works: how it deals with various issues in the foundations of quantum mechanics and how it is related to the usual quantum formalism. We then turn to some objections to Bohmian mechanics, for example the fact that in Bohmian mechanics there is no back action of particle configurations upon wave functions. These lead us to our main concern: a more careful consideration of the meaning of the wave function in quantum mechanics, as suggested by a Bohmian perspective. We propose that the reason, on the universal level, that there is no action of configurations upon wave functions, as there seems to be between all other elements of physical reality, is that the wave function of the universe is not an element of physical reality. We propose that the wave function belongs to an altogether different category of existence than that of substantive physical entities, and that its existence is nomological rather than material. We propose, in other words, that the wave function is a component of physical law rather than of the reality described by the law.
The wave function gives not the density of stuff, but gives rather (on squaring its modulus) the density of probability. Probability of what, exactly? Not of the electron being there, but of the electron being found there, if its position is ‘measured’. Why this aversion to ‘being’ and insistence on ‘finding’? The founding fathers were unable to form a clear picture of things on the remote atomic scale . John S. Bell (1990) Introduction The physical meaning of the wave function is an important interpretative problem of quantum mechanics. Notwithstanding nearly ninety years of development of the theory, it is still an unsolved issue. During recent years, more and more research has been done on the ontological status and meaning of the wave function (see, e.g. Monton, 2002; Lewis, 2004; Gao, 2011a, 2011b; Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph, 2012; Ney and Albert, 2013). In particular, Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph (2012) demonstrated that under certain non-trivial assumptions such as the preparation independence assumption, the wave function of a quantum system is a representation of the physical state of the system. This poses a further question, namely whether the reality of the wave function can be argued without resorting to non-trivial assumptions. Moreover, a harder problem is to determine the ontological meaning of the wave function, which is still a hot topic of debate in the realistic alternatives to quantum mechanics such as the de Broglie–Bohm theory or Bohmian mechanics (Belot, 2012). In this chapter, we will first give a clearer argument for the reality of the wave function in terms of protective measurements, which does not depend on non-trivial assumptions and can also overcome existing objections. Next, based on an analysis of the mass and charge properties of a quantum system, we will propose a new ontological interpretation of the wave function. According to this interpretation, the wave function of an N -body system represents the state of ergodic motion of N particles.
The meaning of the wave function has been a hot topic of debate since the early days of quantum mechanics. Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in this long-standing question. Is the wave function ontic, directly representing a state of reality, or epistemic, merely representing a state of (incomplete) knowledge, or something else? If the wave function is not ontic, then what, if any, is the underlying state of reality? If the wave function is indeed ontic, then exactly what physical state does it represent? In this book, I aim to make sense of the wave function in quantum mechanics and find the ontological content of the theory. The book can be divided into three parts. The first part addresses the question of the nature of the wave function (Chapters 1-5). After giving a comprehensive and critical review of the competing views of the wave function, I present a new argument for the ontic view in terms of protective measurements. In addition, I also analyze the origin of the wave function by deriving the free Schroedinger equation. The second part analyzes the ontological meaning of the wave function (Chapters 6, 7). I propose a new ontological interpretation of the wave function in terms of random discontinuous motion of particles, and give two main arguments supporting this interpretation. The third part investigates whether the suggested quantum ontology is complete in accounting for our definite experience and whether it needs to be revised in the relativistic domain (Chapters 8, 9).
Some recent experiments claim to show that any model in which a quantum state represents mere information about an underlying physical reality of the system must make predictions which contradict those of quantum theory. The present work undertakes to investigate the issue of reality, treading a more fundamental route from the Hamilton-Jacobi equation of classical mechanics to the Schrodinger equation of quantum mechanics. Motivation for this is a similar approach from the eikonal equation in geometrical optics to the wave equation in electromagnetic theory. We rewrite the classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation as a wave equation and seek to generalise de Broglie's wave particle duality by demanding that both particle and light waves have the freedom of being described by any square-integrable function. This generalisation, which allows superposition also for matter wave functions, helps us to obtain the Schrodinger equation, whose solution can be seen to be as much objective as the classical mechanics wave function. Several other equations which one writes in quantum mechanics, including the eigenvalue equations for observables, series expansion of energy states in terms of eigenstates of observables other than energy, etc., can be written in the classical case too. Absence of any collapse of the wave function, entanglement, etc. in the classical realm have their origin in the nonlinearity of the classical wave equation. These considerations indicate that many of the puzzles in quantum mechanics are present also in classical mechanics in a dormant form, which fact shall help to demystify quantum mechanics to a great extent.
Introduction It is not exaggeration to claim that one of the major divides in the foundations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics derives from the way physicists and philosophers understand the status of the wave function. On the instrumentalist side of the camp, the wave function is regarded as a mere instrument to calculate probabilities that have been established by previous measurement outcomes. On the other “realistic” camp, the wave function is regarded as a new physical entity or a physical field of some sort. While both sides agree about the existence of quantum “particles” (the so-called theoretical entities), and therefore reject the radical agnosticism about them preached by van Fraassen (1980), the various “realistic” (and consequently, instrumentalist) philosophies of quantum mechanics are typically formulated in different, logically independent ways, so their implications need to be further investigated. For instance, on the one hand it seems plausible to claim that a realistic stance about the wave function is not the only way to defend “realism” about quantum theory. One can support a “flash” or a “density-of-stuff ” ontology (two variants of GRW), or an ontology of particles with well-defined positions (as in Bohmian mechanics), as primitive ontologies for observer-independent formulations of quantum mechanics (Allori, Goldstein, Tumulka and Zanghí, 2008). “Primitive ontologies”, as here are understood, are not only a fundamental ground for other ontological posits, but also entail a commitment to something concretely existing in spacetime (see also Allori, 2013). On the other hand, however, it is still debated whether such primitive ontologies can be autonomous from some form of realism about the wave function (Albert, 1996). In order to discuss this problem, we begin with a preliminary clarification of the meaning of “realism” and “instrumentalism” in physics, which are often subject to ideological and abstract discussions that often have little to do with the practice of physics (Section 9.2).
Under some well-defined conditions, the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics enables physicists, chemists and others to calculate and predict the outcome of a vast number of experiments. In fact, especially the Schr?dinger equation which involves an imaginary quantity describes how a quantum state of a physical system changes with time and is one of the main pillars of modern quantum mechanics. The wave function itself is a determining part of the Schrödinger equation, but the physical meaning of the wave function is still not clear. Altogether, does the wave function represent a new kind of reality? This publication will solve the problem of the physical meaning of the wave function by investigating the relationship between the wave function and the theory of special relativity. It is shown that the wave function is determined by notion co-ordinate time of the special theory of relativity. Moreover, the result of this investigation suggests a new understanding of the wave function, according to which the wave function and co-ordinate time of the theory of special relativity are equivalent.