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arXiv:quant-ph/0508169 · Physical Review A

Coherent-state quantum key distribution without random basis switching

Christian Weedbrook, Andrew M. Lance, Warwick P. Bowen, Thomas Symul, Timothy C. Ralph, Ping Koy Lam

Published Feb 9, 2006• 54 citations
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Abstract

The random switching of measurement bases is commonly assumed to be a necessary step of quantum key distribution protocols. In this paper we present a no-switching protocol and show that switching is not required for coherent-state continuous-variable quantum key distribution. Further, this protocol achieves higher information rates and a simpler experimental setup compared to previous protocols that rely on switching. We propose an optimal eavesdropping attack against this protocol, assuming individual Gaussian attacks. Finally, we investigate and compare the no-switching protocol applied to the original Bennett-Brassard 1984 scheme.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.73.022316

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The random switching of measurement bases is commonly assumed to be a necessary step of quantum key distribution protocols. In this paper we present a no-switching protocol and show that switching is not required for coherent-state continuous-variable quantum key distribution. Further, this protocol achieves higher information rates and a simpler experimental setup compared to previous protocols that rely on switching. We propose an optimal eavesdropping attack against this protocol, assuming individual Gaussian attacks. Finally, we investigate and compare the no-switching protocol applied to the original Bennett-Brassard 1984 scheme.
The Gaussian continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol based on coherent states and heterodyne detection [Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 170504 (2004)] has the advantage that no active random basis switching is needed on the receiver's side. Its security is, however, not very satisfyingly understood today because the bounds on the secret key rate that have been derived from Heisenberg relations are not attained by any known scheme. Here, we address the problem of the optimal Gaussian individual attack against this protocol, and derive tight upper bounds on the information accessible to an eavesdropper. Interestingly, this protocol is proven to be even more resistant to individual attacks than originally thought. Optical schemes achieving these bounds are also exhibited, which concludes the security analysis of Gaussian protocols against individual attacks.
We realize an end-to-end no-switching quantum key distribution protocol using continuous-wave coherent light. We encode weak broadband Gaussian modulations onto the amplitude and phase quadratures of light beams. Our no-switching protocol achieves high secret key rate via a post-selection protocol that utilizes both quadrature information simultaneously. We establish a secret key rate of 25 Mbits/s for a lossless channel and 1 kbit/s for 90% channel loss, per 17 MHz of detected bandwidth, assuming individual Gaussian eavesdropping attacks. Since our scheme is truly broadband, it can potentially deliver orders of magnitude higher key rates by extending the encoding bandwidth with higher-end telecommunication technology.
We propose several methods for quantum key distribution (QKD) based on the generation and transmission of random distributions of coherent or squeezed states, and we show that they are secure against individual eavesdropping attacks. These protocols require that the transmission of the optical line between Alice and Bob is larger than 50%, but they do not rely on "sub-shot-noise" features such as squeezing. Their security is a direct consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which limits the signal-to-noise ratio of possible quantum measurements on the transmission line. Our approach can also be used for evaluating various QKD protocols using light with Gaussian statistics.
First, we calculate eavesdropper's optimal information on raw bits in Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution (BB84 QKD) scheme and six-states one in coherent attacks, using the method by Lo and Chau [Science {\\bf 283}, 2050 (1999)]. Next, we show that eavesdropper's optimal information in multiple-basis scheme is the same as that of six-states one. Then, we consider QKD without public announcement of bases [Phys. Lett. A {\\bf244}(1998), 489]: we find that eavesdropper's optimal information in it is the same as that of a corresponding QKD with public announcement of bases. This fact suggests that QKD without public announcement of bases is as secure as BB84 scheme even in coherent attacks.
In conventional quantum key distribution protocols, the secure key is normally extracted from the measurement outcomes of the system. Here, a different approach is proposed, where the secure key is extracted from the measurement bases, rather than outcomes. Compared to the original Bennett-Brassard-1984 protocol, the proposed protocol involves no hardware change but modifications in data postprocessing. We show that this protocol is more robust against detector efficiency attacks and photon-number-splitting attacks when practical detectors and photon sources are used.