This thesis is a contribution to the debate on the implications of quantum information theory for the foundations of quantum mechanics. In Part 1, the logical and conceptual status of various notions of information is assessed. It is emphasized that the everyday notion of information is to be firmly distinguished from the technical notions arising in information theory; however it is maintained that in both settings `information' functions as an abstract noun, hence does not refer to a particular or substance (the worth of this point is illustrated in application to quantum teleportation). The claim that `Information is Physical' is assessed and argued to face a destructive dilemma. Accordingly, the slogan may not be understood as an ontological claim, but at best, as a methodological one. The reflections of Bruckner and Zeilinger (2001) and Deutsch and Hayden (2000) on the nature of information in quantum mechanics are critically assessed and some results presented on the characterization of entanglement in the Deutsch-Hayden formalism. Some philosophical aspects of quantum computation are discussed and general morals drawn concerning the nature of quantum information theory. In Part II, following some preliminary remarks, two particular information-theoretic approaches to the foundations of quantum mechanics are assessed in detail. It is argued that Zeilinger's (1999) Foundational Principle is unsuccessful as a foundational principle for quantum mechanics. The information-theoretic characterization theorem of Clifton, Bub and Halvorson (2003) is assessed more favourably, but the generality of the approach is questioned and it is argued that the implications of the theorem for the traditional foundational problems in quantum mechanics remains obscure.
This thesis is a contribution to the debate on the implications of quantum information theory for the foundations of quantum mechanics. In Part 1, the logical and conceptual status of various notions of information is assessed. It is emphasized that the everyday notion of information is to be firmly distinguished from the technical notions arising in information theory; however it is maintained that in both settings information' functions as an abstract noun, hence does not refer to a particular or substance (the worth of this point is illustrated in application to quantum teleportation). The claim that Information is Physical' is assessed and argued to face a destructive dilemma. Accordingly, the slogan may not be understood as an ontological claim, but at best, as a methodological one. The reflections of Bruckner and Zeilinger (2001) and Deutsch and Hayden (2000) on the nature of information in quantum mechanics are critically assessed and some results presented on the characterization of entanglement in the Deutsch-Hayden formalism. Some philosophical aspects of quantum computation are discussed and general morals drawn concerning the nature of quantum information theory. In Part II, following some preliminary remarks, two particular information-theoretic approaches to the foundations of quantum mechanics are assessed in detail. It is argued that Zeilinger's (1999) Foundational Principle is unsuccessful as a foundational principle for quantum mechanics. The information-theoretic characterization theorem of Clifton, Bub and Halvorson (2003) is assessed more favourably, but the generality of the approach is questioned and it is argued that the implications of the theorem for the traditional foundational problems in quantum mechanics remains obscure.
Some approaches which seek to make progress with the conceptual troubles of quantum theory using information-theoretic ideas are investigated. These include Zeilinger’s Foundational Principle and the information-theoretic characterization theorem of Clifton, Bub and Halvorson. It is shown that Zeilinger’s Foundational Principle does not provide a foundational principle for quantum mechanics and fails to underwrite explanations of the randomness of quantum measurement and the existence of entanglement. The Clifton- Bub-Halvorson theorem is more positively assessed: here an axiomatisation of quantum mechanics has been achieved. However some questions are raised concerning the C ∗-algebraic starting point of the theorem, which seems not a sufficiently neutral theoretical framework for the axiomatic project. Moreover, it is argued that rather than the Clifton-Bub-Halvorson result motivating an information-theoretic approach (principle theory approach) to understanding the quantum world which obviates our traditional concerns, such an approach simply fails to engage with the crucial interpretational issues.
Quantum information theory represents a rich subject of discussion for those interested in the philosphical and foundational issues surrounding quantum mechanics for a simple reason: one can cast its central concerns in terms of a long-familiar question: How does the quantum world differ from the classical one? Moreover, deployment of the concepts of information and computation in novel contexts hints at new (or better) means of understanding quantum mechanics, and perhaps even invites re-assessment of traditional material conceptions of the basic nature of the physical world. In this paper I review some of these philosophical aspects of quantum information theory, begining with an elementary survey of the theory, seeking to highlight some of the principles and heuristics involved. We move on to a discussion of the nature and definition of quantum information and deploy the findings in discussing the puzzles surrounding teleportation. The final two sections discuss, respectively, what one might learn from the development of quantum computation (both about the nature of quantum systems and about the nature of computation) and consider the impact of quantum information theory on the traditional foundational questions of quantum mechanics (treating of the views of Zeilinger, Bub and Fuchs, amongst others).
Quantum information theory represents a rich subject of discussion for those interested in the philosphical and foundational issues surrounding quantum mechanics for a simple reason: one can cast its central concerns in terms of a long-familiar question: How does the quantum world differ from the classical one? Moreover, deployment of the concepts of information and computation in novel contexts hints at new (or better) means of understanding quantum mechanics, and perhaps even invites re-assessment of traditional material conceptions of the basic nature of the physical world. In this paper I review some of these philosophical aspects of quantum information theory, begining with an elementary survey of the theory, seeking to highlight some of the principles and heuristics involved. We move on to a discussion of the nature and definition of quantum information and deploy the findings in discussing the puzzles surrounding teleportation. The final two sections discuss, respectively, what one might learn from the development of quantum computation (both about the nature of quantum systems and about the nature of computation) and consider the impact of quantum information theory on the traditional foundational questions of quantum mechanics (treating of the views of Zeilinger, Bub and Fuchs, amongst others).
The principle aim of this dissertation is to investigate the philosophical application of quantum information theory to interpretational issues regarding the theory of quantum mechanics. Recently, quantum information theory has emerged as a potential source for such an interpretation. The main question with which this dissertation will be concerned is whether or not an information-theoretic interpretation can serve as a conceptually acceptable interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will be argued that some of the more obvious approaches - that quantum information theory shows us that ultimately the world is made of information, and quantum Bayesianism - fail as philosophical interpretations of quantum mechanics. However, the information-theoretic approach of Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson introduces Einstein's distinction between principle theories and constructive theories, arguing that quantum mechanics is best understood as an information-theoretic principle theory. While I argue that this particular approach fails, it does offer a viable new philosophical role for information theory. Specifically, an investigation of interpretationally successful principle theories such as Newtonian mechanics, special relativity, and general relativity, shows that the particular principles employed are necessary as constitutive elements of a framework which partially defines the basic explanatory concepts of space, time, and motion. Without such constitutive principles as preconditions for empirical meaning, scientific progress is hampered. It is argued that the philosophical issues in quantum mechanics stem from an analogous conceptual crisis. On the basis of this comparison, the best strategy for resolving these problems is to apply a similar sort of conceptual analysis to quantum mechanics so as to provide an appropriate set of constitutive principles clarifying the conceptual issues at stake. It is further argued that quantum information theory is ideally placed as a novel conceptual framework from which to conduct this analysis.
Introduction Many philosophers and physicists have expressed great hope that quantum information theory will help us understand the nature of the quantum world. The general problem is that there is no widespread agreement on what quantum information is. Hence, such pronouncements regarding quantum information theory as the savior of the philosophy of physics are hard to evaluate. Much work has been done producing and evaluating concepts of information. In I have defended and articulated the Schumacher concept of quantum information. Roughly speaking, quantum information is construed as the statistical behavior associated with the measurement of a quantum system. Hence it is a coarse-grained operational description of quantum systems, with no recourse to the fundamental ontological features of quantum systems responsible for such behavior. From this perspective, construing quantum mechanics as a theory of quantum information departs from the traditional interpretive endeavors of philosophers and physicists. The question is whether there is any motivation for taking such a view. The theorem of Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson (CBH) provides just such a motivation. The theorem guarantees that, if a theory T satisfies certain conditions, there will exist an empirically equivalent C *-algebraic theory that has a concrete representation in Hilbert space, which it is notoriously difficult to interpret as a constructive or mechanical theory. In such a case, any underlying ontologies philosophers develop that are compatible with T will be undermined by the C*-algebraic equivalent. Bub suggests in light of this in-principle uncertainty regarding ontology that we re-conceive of quantum mechanics as a theory about quantum information.
Information is on everyone's lips.It seems that nowadays there is no philosophical or scientific inquiry that cannot benefit from a reformulation in terms of information theory (IT).Quantum theory (QT) is no exception.Indeed, one of the liveliest debates in the foundations of QT concerns the role that information may play in the solution of the well-known problems in the foundations of QT.For instance, one of the hottest discussions concerns quantum non-locality.On the one hand, IT folks stress how, rather than approaching non-local entanglement as an 'embarrassment', IT invites us to see it as a resource for new information-processing protocols.On the other hand, it is unclear how this invitation can contribute to the solution of the problem of accounting for the apparent nonlocality involved in quantum correlations.Christopher G. Timpson's beautiful book is a welcome contribution to this dialectic.It provides an admirable mix of conceptual and technical analysis of the notion of information and critically analyses the most prominent proposals on the table in the debate over the role of IT in the foundations of QT.Although the focus of Timpson's book is quantum information theory (QIT) and the foundations of QT, a considerable component of its basic precepts will be found extremely useful in any branch (be it more philosophical or more scientific) of applied IT.It is because of this additional value that in this review, sometimes to detriment of exhaustiveness, I prefer to concentrate on providing some samples of Timpson's main argumentative line.This should give a better idea of how this volume can represent valuable reading for both specialists in QIT and non-specialists.First things first.In chapter 2, Timpson provides a sharp analysis of the concepts of information.The plural is due to the necessary distinction between information in the everyday sense and information in the technical sense (informationt).Both are abstract mass nouns, but while the former refers to a semantic and epistemic notion, informationt is a physically defined quantity, measured classically by Shannon information.Informationt is usually described as an undefined notion.Contrary to this claim, at the roots of Timpson's analysis is a neat definition: 'Informationt is what is produced by an informationt source that is required to be reproducible at the destination if the transmission is to be counted a success' (22).Although avowedly deflationary, this definition provides a fertile background to dissipate much of the fog around the nature of informationt and its behaviour.It actually turns out that the majority of the results of this book pivots on this very simple definition.Here is a straightforward example.According to the definition above, a successful transmission requires that the message be reproducible at destination.However, what it is said to be repeatable is not the token of a message, but the type.When we talk about something that is transmitted in communication protocols (the so-called pieces of information) we refer to types, i.e. abstracta, rather than to concrete objects.The operation of conceptual cleansing continues when we pass from classical to quantum informationt (chapter 3).An especially noteworthy result is the rejection of the common view that quantum informationt is different in nature from classical informationt.Timpson's methodology allows instead to account for it as an extension of Shannon informationt.In fact, with the template of classical informationt at hand, Timpson reconstructs the notions of quantum informationt source, measure of quantum informationt and piece of quantum informationt, the latter being a sequence of Hilbert space states.