Some approaches which seek to make progress with the conceptual troubles of quantum theory using information-theoretic ideas are investigated. These include Zeilinger’s Foundational Principle and the information-theoretic characterization theorem of Clifton, Bub and Halvorson. It is shown that Zeilinger’s Foundational Principle does not provide a foundational principle for quantum mechanics and fails to underwrite explanations of the randomness of quantum measurement and the existence of entanglement. The Clifton- Bub-Halvorson theorem is more positively assessed: here an axiomatisation of quantum mechanics has been achieved. However some questions are raised concerning the C ∗-algebraic starting point of the theorem, which seems not a sufficiently neutral theoretical framework for the axiomatic project. Moreover, it is argued that rather than the Clifton-Bub-Halvorson result motivating an information-theoretic approach (principle theory approach) to understanding the quantum world which obviates our traditional concerns, such an approach simply fails to engage with the crucial interpretational issues.
Some approaches which seek to make progress with the conceptual troubles of quantum theory using information-theoretic ideas are investigated. These include Zeilinger’s Foundational Principle and the information-theoretic characterization theorem of Clifton, Bub and Halvorson. It is shown that Zeilinger’s Foundational Principle does not provide a foundational principle for quantum mechanics and fails to underwrite explanations of the randomness of quantum measurement and the existence of entanglement. The Clifton- Bub-Halvorson theorem is more positively assessed: here an axiomatisation of quantum mechanics has been achieved. However some questions are raised concerning the C ∗-algebraic starting point of the theorem, which seems not a sufficiently neutral theoretical framework for the axiomatic project. Moreover, it is argued that rather than the Clifton-Bub-Halvorson result motivating an information-theoretic approach (principle theory approach) to understanding the quantum world which obviates our traditional concerns, such an approach simply fails to engage with the crucial interpretational issues.
This thesis is a contribution to the debate on the implications of quantum information theory for the foundations of quantum mechanics. In Part 1, the logical and conceptual status of various notions of information is assessed. It is emphasized that the everyday notion of information is to be firmly distinguished from the technical notions arising in information theory; however it is maintained that in both settings `information' functions as an abstract noun, hence does not refer to a particular or substance (the worth of this point is illustrated in application to quantum teleportation). The claim that `Information is Physical' is assessed and argued to face a destructive dilemma. Accordingly, the slogan may not be understood as an ontological claim, but at best, as a methodological one. The reflections of Bruckner and Zeilinger (2001) and Deutsch and Hayden (2000) on the nature of information in quantum mechanics are critically assessed and some results presented on the characterization of entanglement in the Deutsch-Hayden formalism. Some philosophical aspects of quantum computation are discussed and general morals drawn concerning the nature of quantum information theory. In Part II, following some preliminary remarks, two particular information-theoretic approaches to the foundations of quantum mechanics are assessed in detail. It is argued that Zeilinger's (1999) Foundational Principle is unsuccessful as a foundational principle for quantum mechanics. The information-theoretic characterization theorem of Clifton, Bub and Halvorson (2003) is assessed more favourably, but the generality of the approach is questioned and it is argued that the implications of the theorem for the traditional foundational problems in quantum mechanics remains obscure.
The principle aim of this dissertation is to investigate the philosophical application of quantum information theory to interpretational issues regarding the theory of quantum mechanics. Recently, quantum information theory has emerged as a potential source for such an interpretation. The main question with which this dissertation will be concerned is whether or not an information-theoretic interpretation can serve as a conceptually acceptable interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will be argued that some of the more obvious approaches - that quantum information theory shows us that ultimately the world is made of information, and quantum Bayesianism - fail as philosophical interpretations of quantum mechanics. However, the information-theoretic approach of Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson introduces Einstein's distinction between principle theories and constructive theories, arguing that quantum mechanics is best understood as an information-theoretic principle theory. While I argue that this particular approach fails, it does offer a viable new philosophical role for information theory. Specifically, an investigation of interpretationally successful principle theories such as Newtonian mechanics, special relativity, and general relativity, shows that the particular principles employed are necessary as constitutive elements of a framework which partially defines the basic explanatory concepts of space, time, and motion. Without such constitutive principles as preconditions for empirical meaning, scientific progress is hampered. It is argued that the philosophical issues in quantum mechanics stem from an analogous conceptual crisis. On the basis of this comparison, the best strategy for resolving these problems is to apply a similar sort of conceptual analysis to quantum mechanics so as to provide an appropriate set of constitutive principles clarifying the conceptual issues at stake. It is further argued that quantum information theory is ideally placed as a novel conceptual framework from which to conduct this analysis.
This paper is a commentary on the foundational significance of the Clifton-Bub-Halvorson theorem characterizing quantum theory in terms of three information-theoretic constraints (Foundations of Physics 33, 1561-1591 (2003); quant-ph/0211089). I argue that: (1) a quantum theory is best understood as a theory about the possibilities and impossibilities of information transfer, as opposed to a theory about the mechanics of nonclassical waves or particles, (2) given the information-theoretic constraints, any mechanical theory of quantum phenomena that includes an account of the measuring instruments that reveal these phenomena must be empirically equivalent to a quantum theory, and (3) assuming the information-theoretic constraints are in fact satisfied in our world, no mechanical theory of quantum phenomena that includes an account of measurement interactions can be acceptable, and the appropriate aim of physics at the fundamental level then becomes the representation and manipulation of information.
This paper is a commentary on the foundational significance of the Clifton-Bub-Halvorson theorem characterizing quantum theory in terms of three information-theoretic constraints (Foundations of Physics 33, 1561-1591 (2003); quant-ph/0211089). I argue that: (1) a quantum theory is best understood as a theory about the possibilities and impossibilities of information transfer, as opposed to a theory about the mechanics of nonclassical waves or particles, (2) given the information-theoretic constraints, any mechanical theory of quantum phenomena that includes an account of the measuring instruments that reveal these phenomena must be empirically equivalent to a quantum theory, and (3) assuming the information-theoretic constraints are in fact satisfied in our world, no mechanical theory of quantum phenomena that includes an account of measurement interactions can be acceptable, and the appropriate aim of physics at the fundamental level then becomes the representation and manipulation of information.
A remarkable theorem by Clifton, Bub and Halvorson (2003) (CBH) characterizes quantum theory in terms of information--theoretic principles. According to Bub (2004, 2005) the philosophical significance of the theorem is that quantum theory should be regarded as a ``principle'' theory about (quantum) information rather than a ``constructive'' theory about the dynamics of quantum systems. Here we criticize Bub's principle approach arguing that if the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics remains intact then there is no escape route from solving the measurement problem by constructive theories. We further propose a (Wigner--type) thought experiment that we argue demonstrates that quantum mechanics on the information--theoretic approach is incomplete.
Quantum information theory represents a rich subject of discussion for those interested in the philosphical and foundational issues surrounding quantum mechanics for a simple reason: one can cast its central concerns in terms of a long-familiar question: How does the quantum world differ from the classical one? Moreover, deployment of the concepts of information and computation in novel contexts hints at new (or better) means of understanding quantum mechanics, and perhaps even invites re-assessment of traditional material conceptions of the basic nature of the physical world. In this paper I review some of these philosophical aspects of quantum information theory, begining with an elementary survey of the theory, seeking to highlight some of the principles and heuristics involved. We move on to a discussion of the nature and definition of quantum information and deploy the findings in discussing the puzzles surrounding teleportation. The final two sections discuss, respectively, what one might learn from the development of quantum computation (both about the nature of quantum systems and about the nature of computation) and consider the impact of quantum information theory on the traditional foundational questions of quantum mechanics (treating of the views of Zeilinger, Bub and Fuchs, amongst others).