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arXiv:quant-ph/0407131 · International Journal of Quantum Information

A NOVEL PROTOCOL-AUTHENTICATION ALGORITHM RULING OUT A MAN-IN-THE MIDDLE ATTACK IN QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY

Momtchil Peev, Michael Nölle, O. Maurhardt, Thomas Lorünser, M. SUDA, Andreas Poppe, Rupert Ursin, Alessandro Fedrizzi, Anton Zeilinger

Published Dec 16, 2004• 36 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In this work we review the security vulnerability of quantum cryptography with respect to "man-in-the-middle attacks" and the standard authentication methods applied to counteract these attacks. We further propose a modified authentication algorithm which features higher efficiency with respect to consumption of mutual secret bits.

DOI
10.1142/s0219749905000797

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In this work we review the security vulnerability of quantum cryptography with respect to "man-in-the-middle attacks" and the standard authentication methods applied to counteract these attacks. We further propose a modified authentication algorithm which features higher efficiency with respect to consumption of mutual secret bits.
Authentication is an indispensable part of Quantum Cryptography, which is an unconditionally secure key distribution technique based on the laws of nature. Without proper authentication, Quantum Cryptography is vulnerable to “man-in-the-middle” attacks. Therefore, to guarantee unconditional security of any Quantum Cryptographic protocols, the authentication used must also be unconditionally secure. The standard in Quantum Cryptography is to use theWegman-Carter authentication, which is unconditionally secure and is based on the idea of universal hashing. In this thesis, we first investigate properties of a Strongly Universal hash function family to facilitate understanding the properties of (classical) authentication used in Quantum Cryptography. Then, we study vulnerabilities of a recently proposed authentication protocol intended to rule out a "man-in-the-middle" attack on Quantum Cryptography. Here, we point out that the proposed authentication primitive is not secure when used in a generic Quantum Cryptographic protocol. Lastly, we estimate the lifetime of authentication using encrypted tags when the encryption key is partially known. Under simplifying assumptions, we derive that the lifetime is linearly dependent on the length of the authentication key. Experimental results that support the theoretical results are also presented.