arXiv:quant-ph/0308048 · Physical Review A

Unconditional security of the Bennett 1992 quantum key-distribution protocol over a lossy and noisy channel

Kiyoshi Tamaki, Norbert Lütkenhaus

Published Mar 22, 2004• 76 citations

Abstract

We show that the security proof of the Bennett 1992 protocol over loss-free channel given by Tamaki, Koashi, and Imoto [Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 167904 (2003)] can be adapted to accommodate loss. We assumed that Bob's detectors discriminate between single-photon states on one hand and vacuum state or multiphoton states on the other hand.

DOI: 10.1103/physreva.69.032316

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