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arXiv:quant-ph/0301160

A tentative new approach to the Schrödinger cat problem

Bernard d’Espagnat

Published Jan 29, 2003• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Though scientifically unconvincing, the Broglie-Bohm model has the virtue of reproducing the observational predictions of quantum mechanics while being conceptually crystal-clear. Hence, even if we do not believe in it, we may find it useful in suggesting ways of removing conceptual difficulties. This procedure is here applied to the Schrödinger cat riddle (in its Wigner version). The outcome yields tentative views on the relationship between mentality and physical reality.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0301160

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Though scientifically unconvincing, the Broglie-Bohm model has the virtue of reproducing the observational predictions of quantum mechanics while being conceptually crystal-clear. Hence, even if we do not believe in it, we may find it useful in suggesting ways of removing conceptual difficulties. This procedure is here applied to the Schrödinger cat riddle (in its Wigner version). The outcome yields tentative views on the relationship between mentality and physical reality.
It is possible that discussion of the perennial mind-body problem has been vitiated by a misunderstanding, not of the philosophy or psychology involved, but of the physics? Michael Lockwood thinks so. 'In the preface to mind, Brain and the Quantum he writes' 'In reflecting on the relation of consciousness to the matter of the brain, philosophers have been apt to take matter for granted, assuming that it is mind rather than matter that is philosophicallly problematic.' However,(p178) 'quantum mechanics is not to be regarded as just another scientific theory... it demands a complete revolution in our way of looking at the world.' His thesis, then, is that a proper re-orientation of our view of the physical world in the light of quantum mechanics (or, more precisely, of his preferred view of the interpretation of the quantum formalism) will go at least a long way towards resolving the problem of the nature of 'mental' phenomena and processes.
It is generally agreed that decoherence theory is, if not a complete answer, at least a great step forward towards a solution of the quantum measurement problem. It is shown here however that in the cases in which a sentient being is explicitly assumed to take cognizance of the outcome the reasons we have for judging this way are not totally consistent, so that the question has to be considered anew. It is pointed out that the way the Broglie-Bohm model solves the riddle suggests a possible clue, consisting in assuming that even very simple systems may have some sort of a proto-consciousness, but that their ``internal states of consciousness'' are not predictive. It is, next, easily shown that if we imagine the systems get larger, in virtue of decoherence their internal states of consciousness progressively gain in predictive value. So that, for macro-systems, they may be identified (in practice) with the predictive states of consciousness on which we ground our observational predictions. The possibilities of carrying over this idea to standard quantum mechanics are then investigated. Conditions of conceptual consistency are considered and found rather strict, and, finally, two solutions emerge, differing conceptually very much from one another but in both of which the, possibly non-predictive, generalized internal states of consciousness play a crucial role.
The problem of Schrödinger’s Cat has figured prominently in the debates about the bearing of quantum physics on our understanding of physical reality. On its basis, various theorists have maintained the quantum physical world exhibits a probabilistically indecisive physical reality. The analysis of the paper that this appeal to quantum reality is methodologically at odds with and disjoint from its underlying approach to quantum theory itself. If there is to be methodological uniformity at this juncture it will have to be along the lines that Einstein always focused—an incomplete hidden factor (perhaps better than “hidden variables”) approach.