Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:quant-ph/0209061 · Journal of Modern Optics

Quantum authentication with unitary coding sets

Esther Pérez, Marcos Curty, David J. Santos, Priscila Garcı́a-Fernández

Published Jan 1, 2003• 5 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

A general class of authentication schemes for arbitrary quantum messages is proposed. The class is based on the use of sets of unitary quantum operations in both transmission and reception, and on appending a quantum tag to the quantum message used in transmission. The previous secret between partners required for any authentication is a classical key. We obtain the minimal requirements on the unitary operations that lead to a probability of failure of the scheme less than one. This failure may be caused by someone performing a unitary operation on the message in the channel between the communicating partners, or by a potential forger impersonating the transmitter.

DOI
10.1080/09500340308234550

Related papers

Quantum Authentication Protocol of Classical Messages Based on Different Sets of Orthogonal Quantum States

Xiangjun, Chaoyang Li, Dongsheng Chen +1 more

Most of the quantum authentication protocols are used to authenticate quantum messages.In this paper, by using a pair of non-entangled qubits, a quantum authentication protocol of classical messages is proposed.In the pair of qubits, the first one is used to carry a bit message, and the second one is used as a tag to authenticate the classical message.In our protocol, a bit string instead of a sequence of maximally entangled states is used directly as an authentication key, so the authentication key can be easily stored offline.On the other hand, in our protocol, a unitary operation UA is chosen to encrypt the qubits so that the successful probability of all attacks analyzed is less than one.Our quantum authentication protocol is secure against various attacks such as the no-message attack and message attacks.

International Journal of Future Generation Communication and Networking•May 31, 2016•0 citations

Authentication of quantum messages

Howard Barnum, Claude Crépeau, Daniel Gottesman +2 more

Authentication is a well-studied area of classical cryptography: a sender A and a receiver B sharing a classical secret key want to exchange a classical message with the guarantee that the message has not been modified or replaced by a dishonest party with control of the communication line. In this paper we study the authentication of messages composed of quantum states. We give a formal definition of authentication in the quantum setting. Assuming A and B have access to an insecure quantum channel and share a secret, classical random key, we provide a non-interactive scheme that enables A to both encrypt and authenticate an m qubit message by encoding it into m+s qubits, where the error probability decreases exponentially in the security parameter s. The scheme requires a secret key of size 2m+O(s). To achieve this, we give a highly efficient protocol for testing the purity of shared EPR pairs. It has long been known that learning information about a general quantum state will necessarily disturb it. We refine this result to show that such a disturbance can be done with few side effects, allowing it to circumvent cryptographic protections. Consequently, any scheme to authenticate quantum messages must also encrypt them. In contrast, no such constraint exists classically. This reasoning has two important consequences: It allows us to give a lower bound of 2m key bits for authenticating m qubits, which makes our protocol asymptotically optimal. Moreover, we use it to show that digitally signing quantum states is impossible.

arXiv:quant-ph/0205128•Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science•Jun 26, 2003•282 citations

Quantum authentication scheme based on algebraic coding

Rex A. C. Medeiros, Francisco de Assis, Júior, Bernardo L. +1 more

This paper presents a simple, but efficient class of non-interactive protocols for quantum authentication of $m$-length clas sical messages. The message is encoded using a classical linear algebraic code $C[n,m,t]$. We assume that Alice and Bob share a classical secret key, $x_{AB}$, of $n$ bits. Alice creates $n$ qubits based on the code word and the key, that indicates the bases used to create each qubit. The quantum states are sent to Bob through a noiseless quantum channel. We calculate the failure probability of the protocol considering several types of attacks.

arXiv:quant-ph/0307095•Jul 14, 2003•4 citations

Secure quantum signatures using insecure quantum channels

Ryan Amiri, Petros Wallden, Adrian Kent +1 more

Digital signatures are widely used in modern communication to guarantee authenticity and transferability of messages. The security of currently used classical schemes relies on computational assumptions. We present a quantum signature scheme that does not require trusted quantum channels. We prove that it is unconditionally secure against the most general coherent attacks, and show that it requires the transmission of significantly fewer quantum states than previous schemes. We also show that the quantum channel noise threshold for our scheme is less strict than for distilling a secure key using quantum key distribution. This shows that ``direct'' quantum signature schemes can be preferable to signature schemes relying on secret shared keys generated using quantum key distribution.

arXiv:1507.02975•Physical Review A•Mar 17, 2016•132 citations

Streaming authentication and multi-level security for communications networks using quantum cryptography

Richard Hughes

Message authenticators for quantum-secured communications facilitate low-latency authentication with assurances of security. Low-latency message authenticators are especially valuable in infrastructure systems where security and latency constraints are difficult to satisfy with conventional non-quantum cryptography. For example, a message transmitter receives a message and derives an authentication tag for the message based at least in part on an authenticator that uses one or more quantum keys. The message transmitter outputs the message and its authentication tag. A message receiver receives a message and authentication tag for the message. The message receiver derives a comparison tag for the message based at least in part on an authenticator that uses one or more quantum keys. The message receiver checks whether the message is authentic based on a comparison of the authentication tag and the comparison tag. In example implementations, the authenticator uses stream-wise cyclic redundancy code operations.

•Dec 6, 2023•0 citations

Quantum Authentication of Classical Messages with Perfect Security

Francisco de Assis, Paulo Mateus, Yasser Omar

In this work we have investigated how quantum resources can improve the security of protocol for authentication of classical messages, introduced by Brassard in 1983. In that protocol, the shared key is the seed of a pseudo-random generator (PRG) and a hash function is used to create the authentication tag of a public message. We have started by showing that a BB84-type encoding of secret bits offers more security than the classicalXOR function introduced by Brassard. Furthermore, we established the conditions a general PRG must satisfy for our quantum-enhanced protocol to yield informationtheoretical security. Altogether, our proposal represents a twofold improvement: first it offers proven information-theoretical security under some assumptions on the PRG; secondly, these assumptions are weaker than the requirements for the PRG in Brassard’s protocol. Additionally, our proposal is also more practical in the sense that it requires a shorter key than the classical scheme by using the pseudorandom bits to choose the tag’s hash function. 1

arXiv:0806.1231•Jun 6, 2008•1 citation
A general class of authentication schemes for arbitrary quantum messages is proposed. The class is based on the use of sets of unitary quantum operations in both transmission and reception, and on appending a quantum tag to the quantum message used in transmission. The previous secret between partners required for any authentication is a classical key. We obtain the minimal requirements on the unitary operations that lead to a probability of failure of the scheme less than one. This failure may be caused by someone performing a unitary operation on the message in the channel between the communicating partners, or by a potential forger impersonating the transmitter.
Most of the quantum authentication protocols are used to authenticate quantum messages.In this paper, by using a pair of non-entangled qubits, a quantum authentication protocol of classical messages is proposed.In the pair of qubits, the first one is used to carry a bit message, and the second one is used as a tag to authenticate the classical message.In our protocol, a bit string instead of a sequence of maximally entangled states is used directly as an authentication key, so the authentication key can be easily stored offline.On the other hand, in our protocol, a unitary operation UA is chosen to encrypt the qubits so that the successful probability of all attacks analyzed is less than one.Our quantum authentication protocol is secure against various attacks such as the no-message attack and message attacks.
Authentication is a well-studied area of classical cryptography: a sender A and a receiver B sharing a classical secret key want to exchange a classical message with the guarantee that the message has not been modified or replaced by a dishonest party with control of the communication line. In this paper we study the authentication of messages composed of quantum states. We give a formal definition of authentication in the quantum setting. Assuming A and B have access to an insecure quantum channel and share a secret, classical random key, we provide a non-interactive scheme that enables A to both encrypt and authenticate an m qubit message by encoding it into m+s qubits, where the error probability decreases exponentially in the security parameter s. The scheme requires a secret key of size 2m+O(s). To achieve this, we give a highly efficient protocol for testing the purity of shared EPR pairs. It has long been known that learning information about a general quantum state will necessarily disturb it. We refine this result to show that such a disturbance can be done with few side effects, allowing it to circumvent cryptographic protections. Consequently, any scheme to authenticate quantum messages must also encrypt them. In contrast, no such constraint exists classically. This reasoning has two important consequences: It allows us to give a lower bound of 2m key bits for authenticating m qubits, which makes our protocol asymptotically optimal. Moreover, we use it to show that digitally signing quantum states is impossible.
This paper presents a simple, but efficient class of non-interactive protocols for quantum authentication of mmm-length clas sical messages. The message is encoded using a classical linear algebraic code C[n,m,t]C[n,m,t]C[n,m,t]. We assume that Alice and Bob share a classical secret key, xABx_{AB}xAB​, of nnn bits. Alice creates nnn qubits based on the code word and the key, that indicates the bases used to create each qubit. The quantum states are sent to Bob through a noiseless quantum channel. We calculate the failure probability of the protocol considering several types of attacks.
Digital signatures are widely used in modern communication to guarantee authenticity and transferability of messages. The security of currently used classical schemes relies on computational assumptions. We present a quantum signature scheme that does not require trusted quantum channels. We prove that it is unconditionally secure against the most general coherent attacks, and show that it requires the transmission of significantly fewer quantum states than previous schemes. We also show that the quantum channel noise threshold for our scheme is less strict than for distilling a secure key using quantum key distribution. This shows that ``direct'' quantum signature schemes can be preferable to signature schemes relying on secret shared keys generated using quantum key distribution.
Message authenticators for quantum-secured communications facilitate low-latency authentication with assurances of security. Low-latency message authenticators are especially valuable in infrastructure systems where security and latency constraints are difficult to satisfy with conventional non-quantum cryptography. For example, a message transmitter receives a message and derives an authentication tag for the message based at least in part on an authenticator that uses one or more quantum keys. The message transmitter outputs the message and its authentication tag. A message receiver receives a message and authentication tag for the message. The message receiver derives a comparison tag for the message based at least in part on an authenticator that uses one or more quantum keys. The message receiver checks whether the message is authentic based on a comparison of the authentication tag and the comparison tag. In example implementations, the authenticator uses stream-wise cyclic redundancy code operations.
In this work we have investigated how quantum resources can improve the security of protocol for authentication of classical messages, introduced by Brassard in 1983. In that protocol, the shared key is the seed of a pseudo-random generator (PRG) and a hash function is used to create the authentication tag of a public message. We have started by showing that a BB84-type encoding of secret bits offers more security than the classicalXOR function introduced by Brassard. Furthermore, we established the conditions a general PRG must satisfy for our quantum-enhanced protocol to yield informationtheoretical security. Altogether, our proposal represents a twofold improvement: first it offers proven information-theoretical security under some assumptions on the PRG; secondly, these assumptions are weaker than the requirements for the PRG in Brassard’s protocol. Additionally, our proposal is also more practical in the sense that it requires a shorter key than the classical scheme by using the pseudorandom bits to choose the tag’s hash function. 1