Message authenticators for quantum-secured communications facilitate low-latency authentication with assurances of security. Low-latency message authenticators are especially valuable in infrastructure systems where security and latency constraints are difficult to satisfy with conventional non-quantum cryptography. For example, a message transmitter receives a message and derives an authentication tag for the message based at least in part on an authenticator that uses one or more quantum keys. The message transmitter outputs the message and its authentication tag. A message receiver receives a message and authentication tag for the message. The message receiver derives a comparison tag for the message based at least in part on an authenticator that uses one or more quantum keys. The message receiver checks whether the message is authentic based on a comparison of the authentication tag and the comparison tag. In example implementations, the authenticator uses stream-wise cyclic redundancy code operations.
Message authenticators for quantum-secured communications facilitate low-latency authentication with assurances of security. Low-latency message authenticators are especially valuable in infrastructure systems where security and latency constraints are difficult to satisfy with conventional non-quantum cryptography. For example, a message transmitter receives a message and derives an authentication tag for the message based at least in part on an authenticator that uses one or more quantum keys. The message transmitter outputs the message and its authentication tag. A message receiver receives a message and authentication tag for the message. The message receiver derives a comparison tag for the message based at least in part on an authenticator that uses one or more quantum keys. The message receiver checks whether the message is authentic based on a comparison of the authentication tag and the comparison tag. In example implementations, the authenticator uses stream-wise cyclic redundancy code operations.
A general class of authentication schemes for arbitrary quantum messages is proposed. The class is based on the use of sets of unitary quantum operations in both transmission and reception, and on appending a quantum tag to the quantum message used in transmission. The previous secret between partners required for any authentication is a classical key. We obtain the minimal requirements on the unitary operations that lead to a probability of failure of the scheme less than one. This failure may be caused by someone performing a unitary operation on the message in the channel between the communicating partners, or by a potential forger impersonating the transmitter.
A novel approach to secure data transmission, quantum communication draws on fundamental principles of quantum physics. It ensures that the transmitted information is private and accurate. To provide security, quantum networks implement physical constraints such as the no-cloning rule and quantum entanglement. In contrast, computational complexity is employed by classical networks. However, with the proliferation of multiuser quantum networks, identity verification has become more challenging. People with malicious intentions might easily disrupt services in long-distance quantum networks by impersonating legitimate nodes and sharing entangled resources and quantum channels. This highlights the absolute necessity of secure authentication systems tailored to quantum environments. Enhancements to recent quantum authentication systems have been made utilizing techniques that are resistant to quantum computing. Researchers are looking into quantum digital signatures, entanglement-assisted protocols, and quantum key distribution (QKD) authentication to make multi-party communications more secure. In order to prevent attacks where a user establishes a fraudulent identity or account, these strategies can be applied to quantum networks. This study takes a look at current quantum authentication systems and gives them the once-over, focusing on how well they could handle multiple users. The article delves into the evolution of authentication systems to accommodate the distributed model, where nodes can function as senders, receivers, or relays. We aim to strike a compromise between practicality and security in our lightweight, low-latency protocols. Additionally, the paper discusses quantum-specific issues, such as side-channel attacks and device malfunctions, and how authentication techniques can help prevent them. Finally, this study demonstrates that authentication is the critical component of secure quantum communication for multiple users. The most secure quantum key distribution methods are still vulnerable to attacks from inside or outside the system if proper authentication is not in place.
Message authentication is a cryptographic task that allows the receiver to reject a message that is forged or has been tampered with. A protocol to authenticate quantum messages was proposed by Barnum, Crépeau, Gottesman, Tapp, and Smith [1] and stand-alone security was proved. Here, we are concerned with universal composable security (which requires a protocol to be essentially indistinguishable from the ideal functionality and ensures overall security when the protocol is part of any larger scheme). We show that the protocol in [1] is universal composably secure, and that most of the required key can be reused with universal composable security.
Secure communication is crucial in many emerging systems enabled by uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) communication networks. To protect legitimate communication in a chaotic UAV environment, where both eavesdropping and jamming become straightforward from multiple adversaries with line-of-sight signal propagation, a new reliable and integrated physical-layer security mechanism is proposed in this article for a massive multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) UAV system. Particularly, a physical-layer fingerprint, also called a tag, is first embedded into each message for authentication purpose. We then propose to reuse the tag additionally as a reference to encode each message to ensure secrecy for confidentiality enhancement at a low cost. Specifically, we create a new dual-reference symmetric tag generation mechanism by inputting an encoding-insensitive feature of plaintext along with the key into a hash function. At a legitimate receiver, an expected tag, reliable for decoding, can be symmetrically regenerated based on the received ciphertext, and authentication can be performed by comparing the regenerated reference tag to the received tag. However, an illegitimate receiver can only receive the fuzzy tag which can not be used to decode the received message. Additionally, we introduce artificial noise (AN) to degrade eavesdropping to further decrease message leakage. To verify the efficiency of our proposed tag-based encoding (TBE) scheme, we formulate two optimization problems, including ergodic sum secrecy rate maximization and authentication fail probability minimization. The power allocation solutions are derived by difference-of-convex (DC) programming and the Lagrange method, respectively. The simulation results demonstrate the superior performance of the proposed TBE approach compared to the prior AN-aided tag embedding scheme.
Quantum authentication protocol can be used to authenticate classical messages in a secure manner. In this paper, by using the cryptographic hash function and non-orthogonal qubits, a quantum authentication protocol of classical messages is proposed. In our protocol, the classical messages and their corresponding tags are encoded as nonorthogonal qubits. The message receiver decodes the classical messages and their corresponding tags from the received qubits by using the authentication key. To verify the validity of the received classical messages, the message receiver verifies whether the hash values of the decoded classical messages are equal to the corresponding tags. Our scheme can be proved to be secure against forgery attack and measurement attack. On the other hand, the authentication key is a binary string, which can be securely obtained and easily saved. What is more, because the authentication key remains secure after executing the authentication protocol, it provides the possibility of reusing the authentication key.