Unsharp spin-one observables arise from the fact that a residual uncertainty about the actual orientation of the measurement device remains. If the uncertainty is below a certain level, and if the distribution of measurement errors is covariant under rotations, a Kochen-Specker theorem for the unsharp spin observables follows: There are finite sets of directions such that not all the unsharp spin observables in these directions can consistently be assigned approximate truth values in a noncontextual way.
Unsharp spin-one observables arise from the fact that a residual uncertainty about the actual orientation of the measurement device remains. If the uncertainty is below a certain level, and if the distribution of measurement errors is covariant under rotations, a Kochen-Specker theorem for the unsharp spin observables follows: There are finite sets of directions such that not all the unsharp spin observables in these directions can consistently be assigned approximate truth values in a noncontextual way.
Uncertainty about the actual orientation of the measurement device has been claimed to open a loophole for hidden variable models of quantum mechanics. In this paper I describe the statistics of inaccurate spin measurements by unsharp spin observables. A no-go theorem for hidden variable models of the inaccurate measurement statistics follows: There is a finite set of directions for which not all results of inaccurate spin measurements can be predetermined in a non-contextual way. In contrast to an earlier theorem (Breuer 2002) this result does not rely on the assigment of approximate truth values, and it holds under weaker assumptions on the measurement inaccuracy.
Meyer [Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 3751 (1999)] recently showed that the Kochen-Specker theorem, which demonstrates the impossibility of a deterministic hidden variable description of ideal spin measurements on a spin 1 particle, can be effectively nullified if only finite precision measurements are considered. We generalize this result: one can ascribe consistent outcomes to a dense subset of the set of projection valued measurements, or to a dense subset of the set of positive operator valued measurements, on any finite dimensional system. Hence no Kochen-Specker-like contradiction can rule out hidden variable theories indistinguishable from quantum theory by finite precision measurements in either class.
The Kochen-Specker theorem proves the inability to assign, simultaneously, noncontextual definite values to all (of a finite set of) quantum mechanical observables in a consistent manner. If one assumes that any definite values behave noncontextually, one can nonetheless only conclude that some observables (in this set) are value indefinite. In this paper, we prove a variant of the Kochen-Specker theorem showing that, under the same assumption of noncontextuality, if a single one-dimensional projection observable is assigned the definite value 1, then no one-dimensional projection observable that is incompatible (i.e., non-commuting) with this one can be assigned consistently a definite value. Unlike standard proofs of the Kochen-Specker theorem, in order to localise and show the extent of value indefiniteness, this result requires a constructive method of reduction between Kochen-Specker sets. If a system is prepared in a pure state ψ, then it is reasonable to assume that any value assignment (i.e., hidden variable model) for this system assigns the value 1 to the observable projecting onto the one-dimensional linear subspace spanned by ψ, and the value 0 to those projecting onto linear subspaces orthogonal to it. Our result can be interpreted, under this assumption, as showing that the outcome of a measurement of any other incompatible one-dimensional projection observable cannot be determined in advance, thus formalising a notion of quantum randomness.
The Kochen-Specker theorem, Bell inequalities, and several other tests that were designed to rule out hidden-variable theories, assume the existence of observables having infinitely sharp eigenvalues. A paradigmatic example is spin-1/2. It is measured with a Stern-Gerlach array whose outputs are divided into two classes, spin-up and spin-down, in correspondence to the two spots observed on a detection screen. The spot's finite size is attributed to imperfections of the measuring device. This assumption turns the experimental output into a dichotomic, discrete one, thereby allowing the assignment of each spot to an infinitely sharp eigenvalue. Alternatively, one can assume that the spot's finite size stems from eigenvalues spanning a continuous range. Can we disprove such an assumption? Can we rule out hidden-variable theories that reproduce quantum predictions by assuming that, e.g., the electron's magnetic moment is not exactly the same for all electrons? We address these questions by focusing on the Peres-Mermin version of the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem. It is shown that the assumption of unsharp eigenvalues precludes ruling out non-contextual hidden-variable theories and hence quantum contextuality does not arise. Analogous results hold for Bell-like inequalities. This represents a new loophole that spoils several fundamental tests of quantum mechanics and issues the challenge to close it.
The Kochen-Specker theorem states that exclusive and complete deterministic outcome assignments are impossible for certain sets of measurements, called Kochen-Specker (KS) sets. A straightforward consequence is that KS sets do not have joint probability distributions because no set of joint outcomes over such a distribution can be constructed. However, we show it is possible to construct a joint quasiprobability distribution over any KS set by relaxing the completeness assumption. Interestingly, completeness is still observable at the level of measurable marginal probability distributions. This suggests the observable completeness might not be a fundamental feature, but a secondary property.
When it isn't possible to tell two distinct experimental procedures apart purely from their input/output statistics, then it seems a plausible hypothesis that the two procedures must be physically identical. We call such a hypothesis "noncontextuality", an instance of Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Read in the contrapositive, this hypothesis entails that any physical distinctions between two experimental procedures must necessarily lead to a difference in their operational statistics. The results I present in this thesis concern the failure of this hypothesis -- a failure dubbed "contextuality" -- when one tries to embed an operational theory (such as quantum theory) in the ontological models framework. The Kochen-Specker theorem demonstrates the failure of noncontextuality for deterministic ontological models of quantum theory, i.e., those ontological models where the ontic/physical state of the system fixes the outcome of any projective measurement on the system in a deterministic manner. This thesis goes beyond the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem by asking what operational facts must be verified in experiments to conclude that Nature does not admit noncontextual ontological models, not even indeterministic ones. This leads to noncontextuality inequalities that are robust to noise in the preparations and measurements. In the particular case of quantum theory, these inequalities are meaningful even when unsharp measurements (or POVMs) are allowed, a feature not shared by the traditional approach to KS-noncontextuality where unsharp measurements are excluded by fiat: allowing them renders even trivial POVMs (proportional to identity) maximally KS-contextual. The sense in which trivial POVMs are indeed "trivial" (or "noncontextual") is clear in our approach: they are simply too noisy to lead to violation of our noncontextuality inequalities.