We argue that certain types of many minds (and many worlds) interpretations of quantum mechanics, e.g. Lockwood ([1996a]), Deutsch ([1985]) do not provide a coherent interpretation of the quantum mechanical probabilistic algorithm. By contrast, in Albert and Loewer's ([1988]) version of the many minds interpretation, there is a coherent interpretation of the quantum mechanical probabilities. We consider Albert and Loewer's probability interpretation in the context of Bell‐type and GHZ‐type states and argue that it implies a certain (weak) form of nonlocality.1Introduction2Albert and Loewer's interpretation3Probabilities in Lockwood's interpretation4Sets of minds and their correlations5Many minds and GHZ
We argue that certain types of many minds (and many worlds) interpretations of quantum mechanics, e.g. Lockwood ([1996a]), Deutsch ([1985]) do not provide a coherent interpretation of the quantum mechanical probabilistic algorithm. By contrast, in Albert and Loewer's ([1988]) version of the many minds interpretation, there is a coherent interpretation of the quantum mechanical probabilities. We consider Albert and Loewer's probability interpretation in the context of Bell‐type and GHZ‐type states and argue that it implies a certain (weak) form of nonlocality.1Introduction2Albert and Loewer's interpretation3Probabilities in Lockwood's interpretation4Sets of minds and their correlations5Many minds and GHZ
In this work we investigate the problem of locality in theories inspired by Everett’s Relative State Theory. Specifically we address the Many Worlds by Deutsch, the Many Minds Theory by David Albert and Barry Loewer and the Relational Theory by Simon Saunders, and we carry out our inquiry in view of recent work by Meir Hemmo and Itamar Pitowsky. Our aim is, on the one hand, to clarify the remarkably important points which have been put forward within Hemmo and Pitowsky work on the issue of the interpretation of probability in Many Minds, on the other hand to argue against a remark on the Relational theory, stating that the analysis carried out on the Many Minds interpretation could be applied, mutatis mutandis, to Saunders’ theory.
An increasingly popular interpretation of quantum mechanics holds that in any genuinely chancy situation, all possible outcomes occur.1 For example, if the spin of a typical electron is measured in a given direction, then both 'up' and 'down' results will be registered. (True, 'up' and 'down' won't occur within the same 'branch of reality', for that would be inconsistent. Rather, the idea is that reality comes to contain two elements, with 'up' registered relative to one, and 'down' registered relative to the other.) This kind of 'many worlds' or 'many minds' interpretation of quantum mechanics has advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage is that it avoids any 'collapse of the wave function' and so avoids the measurement problem, mysterious non-local interactions, and the like. The most obvious disadvantage is that its burgeoning world of duplicate histories seems repugnant to common sense. Some commentators think that there is another disadvantage. They argue that this interpretation undermines itself by destroying any notion of objective probability. Quantum mechanics is, if anything, a theory which specifies the objective probabilities of certain results. But in what sense is there an objective probability for 'up' and 'down' in a spin measurement, if both results always happen? (Albert [1]; Albert and Loewer [3], [4]; Healey [5]; Squires [9]; Stein [8].) This looks like a good objection. But I shall show in this note that it is not. The proposed interpretation does leave objective probability as a rather mysterious notion. But it is no more mysterious on the proposed interpretation than on the conventional view of the world. This is not the place to go into details about the 'many minds'2 interpretation of quantum mechanics, but one point may help readers. If both the 'up' and 'down' results occur, why do we experience only one?
Dualistic interpretations attempt to solve the measurement problem of quantum mechanics by postulating the existence of non-physical minds, and by giving a suitable dynamical equation for how these minds evolve. I consider the relative merits of three extant dualistic interpretations (Albert and Loewer’s single-mind and many-minds interpretations, and Squires’ interpretation), and I defend Squires’ interpretation as preferable to the Albert/Loewer interpretations. I also argue that, for all three of these interpretations, the minds evolve independently of the physical universe, and hence render the physical universe otiose; the interpretations are better viewed as supporting not dualism, but mental monism.
Everett’s many-worlds or multiverse theory is an attempt to find an alternative to the standard Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Everett’s theory is often claimed to be local in the Bell sense. Here, we show that this is not the case and debunk the contradictions by analyzing in detail the Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger (GHZ) nonlocality theorem. We discuss and compare different notions of locality often mixed in the Everettian literature and try to explain the nature of the confusion. We conclude with a discussion of probability and statistics in the many-worlds theory and stress that the strong symmetry existing between branches in the theory prohibits the definition of probability and that the theory cannot recover statistics. The only way out from this contradiction is to modify the theory by adding hidden variables à la Bohm and, as a consequence, the new theory is explicitly Bell-nonlocal.
Quantum Mechanics notoriously faces a measurement problem, the problem that the unitary time evolution, encoded in its dynamical equations, together with the kinematical structure of the theory generally implies the non-existence \nof definite measurement outcomes. There have been multiple suggestions to solve this problem, among them the so called many worlds interpretation that originated with the work of Hugh Everett III. According to it, the quantum state and time evolution fully and accurately describe nature as it is, implying that under certain conditions multiple measurement outcomes that are seemingly mutually exclusive can be realized at the same time – but as different 'worlds' contained in a global, quantum mechanical structure, sometimes referred to as 'the multiverse'. The many worlds interpretation has, however, been confronted with serious difficulties over the course of its development, some of which were solved by the advent of decoherence theory. The present thesis critically investi- \ngates the state of play on a key remaining problem of the many worlds interpretation, the problem of the meaning and quantification of probabilities in a quantum multiverse. Recent attempts of deriving the pivotal statistical ingredient of quantum mechanics, Born’s rule, from either principles of decision theory or from quantum mechanics alone, supplemented with a few general premises about \nprobability are analyzed and their premises are scrutinized. It will be argued that, though both approaches yield promising results, they both ultimately fail \nto clearly establish the validity of Born’s rule in the context of the many worlds interpretation. It is hence suggested that further research on this problem is indicated.