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arXiv:quant-ph/0107151

Whose Knowledge?

N. David Mermin

Published Jul 30, 2001• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Sir Rudolph Peierls, in a reply to John Bell's last critique of the state of our understanding of quantum mechanics, maintained that it is easy to give an acceptable account of the physical significance of the quantum theory. The key is to recognize that all the density matrix characterizing a physical system ever represents is knowledge about that system. In answer to Bell's implicit rejoinder "Whose knowledge?" Peierls offered two simple consistency conditions that must be satisfied by density matrices that convey the knowledge different people might have about one and the same physical system: their density matrices must commute and must have a non-zero product. I describe a simple counterexample to his first condition, but show that his second condition, which holds trivially if the first does, continues to be valid in its absence. It is an open question whether any other conditions must be imposed.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0107151

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Sir Rudolph Peierls, in a reply to John Bell's last critique of the state of our understanding of quantum mechanics, maintained that it is easy to give an acceptable account of the physical significance of the quantum theory. The key is to recognize that all the density matrix characterizing a physical system ever represents is knowledge about that system. In answer to Bell's implicit rejoinder "Whose knowledge?" Peierls offered two simple consistency conditions that must be satisfied by density matrices that convey the knowledge different people might have about one and the same physical system: their density matrices must commute and must have a non-zero product. I describe a simple counterexample to his first condition, but show that his second condition, which holds trivially if the first does, continues to be valid in its absence. It is an open question whether any other conditions must be imposed.
Sir Rudolph Peierls, in a reply to John Bell's last critique of the state of our understanding of quantum mechanics, maintained that it is easy to give an acceptable account of the physical significance of the quantum theory. The key is to recognize that all the density matrix characterizing a physical system ever represents is knowledge about that system. In answer to Bell's implicit rejoinder Whose knowledge? Peierls offered two simple consistency conditions that must be satisfied by density matrices that convey the knowledge different people might have about one and the same physical system: their density matrices must commute and must have a non-zero product. I describe a simple counterexample to his first condition, but show that his second condition, which holds trivially if the first does, continues to be valid in its absence. It is an open question whether any other conditions must be imposed.
The brief works of Peierls on the role of the observer in quantum mechanics are examined, interpreted and expanded to widen accessibility and understanding of these works. The approach followed here is very much in the spirit adopted by Peierls who eschewed a `rigorous axiomatic' and aimed at using `logic at the level of the working physicist'. The fundamental tenet of his work is that the wavefunction or density matrix represents the knowledge of an observer and that two observers of the same system may well have different knowledge and will use different density matrices to describe it. Essential to the understanding of Peierls's approach is the demonstration given here that the density matrix generally can be expressed entirely in terms of probabilities of observable outcomes and that such probabilities are subjective in the first instance.The process by which the knowledge of two observers may be combined is discussed in detail for some simple cases and, by using Bayes's theorem, the progress to a common understanding of the correct density matrix for a given situation demonstrated. Peierls gave a criterion to ensure that the amalgamation of data from two observers can never lead to violation of the uncertainty principle : that the density matrices of two observers must commute. It is pointed out that it is essential that the density matrices of two observers commute under all circumstances no matter how inaccurate or even fanciful the data or beliefs used to construct them. Once this is appreciated it can be shown that Peierls's density matrix commutation criterion is fully equivalent to the standard result in quantum mechanics that two observables must commute if they are to be known precisely and simultaneously,but now extended to imperfectly known mixed states rather than a single eigenstate.
When various observers obtain information in an independent fashion about a classical system, there is a simple rule which allows them to pool their knowledge, and this requires only the states-of-knowledge of the respective observers. Here we derive an equivalent quantum formula. While its realm of applicability is necessarily more limited, it does apply to a large class of measurements, and we show explicitly for a single qubit that it satisfies the intuitive notions of what it means to pool knowledge about a quantum system. This analysis also provides a physical interpretation for the trace of the product of two density matrices.
If the density matrix is treated as an objective description of individual systems, it may become possible to attribute the same objective significance to statistical mechanical properties, such as entropy or temperature, as to properties such as mass or energy. It is shown that the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of quantum theory can be consistently applied to density matrices as a description of individual systems. The resultant trajectories are examined for the case of the delayed choice interferometer, for which Bell appears to suggest that such an interpretation is not possible. Bell's argument is shown to be based upon a different understanding of the density matrix to that proposed here.
A quantum state, via the Born Rule, assigns probabilities to the different possible values of observables of a quantum system. It is only in virtue of these probabilities — or, alternatively, expectation values — that quantum mechanics is empirically testable. Since assigning a state to a system means assigning probabilities to the values of observables, it may seem natural to read Peierls’ claim that the state ‘represents our knowledge of the system’ (Peierls [1991], p. 19) as a shorthand for saying that the state represents our knowledge of these probabilities. The latter view is sometimes even straightforwardly identified with the epistemic conception of states, for example by Marchildon, who claims that ‘[i]n the epistemic view [of quantum states], the state vector (or wave function or density matrix) does not represent the objective state of a microscopic system […], but rather our knowledge of the probabilities of outcomes of future measurements’ (Marchildon [2004], p. 1454). However, according to an argument due to Fuchs and endorsed by Timpson, 31 the idea that quantum states represent our knowledge about quantum probabilities should not be regarded as the core claim of the epistemic conception of quantum states, simply because, as they argue, this idea is in fact incompatible with the latter. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.