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Journal of Mathematical Physics

Compatibility of state assignments

N. David Mermin

Published Sep 1, 2002• 9 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Rudolf Peierls raised the question of when different density matrices can characterize the knowledge available to different people about one and the same physical system. I describe counterexamples to the condition he imposed on such state assignments, and suggest what the correct condition ought to be.
DOI
10.1063/1.1495897

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The state that an observer attributes to a quantum system depends on the information available to that observer. If two or more observers have different information about a single system, they will in general assign different states. Is there any restriction on what states can be assigned, given reasonable assumptions about how the observers use their information? We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a group of general density matrices to characterize what different people may know about one and the same physical system. These conditions are summarized by a single criterion, which we term compatibility.
Sir Rudolph Peierls, in a reply to John Bell's last critique of the state of our understanding of quantum mechanics, maintained that it is easy to give an acceptable account of the physical significance of the quantum theory. The key is to recognize that all the density matrix characterizing a physical system ever represents is knowledge about that system. In answer to Bell's implicit rejoinder "Whose knowledge?" Peierls offered two simple consistency conditions that must be satisfied by density matrices that convey the knowledge different people might have about one and the same physical system: their density matrices must commute and must have a non-zero product. I describe a simple counterexample to his first condition, but show that his second condition, which holds trivially if the first does, continues to be valid in its absence. It is an open question whether any other conditions must be imposed.
Sir Rudolph Peierls, in a reply to John Bell's last critique of the state of our understanding of quantum mechanics, maintained that it is easy to give an acceptable account of the physical significance of the quantum theory. The key is to recognize that all the density matrix characterizing a physical system ever represents is knowledge about that system. In answer to Bell's implicit rejoinder Whose knowledge? Peierls offered two simple consistency conditions that must be satisfied by density matrices that convey the knowledge different people might have about one and the same physical system: their density matrices must commute and must have a non-zero product. I describe a simple counterexample to his first condition, but show that his second condition, which holds trivially if the first does, continues to be valid in its absence. It is an open question whether any other conditions must be imposed.
In approaches to quantum theory in which the quantum state is regarded as a representation of knowledge, information, or belief, two agents can assign different states to the same quantum system. This raises two questions: when are such state assignments compatible? And how should the state assignments of different agents be reconciled? In this paper, we address these questions from the perspective of the recently developed conditional states formalism for quantum theory (Leifer M S and Spekkens R W 2013 Phys. Rev. A 88 052310). Specifically, we derive a compatibility criterion proposed by Brun, Finkelstein and Mermin from the requirement that, upon acquiring data, agents should update their states using a quantum generalization of Bayesian conditioning. We provide two alternative arguments for this criterion, based on the objective and subjective Bayesian interpretations of probability theory. We then apply the same methodology to the problem of quantum state improvement, i.e. how to update your state when you learn someone else's state assignment, and to quantum state pooling, i.e. how to combine the state assignments of several agents into a single assignment that accurately represents the views of the group. In particular, we derive a pooling rule previously proposed by Spekkens and Wiseman under much weaker assumptions than those made in the original derivation. All of our results apply to a much broader class of experimental scenarios than have been considered previously in this context.