Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:quant-ph/0011016

The EPR Argument in a Relational Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Federico Laudisa

Published Nov 3, 2000• 7 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

It is shown that in the Rovelli relational interpretation of quantum mechanics, in which the notion of absolute or observer independent state is rejected, the conclusion of the ordinary EPR argument turns out to be frame-dependent, provided the conditions of the original argument are suitably adapted to the new interpretation. The consequences of this result for the `peaceful coexistence' of quantum mechanics and special relativity are briefly discussed.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0011016

Related papers

Relational Quantum Mechanics and the PBR Theorem: A Peaceful Coexistence

Andréa Oldofredi, Claudio Calosi

Abstract According to Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) the wave function $$\psi$$ ψ is considered neither a concrete physical item evolving in spacetime, nor an object representing the absolute state of a certain quantum system. In this interpretative framework, $$\psi$$ ψ is defined as a computational device encoding observers’ information; hence, RQM offers a somewhat epistemic view of the wave function. This perspective seems to be at odds with the PBR theorem, a formal result excluding that wave functions represent knowledge of an underlying reality described by some ontic state. In this paper we argue that RQM is not affected by the conclusions of PBR’s argument; consequently, the alleged inconsistency can be dissolved. To do that, we will thoroughly discuss the very foundations of the PBR theorem, i.e. Harrigan and Spekkens’ categorization of ontological models, showing that their implicit assumptions about the nature of the ontic state are incompatible with the main tenets of RQM. Then, we will ask whether it is possible to derive a relational PBR-type result, answering in the negative. This conclusion shows some limitations of this theorem not yet discussed in the literature.

arXiv:2107.02566•Foundations of Physics•Jul 31, 2021•9 citations

Relationalism versus realism: a dilemma for relational quantum mechanics

Jacobs, Caspar, Read, James

Are absolute representations of reality---i.e., representations of reality from no particular point view---possible? Moore (1997) has offered abstract arguments for the following answer to this question: 'yes, invariably'. But there are questions regarding whether (and how) this conclusion can be compatible with modern physics, where absolute representations often seem hard to come by. These questions were taken up by Jacobs & Read (2025) in the context of classical spacetime physics; here, we turn our attention to quantum mechanics. In particular, when the arguments of Moore (1997) are brought into contact with the 'relational quantum mechanics' of Rovelli (1996) and collaborators, one finds that the latter is unstable: either it is not relational view, or it is not a realist view.

•Aug 6, 2025•0 citations

Physical Relations or Functional Relations ? A non-metaphysical construal of Rovelli’s Relational Quantum Mechanics

Michel Bitbol

Rovelli’s RQM is first characterized by contrast with both Everett’s and Bohr’s interpretations of quantum mechanics. Then, it is shown that a basic difficulty arises from the choice of formulating RQM in a naturalistic framework. Even though, according to Rovelli’s interpretation, statements about the world only make sense relative to certain naturalized observers described by means of quantum mechanics, this very meta-statement seems to make sense relative to a sort of super-observer which does not partake of the naturalized status of ordinary observers. The difficulty is solved by substituting functional reference frames for physical (or naturalized) observers throughout. Instead of being relative to physical observers, statements about the state vector of physical systems are here relative to well-defined projects of probabilistic prediction which may be embodied by several physical observers.

•Sep 1, 2007•10 citations

“What is relational is real, and what is real is relational”: an ontological assessment of Relational Quantum Mechanics

Juan Carlos Vila

Abstract The following paper explores the metaphysical significance of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). For this, I will first outline Rovelli’s philosophical framework, and then offer a reconstruction of Rovelli’s seminal argument in favour of RQM. I will then explore some healthy lines of philosophical work that may be undertaken to strengthen RQM. First, I will frame RQM in the debate between realist and antirealist readings of QM and defend the general claim that RQM is compatible with realism. Then, I discuss the main ontological interpretations of RQM, which I classify as “dispositional”, “transcendental” and “structural”, and argue that all of them remain committed to substantialist assumptions that limit the radicality of Rovelli’s proposal. Finally, I analyse recent developments on RQM’s ontology and suggest that preserving its ontological originality requires an assessment on the concept of “pattern”.

•Sep 30, 2026•0 citations

On relational quantum mechanics

Oscar Acosta

A problem facing quantum mechanics is that there are a number of views or interpretations available that purport to 'explain' quantum mechanics. In this paper I discuss and analyze the view of relational quantum mechanics by Carlo Rovelli in the context of theoretical underdetermination. I will show that even though Rovelli offers a view that consolidates some of the aspects of competing theories it still falls short of breaking out of the theoretical underdetermination. The criteria that I have used to consider a theory successful in this context is one that increases the predictive output of quantum theory. Lacking an increase of predictive output then we can consider how a view helps solve the paradoxes in quantum mechanics or makes the paradoxes meaningless. I will conclude that relational quantum mechanics does not attempt to increase the predictive output and has limited success in resolving the EPR paradox. What Rovelli's view of quantum mechanics offers is a non-trivial and interesting re-interpretation of the main issues of quantum mechanics that does leave the door open for further study.

•Jan 1, 2010•0 citations

A reply to Rovelli's response to our "Assessing Relational Quantum Mechanics''

R. Muciño, Elias Okon, Daniel Sudarsky

In a recent paper, Rovelli responds to our critical assessment of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). His main argument is that our assessment lacks merit, because we fail to understand, or cope with, the premises of his theory; instead, he argues, we judge his proposal, blinded by the preconceptions inherent to ``our camp''. Here, we explicitly show that our assessment judges RQM on its own terms, together with the basic requirements of precision, clarity, logical soundness and empirical suitability. Under those circumstances, we prove false Rovelli's claim that RQM provides a satisfactory, realistic, non-solipsistic description of the world. Moreover, his reply serves us to further exhibit the serious problems of the RQM proposal, as well as the failures of its author to understanding the basic conceptual difficulties of quantum theory.

arXiv:2107.05817•Jul 13, 2021•1 citation
It is shown that in the Rovelli relational interpretation of quantum mechanics, in which the notion of absolute or observer independent state is rejected, the conclusion of the ordinary EPR argument turns out to be frame-dependent, provided the conditions of the original argument are suitably adapted to the new interpretation. The consequences of this result for the `peaceful coexistence' of quantum mechanics and special relativity are briefly discussed.
Abstract According to Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) the wave function ψ\psiψ ψ is considered neither a concrete physical item evolving in spacetime, nor an object representing the absolute state of a certain quantum system. In this interpretative framework, ψ\psiψ ψ is defined as a computational device encoding observers’ information; hence, RQM offers a somewhat epistemic view of the wave function. This perspective seems to be at odds with the PBR theorem, a formal result excluding that wave functions represent knowledge of an underlying reality described by some ontic state. In this paper we argue that RQM is not affected by the conclusions of PBR’s argument; consequently, the alleged inconsistency can be dissolved. To do that, we will thoroughly discuss the very foundations of the PBR theorem, i.e. Harrigan and Spekkens’ categorization of ontological models, showing that their implicit assumptions about the nature of the ontic state are incompatible with the main tenets of RQM. Then, we will ask whether it is possible to derive a relational PBR-type result, answering in the negative. This conclusion shows some limitations of this theorem not yet discussed in the literature.
Are absolute representations of reality---i.e., representations of reality from no particular point view---possible? Moore (1997) has offered abstract arguments for the following answer to this question: 'yes, invariably'. But there are questions regarding whether (and how) this conclusion can be compatible with modern physics, where absolute representations often seem hard to come by. These questions were taken up by Jacobs & Read (2025) in the context of classical spacetime physics; here, we turn our attention to quantum mechanics. In particular, when the arguments of Moore (1997) are brought into contact with the 'relational quantum mechanics' of Rovelli (1996) and collaborators, one finds that the latter is unstable: either it is not relational view, or it is not a realist view.
Rovelli’s RQM is first characterized by contrast with both Everett’s and Bohr’s interpretations of quantum mechanics. Then, it is shown that a basic difficulty arises from the choice of formulating RQM in a naturalistic framework. Even though, according to Rovelli’s interpretation, statements about the world only make sense relative to certain naturalized observers described by means of quantum mechanics, this very meta-statement seems to make sense relative to a sort of super-observer which does not partake of the naturalized status of ordinary observers. The difficulty is solved by substituting functional reference frames for physical (or naturalized) observers throughout. Instead of being relative to physical observers, statements about the state vector of physical systems are here relative to well-defined projects of probabilistic prediction which may be embodied by several physical observers.
Abstract The following paper explores the metaphysical significance of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). For this, I will first outline Rovelli’s philosophical framework, and then offer a reconstruction of Rovelli’s seminal argument in favour of RQM. I will then explore some healthy lines of philosophical work that may be undertaken to strengthen RQM. First, I will frame RQM in the debate between realist and antirealist readings of QM and defend the general claim that RQM is compatible with realism. Then, I discuss the main ontological interpretations of RQM, which I classify as “dispositional”, “transcendental” and “structural”, and argue that all of them remain committed to substantialist assumptions that limit the radicality of Rovelli’s proposal. Finally, I analyse recent developments on RQM’s ontology and suggest that preserving its ontological originality requires an assessment on the concept of “pattern”.
A problem facing quantum mechanics is that there are a number of views or interpretations available that purport to 'explain' quantum mechanics. In this paper I discuss and analyze the view of relational quantum mechanics by Carlo Rovelli in the context of theoretical underdetermination. I will show that even though Rovelli offers a view that consolidates some of the aspects of competing theories it still falls short of breaking out of the theoretical underdetermination. The criteria that I have used to consider a theory successful in this context is one that increases the predictive output of quantum theory. Lacking an increase of predictive output then we can consider how a view helps solve the paradoxes in quantum mechanics or makes the paradoxes meaningless. I will conclude that relational quantum mechanics does not attempt to increase the predictive output and has limited success in resolving the EPR paradox. What Rovelli's view of quantum mechanics offers is a non-trivial and interesting re-interpretation of the main issues of quantum mechanics that does leave the door open for further study.
In a recent paper, Rovelli responds to our critical assessment of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). His main argument is that our assessment lacks merit, because we fail to understand, or cope with, the premises of his theory; instead, he argues, we judge his proposal, blinded by the preconceptions inherent to ``our camp''. Here, we explicitly show that our assessment judges RQM on its own terms, together with the basic requirements of precision, clarity, logical soundness and empirical suitability. Under those circumstances, we prove false Rovelli's claim that RQM provides a satisfactory, realistic, non-solipsistic description of the world. Moreover, his reply serves us to further exhibit the serious problems of the RQM proposal, as well as the failures of its author to understanding the basic conceptual difficulties of quantum theory.