arXiv:quant-ph/0007075

Quantum mechanics without interpretation

Yaremchuk, O.

Published Jul 20, 2000• 0 citations

Abstract

It is shown that the independence of the continuum hypothesis points to the unique definite status of the set of intermediate cardinality: the intermediate set exists only as a subset of continuum. This latent status is a consequence of duality of the members of the set. Due to the structural inhomogeneity of the intermediate set, its complete description falls into several "sections" (theories) with their special main laws, dimensions, and directions, i.e., the complete description of the one-dimensional intermediate set is multidimensional. Quantum mechanics is one of these theories.

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0007075

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