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arXiv:physics/0608208

Physical Realities from Simple Philosophical Conjectures

Helen Lynn, Michele Caponigro

Published Aug 21, 2006• 0 citations
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Abstract

We will focus on the Quantum theory and starting from simple philosophical conjectures, we infer possible different physical realities. Also we argue of possible wavefunction emerging under specific conditions of the physical reality. Finally, we affirm that the "hidden choice" of the ontic elements as primitive is a fundamental step to analyze the construction of any theory.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.physics/0608208

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We will focus on the Quantum theory and starting from simple philosophical conjectures, we infer possible different physical realities. Also we argue of possible wavefunction emerging under specific conditions of the physical reality. Finally, we affirm that the "hidden choice" of the ontic elements as primitive is a fundamental step to analyze the construction of any theory.
We argue, through some philosophical considerations, on (i)dependent or (ii) an independent existence of physical reality underlying quantum states. According these simple considerations, we conclude that is impossible to have a clear independent existence of physical reality, we need to search the reasons in the relationship between our questions (the observers) and the consequent answers (always estimated by the same observers). Finally, we infer that every theory is affected by our "questions", so we cannot speak about an unconditional and independent theory underlying physical reality. Plan of the paper. The existence of physical reality underlying quantum states: (i) it before bit,(ii)it without bit,(iii)it from bit.
Our notions of what is physically 'real' have long been based on the idea that the real is what is immediately apprehended, that is the local or observable, the physically tangible, though there has always been an alternative philosophical notion that the 'real' is some kind of ontological structure beyond immediate apprehension, and so inaccessible through physics. However, quantum mechanics, with its intrinsic nonlocal correlations, has seemingly left us with a dilemma by showing that fundamental physical theories cannot be both real and local. Reality cannot be reconstructed as a deterministic projection from physical observations. Many people think that the problem lies with quantum mechanics, but, in fact, it is more likely to be a result of unrealistic expectations. We have assumed that fundamental physics ought to be compatible with normal (macroscopic) experience. If, however, we go beyond our current high-level physical theories to the basic elements from which they are constructed, we see that a pattern emerges that gives us a very different and much more coherent understanding of what is meant by physical 'reality'.
We argue about a conceptual approach to quantum formalism. Starting from philosophical conjectures (Platonism, Idealism and Realism) as basic ontic elements (namely: math world, data world, and state of matter), we will analyze the quantum superposition principle. This analysis bring us to demonstrate that the basic assumptions affect in different ways:(a) the general problem of the information and computability about a system, (b) the nature of the math tool utilized and (c) the correspondent physical reality.
The concept of "reality" is often raised in the context of philosophical foundations of physics or interpretations of quantum mechanics. When this term is so raised, it is a warning to me that I am about to be led down a rabbit hole. Such diversions usually lead nowhere unless you consider endless discussions of Schrodinger's cat, wave function collapse, quantum non-locality, and parallel universes to be useful. A prime example is the famous Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen paper wherein they concluded that the quantum wave function cannot provide a complete description of physical reality. In this essay I suggest that, in physics discourse, the term "reality" should be avoided at all costs.
In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. In the first part we will argue that a general confusion within the literature comes from the improper "scrambling" of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. The first one is related to an epistemic interpretation of contextuality, introduced by Bohr, which stresses the incompatibility (or complementarity) of quantum measurements. The second, is related to an ontic notion of contextuality, exposed through the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem, which focuses on the constraints to discuss about actual (definite valued) properties within the orthodox formalism of QM. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an "omelette of contextuality" which has been fully widespread through a popularized "epistemic explanation" of the KS theorem according to which: The outcome of the observable A when mea- sured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A,B] = [A,C] = 0, and [B,C] ̸= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling epistemic and ontic perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. In the second part of the paper, we will analyse the relation between ‘classical contexts’ and QM. We will show that three accepted presuppositions found within the orthodox literature are, in general, false. Namely: (i) that quantum contextuality does not preclude an objective description of physical reality, (ii) that the choice of a context (or basis) restores a classical description of reality, and (iii) that the choice of a (classical) context is a necessary condition for accounting for empirical statements in QM.