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Information Sciences

New chosen-ciphertext secure identity-based encryption with tight security reduction to the bilinear Diffie–Hellman problem

Jong Hwan Park, Kwangsu Lee, Dong Hoon Lee

Published Jul 13, 2015• 7 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/j.ins.2015.07.011

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