Correlations and Counterfactuals: The EPR Illusion

Bas C. van Fraassen

Joy Christian

An elementary topological error in Bell's representation of the EPR elements of reality is identified. Once recognized, it leads to a topologically correct local-realistic framework that provides exact, deterministic, and local underpinning of at least the Bell, GHZ-3, GHZ-4, and Hardy states. The correlations exhibited by these states are shown to be exactly the classical correlations among the points of a 3 or 7-sphere, both of which are closed under multiplication, and hence preserve the locality condition of Bell. The alleged non-localities of these states are thus shown to result from misidentified topologies of the EPR elements of reality. When topologies are correctly identified, local-realistic completion of any arbitrary entangled state is always guaranteed in our framework. This vindicates EPR, and entails that quantum entanglement is best understood as an illusion.

Thierry Martin

Charles P. Tresser

Two typical entanglements will be shown to stand on opposite sides on the issue of \emph{instrumental realism}, the issue of whether (as for EPR in the original form or EPRB, Bohm's versions using spin) or not (as for GHZ) observables have values that preexist measurement. Instrumental realism in the EPR context helps us prove that in some special circumstances, one can get simultaneous knowledge of two conjugate quantities, which in particular make sense together. This shatters the axiomatic presentation of Quantum Mechanics. This simultaneous knowledge of two conjugate quantities elaborates on 1935 work by Schr{ö}dinger, hence the name, \emph{Schr{ö}dinger Unorthodoxy Theorem}, given to the second main result that is easily deduced from the result on instrumental realism. Once the axiomatic edifice of Quantum Mechanics is broken, we can let go the completeness of the wave function as suggested in EPR, and hold fast on locality. The EPR paper of mid-1935 gets here contrasted, from a new point of view, with a 1936 text where Einstein avoids using counterfactuals. Counterfactuals get a precise definition and the corresponding concept is used all along, but may be new under an old name. We provide a short critical review of Bell's 1964 paper. Then, a small modification of arguments for the Schr{ö}dinger Unorthodoxy Theorem will let appear a simple conservation law, combined with the Malus Law, as the origin of the correlation in Bell's version of EPRB: this is our third main result. As the fourth main result, a last use of the concept of counterfactual yields the decay of geometry at small enough scale. This opens a new world of interpretation of aspects of Quantum Mechanics, aspects that range from measurement and the need of classical physics to views on what realism should mean in microphysics.

Jeremy Butterfield

I show that locality, as it occurs in EPR arguments for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics, can be construed as causal independence understood in terms of Lewis’ counterfactual analysis of causation. This construal has two benefits. It supplements recent analyses, which have not treated locality in detail. And it clarifies the relation between two EPR arguments that have recently been distinguished. It shows that the simpler of the two is more complex than has been thought; and that the other argument does not need ‘counterfactual definiteness’. I aim to show that in the EPR argument (Einstein et al. 1935) for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics (QM), locality can be taken as causal independence, understood in terms of Lewis’ counterfactual analysis of causation. Recent analyses of the EPR argument makes this construal of locality timely, for two reasons. First, these analyses typically say little about locality.

Geoff Beck

The empirical proof of Bell inequality violations was a landmark moment for research into quantum foundations. It commits us to a universe without strict relativistic locality or requires that we escape through a potential loophole like many-worlds or superdeterminism. In this work, we consider a sequential, single-spin experiment whose auto-correlations match the two-spin entangled correlations of a Bell scenario. We use a counterfactual equivalence between the two to argue that Bell-type correlations are actually just a different implementation of the sequential experiment. This comports well with the counterfactual basis of the original EPR argument, and explains any apparent non-locality as a consequence of indirectly measuring quantities that do not have predefined values, due to the state-altering nature of sequential spin measurements.