I show that locality, as it occurs in EPR arguments for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics, can be construed as causal independence understood in terms of Lewis’ counterfactual analysis of causation. This construal has two benefits. It supplements recent analyses, which have not treated locality in detail. And it clarifies the relation between two EPR arguments that have recently been distinguished. It shows that the simpler of the two is more complex than has been thought; and that the other argument does not need ‘counterfactual definiteness’. I aim to show that in the EPR argument (Einstein et al. 1935) for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics (QM), locality can be taken as causal independence, understood in terms of Lewis’ counterfactual analysis of causation. Recent analyses of the EPR argument makes this construal of locality timely, for two reasons. First, these analyses typically say little about locality.
I show that locality, as it occurs in EPR arguments for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics, can be construed as causal independence understood in terms of Lewis’ counterfactual analysis of causation. This construal has two benefits. It supplements recent analyses, which have not treated locality in detail. And it clarifies the relation between two EPR arguments that have recently been distinguished. It shows that the simpler of the two is more complex than has been thought; and that the other argument does not need ‘counterfactual definiteness’. I aim to show that in the EPR argument (Einstein et al. 1935) for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics (QM), locality can be taken as causal independence, understood in terms of Lewis’ counterfactual analysis of causation. Recent analyses of the EPR argument makes this construal of locality timely, for two reasons. First, these analyses typically say little about locality.
This book uses the formal semantics of counterfactual conditionals to analyze the problem of non-locality in quantum mechanics. Counterfactual conditionals (subjunctive conditionals) enter the analysis of quantum entangled systems in that they enable us to precisely formulate the locality condition that purports to exclude the existence of causal interactions between spatially separated parts of a system. They also make it possible to speak consistently about alternative measuring settings, and to explicate what is meant by quantum property attributions. The book develops the possible-world semantics of quantum counterfactuals using David Lewis’s famous approach as a starting point but modifying it significantly in order to achieve compatibility with the demands of the special theory of relativity as well as quantum mechanics. There have been several attempts to use counterfactual semantics to strengthen Bell’s theorem and its cognates such as the GHZ and Hardy theorems. These are critically evaluated in the book. Finally, a counterfactual reconstruction of the EPR argument and Bell’s theorem is proposed that sheds a new light on their philosophical consequences regarding the relations between realism and local causation.
It has been claimed that quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, i.e., that the predictions of quantum mechanics are at odds with a conception of the world where all the interactions are mediated by local mechanisms. The cited reason is the violation of the Bell inequality in cases where measurements are performed on quantum systems of particles that have interacted in the past. Quantum mechanics predicts that the state of the particles in such a system are correlated, a result obtained from considering a thought-experiment often known as EPR. In this thesis, I will argue that the violation of the Bell inequality in EPR forces us to either accept that causes sometimes act both backwards and forwards in time, or give up some widely-held assumptions about causal relations or the role of causal explanations. First, I will present three principles regarding causality that I take be widely accepted. I will then present the background for the claim the quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, and discuss the implications of non-local causal influences in light of the Special Theory of Relativity. One argument against a causal explanation of the EPR-correlations will be discussed, and different models for the causal structure of EPR will be assessed. I will argue that a retrocausal model – models that include instances of retrocausation, where the direction of causation is the opposite of the direction of time – is the only viable option if we want to uphold the three principles presented in chapter 1. I will discuss the plausibility of rejecting one of these principles, and argue that at least one of the can be restricted in a way that still accounts for our commitment to it. Finally, I will assess the non-local models against the retrocausal models, and argue that a retrocausal model offers interpretational advantages over the non-local alternatives.
Does determinism (or even the incompleteness of quantum mechanics) follow from locality and perfect correlations? In a 1964 paper, John Bell gave the first demonstration that quantum mechanics is incompatible with local hidden variables. Since then, a vigorous debate has rung out over whether he relied on an assumption of determinism or instead, as he later claimed in a 1981 paper, derived determinism from assumptions of locality and perfect correlation. This paper aims to bring clarity to the debate via simple examples and rigorous results. It is first recalled, via quantum and classical counterexamples, that the weakest statistical form of locality consistent with Bell’s 1964 paper (parameter independence) is insufficient for the derivation of determinism. Attention is then turned to critically assess Bell’s appeal to the Einstein–Rosen–Podolsky (EPR) incompleteness argument to support his claim. It is shown that this argument is itself incomplete, via counterexamples that expose two logical gaps. Closing these gaps via a strong “counterfactual” reality criterion enables a rigorous derivation of both determinism and parameter independence, and in this sense justifies Bell’s claim. Conversely, however, it is noted that whereas the EPR argument requires a weaker “measurement choice” assumption than Bell’s demonstration, it nevertheless leads to a similar incompatibility with quantum predictions rather than quantum incompleteness.
Most physicists agree that the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen–Bell paradox exemplifies much of the strange behavior of quantum mechanics, but argument persists about what assumptions underlie the paradox. To clarify what the debate is about, we employ a simple and well-known thought experiment involving two correlated photons to help us focus on the logical assumptions needed to construct the EPR and Bell arguments. The view presented in this paper is that the minimal assumptions behind Bell’s inequality are locality and counterfactual definiteness but not scientific realism, determinism, or hidden variables as are often suggested. We further examine the resulting constraints on physical theory with an illustration from the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics—an interpretation that we argue is deterministic, local, and realist but that nonetheless violates the Bell inequality.
Bell's Theorem demonstrates that factorizable theories for the EPR experiment (EPR) cannot reproduce the quantum correlations. Factorizability is motivated by various locality conditions. So to understand the nature of nonlocality in EPR, we first need to understand the conceptual relations between factorizability, these various locality conditions and the nature of the quantum correlations. That is the main focus of my thesis. My main conclusion is that these conceptual relations are more subtle than the literature has usually suggested. Chapter 1 is a general introduction. In Chapter 2, I review the general framework of factorizable stochastic theories for EPR. I argue that factorizability can be motivated by various locality conditions, even in theories that admit time-dependent states and take the measurement interactions to be neither instantaneous, nor simultaneous. In Chapter 3, I focus on Cartwright' s (1989) and Humphreys' (1989) theories of probabilistic causation for singular events, which are based on modifications of traditional causal linear modelling. I argue (against Cartwright) that local models for EPR in the framework of these theories are committed to factorizability; and so they cannot reproduce the EPR correlations. In Chapter 4, I turn to Stochastic-Einstein Locality (SEL). Hellman (1982) proposed that SEL with some provisos characterizes the No-Superluminal-Action (NSA) of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR), and he argued that SEL is not violated in EPR. Butterfield (1994) proposed that SEL (without Hellman's provisos) characterizes the lack of superluminal Lewisian causation, and he argued that SEL is violated in EPR. I argue that SEL (without Hellman's provisos) is motivated by NSA and spatiotemporal separability. Thus, the violation of SEL might arise from the failure of spatiotemporal separability. And this failure is compatible with NSA and superluminal Lewisian causation. Accordingly, Hellman's and Butterfield's views need not be in tension. In Chapter 5, I focus on the implications for nonlocality of Jarrett's (1984) analysis of factorizability into "locality" and "completeness". I argue that although this analysis cannot distinguish between failures of factorizability which are compatible with STR and those which are not, it is significant for clarifying the implications of Bell's theorem for nonlocality. In Chapter 6, I qmsider three arguments that are intended to deny superluminal causal propagation in EPR, and a fourth argument that is intended to establish the opposite conclusion. I argue that in various ways these arguments have gone wrong. Three of these argument rely on implicit assumptions that have been overlooked. Accordingly, two of them reached a reasonable conclusion, i.e. the failure of separability, for the wrong reasons; whereas the third reached a wrong conclusion, i.e. that the failure of the contiguity of causal processes explains the failure of factorizability in EPR. The fourth relies on a wrong assumption, and thus it reaches a too strong conclusion, that the EPR correlations require superluminal action. My main conclusion is that the quantum correlations require nonseparability . In Chapter 7, I focus on decision theory in the context of EPR. In both EPR and the famous Newcomb's problem (NewProb), there are unscreenable-off correlations. I argue that NewProb can be related to EPR, in the sense that a NewProb can be realized by that experiment.
Einstein's 1927 argument for incompleteness A huge literature arose out of the famous ‘EPR’ paper by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935), entitled ‘Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?’. The EPR paper argued, on the basis of (among other things) the absence of action at a distance, that quantum theory must be incomplete. It is less well-known that a much simpler argument, leading to the same conclusion, was presented by Einstein eight years earlier in the general discussion at the fifth Solvay conference (pp. 440ff.). Einstein compares and contrasts two views about the nature of the wave function ψ , for the specific case of a single electron. According to view I, ψ represents an ensemble (or ‘cloud’) of electrons, while according to view II, ψ is a complete description of an individual electron. Einstein argues that view II is incompatible with locality, and that to avoid this, in addition to ψ there should exist a localised particle (along the lines of de Broglie's theory). Thus, according to this reasoning, if one assumes locality, then quantum theory (as normally understood today) is incomplete. The conclusion of Einstein's argument in 1927 is the same as that of EPR in 1935, even if the form of the argument is rather different. Einstein considers electrons striking a screen with a small hole that diffracts the electron wave, which on the far side of the screen spreads out uniformly in all directions and strikes a photographic film in the shape of a hemisphere with large radius (see Einstein's figure, p. 440).