Threshold ring signatures allow a quorum of eligible users to jointly authenticate a message while hiding the identities of the participating signers. Although this combines threshold authenticity with signer-set anonymity, a general T -out-of- N construction may require an expensive zero-knowledge proof to show that any undisclosed T -subset participated. This research investigates whether public structure can be used to reduce the cost of this anonymity statement and whether the resulting construction principle can be generalised across different multi-signature schemes. The first completed contribution introduces structured threshold ring signatures (sTRS), in which the admissible signing sets are defined by a public structure. By representing each complete valid quorum as one candidate set, the anonymity problem is reduced from proving knowledge of an arbitrary hidden T -subset to proving selection of one admissible set among N candidates. This idea is instantiated in LoTRS (CCS'26), our post-quantum sTRS that carefully combines a lattice-based multi-signature derived from DualMS (Crypto'23) with an Esgin et al.-style one-out-of-many proof (IEEE S&P'22). The current research builds on this idea by developing a generic sTRS compiler in which a suitable multi-signature authenticates a hidden admissible signer set, while an extractable one-out-of-many proof hides which set was selected. The subsequent objective investigates a non-interactive sTRS for settings in which additional communication rounds are undesirable.
Threshold ring signatures allow a quorum of eligible users to jointly authenticate a message while hiding the identities of the participating signers. Although this combines threshold authenticity with signer-set anonymity, a general T -out-of- N construction may require an expensive zero-knowledge proof to show that any undisclosed T -subset participated. This research investigates whether public structure can be used to reduce the cost of this anonymity statement and whether the resulting construction principle can be generalised across different multi-signature schemes. The first completed contribution introduces structured threshold ring signatures (sTRS), in which the admissible signing sets are defined by a public structure. By representing each complete valid quorum as one candidate set, the anonymity problem is reduced from proving knowledge of an arbitrary hidden T -subset to proving selection of one admissible set among N candidates. This idea is instantiated in LoTRS (CCS'26), our post-quantum sTRS that carefully combines a lattice-based multi-signature derived from DualMS (Crypto'23) with an Esgin et al.-style one-out-of-many proof (IEEE S&P'22). The current research builds on this idea by developing a generic sTRS compiler in which a suitable multi-signature authenticates a hidden admissible signer set, while an extractable one-out-of-many proof hides which set was selected. The subsequent objective investigates a non-interactive sTRS for settings in which additional communication rounds are undesirable.
Anonymous credential schemes are a key application in modern cryptography. Recent research has advanced these schemes by incorporating issuer-hiding capabilities, which prevent the disclosure of the credential issuer’s identity. While several issuer-hiding anonymous credential schemes exist, none offer resilience against quantum computing adversaries. To address this gap, we propose a post-quantum issuer-hiding anonymous credential scheme, building on the recent work known as ring referral (S&P ’25), which allows anonymous signatures from third-party signers. Ring referral is an integration of ring signature and anonymous credential schemes, enabling issuer-hiding anonymous credentials. In this paper, we present an efficient lattice-based ring referral scheme, which supports quantum-resistant security. Our scheme extends a recent lattice-based credential scheme (CCS ’24) via LNP proof system (CRYPTO ’22).
A novel post-quantum threshold oblivious signature scheme is presented. Oblivious signatures enable a requester to obtain a signature on a single selected message from a set of candidates without revealing the selection to the signer. Unlike blind signatures, the signer may be aware of the candidate set. To mitigate single-point failures the scheme employs Shamir’s secret sharing to distribute signing authority among multiple participants. To address quantum threats, it leverages isogeny-based cryptography founded on the Group Action Inverse Problem for post-quantum resilience. The construction adapts an existing isogeny-based oblivious signature by introducing a trusted dealer. The signing protocol is multi-party; verification confirms signature validity on the selected message without revealing secret information. Security reduces to the hardness of Group Action Inverse Problem and the security of the secret-sharing scheme in the semi-honest model, covering corrupted dealers, users, and coalitions of fewer than the threshold number of signers. The threshold design eliminates dependence on a single signer, preventing unauthorized signatures after key compromise. Theoretical contributions advance threshold cryptography with post-quantum primitives; practical applications include anonymous voting, secure transactions, and privacy-preserving distributed systems. Future directions include malicious adversary models and integrations with other post-quantum primitives.
In cryptography, a ring signature is anonymous as it hides the signer’s identity among other users. When generating the signature, the users are arranged as a ring. Compared with group signatures, a ring signature scheme needs no group manager or special setup and supports flexibility of group choice. However, the anonymity provided by ring signatures can be used to conceal a malicious signer and put other ring members under suspicion. At the other extreme, it does not allow the actual signer to prove their identity and gain recognition for their actions. A deniable ring signature is designed to overcome these disadvantages. It can initially protect the signer, but if necessary, it enables other ring members to deny their involvement, and allows the real signer to prove who made the signed action. Many real-world applications can benefit from such signatures. Inspired by the requirement for them to remain viable in the post-quantum age, this work proposes a new non-interactive deniable ring signature scheme based on lattice assumptions. Our scheme is proved to be anonymous, traceable and non-frameable under quantum attacks.
Blind signatures are a central tool for privacy-preserving protocols. They allow users to obtain signatures from a signer without the signer seeing the signed message. For instance, it enables electronic cash: signatures correspond to coins which can be issued by the bank in a privacy-preserving manner via blind signing. To mitigate the risk of key compromise, threshold blind signatures allow the distribution of the signing key amongst N parties. While recent works have focused on improving the security of this primitive in the classical setting, no construction is known to date in the post-quantum setting. We present the first construction of a threshold blind signature secure in the post-quantum setting, based on lattices. We prove its security under an interactive variant of the SIS assumption introduced in [Agrawal et al., CCS’22]. Our construction has a reasonable overhead of a factor of roughly 1.4 X to 2.5 X in signature size over comparable non-threshold blind signatures over lattices under heuristic but natural assumptions.
In quantum cryptography research area, quantum digital signature is an important research field. To provide a better privacy for users in constructing quantum digital signature, the stronger anonymity of quantum digital signatures is required. Quantum ring signature scheme focuses on anonymity in certain scenarios. Using quantum ring signature scheme, the quantum message signer hides his identity into a group. At the same time, there is no need for any centralized organization when the user uses the quantum ring signature scheme. The group used to hide the signer identity can be immediately selected by the signer himself, and no collaboration between users.Since the quantum finite automaton signature scheme is very efficient quantum digital signature scheme, based on it, we propose a new quantum ring signature scheme. We also showed that the new scheme we proposed is of feasibility, correctness, anonymity, and unforgeability. And furthermore, the new scheme can be implemented only by logical operations, so it is easy to implement.
Lattice-based cryptography is one of the most promising candidates for designing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms that resist emerging quantum computing attacks. The recent NIST PQC standardization process is nearing its completion, with practical lattice-based algorithms for basic cryptographic functionalities (namely digital signature and public-key encryption) selected for standardization in the near future. However, practical lattice-based solutions for more advanced privacy-preserving protocols, in particular, Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs), have only emerged recently and are an active area of research. We discuss some recent developments in design and analysis of practical lattice-based post-quantum ZKPs and their applications. In particular, we review some challenges that arise in designing ZKPs in the lattice setting and some recent progress on efficient lattice-based Schnorr-like proofs for important relations, such as binary/range proofs, one-out-of-many proofs and rounding proofs [1, 2, 4]. We discuss applications and optimization of such proof systems as building blocks for practical advanced cryptographic protocols such as ring signatures and balance proofs for privacy-preserving cryptocurrency payment protocols [2, 3]. We also discuss our recent work on succinct designated-verifier ZKPs (DV-ZKSNARKS) for verifying correctness of general delegated computations [5].